FE files, lot 60 D 330, “Position Papers”
Position Paper Prepared for the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference1
GI D–7a
US Position on Participation in the Indochina Phase of the Geneva Conference
Background
At Berlin, the four Foreign Ministers agreed, so far as the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference is concerned “that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina shall also be discussed at the conference to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, the Chinese People’s Republic and other interested states will be invited.” The four Foreign Ministers did not agree as to what the “other interested states” would be or as to how the invitations would be issued to the participants when agreed.
[Page 482]Timing of Four-Power Agreement on Participants
It is considered desirable that the question of participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference be decided by the four Foreign Ministers at Geneva after April 26. No sentiment has apparently yet developed either on our side or in Moscow for a more rapid solution. (This may well mean that substantive discussion of the Indochina problem cannot begin at Geneva until some weeks after the date scheduled for the Korean discussions.) It is important, however, that US, UK and French agreement as to the position to be assumed be reached prior to the Geneva meeting.
Participation in the Indochina Discussions
Since the definition “other interested states” is extremely vague, there are several possible formulas. The following appear to be the principal ones:
Formula A—Restriction of conference to four inviting powers plus Chinese People’s Republic.
This formula has the obvious disadvantage of a five-power discussion of the Indochina problem and hence is totally unacceptable to the U.S. However, it might conceivably be supported by the French on the basis that it is desirable to prevent Ho Chi Minh’s government from being represented at Geneva. The French would then represent the interests of the Associated States and the Chinese People’s Republic would represent the Viet Minh. Our position should be contrary to such a formula and in favor of one which would include the Associated States as participants at Geneva.
Formula B—Inclusion, in addition to the four Berlin powers plus the Chinese People’s Republic, of the States of Indochina including on our side Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos and on the other side the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (we should resist inclusion of the negligible Communist-controlled nationalist movements in Cambodia and Laos).
This formula has the advantage of being in close approximation to the formula already accepted in the case of Korea since it would involve in addition to the four Berlin powers only those states directly involved in the conflict. It would have the disadvantage that outside of the four Berlin powers and Communist China, there would be no other states participating in both the Korean and the Indochina phase of the conference. This could be taken to mean a partial acceptance of the five-power concept so persistently and unsuccessfully advanced by Molotov at Berlin.
Formula C—Inclusion in addition to the states included under Formula B of others having land boundaries with Indochina, i.e., Thailand and Burma.
This formula would have the advantage of obviating any five-power nucleus for both phases of the conference since Thailand is already included in the Korean phase. Furthermore, the Thai interest in developments in Indochina has been frequently expressed, having almost resulted in a Thai presentation to the UN. The “land boundary” [Page 483] concept seems to offer a good factual limitation on the “interested states” definition. I believe that we could live with the Burmese and that we might in fact reasonably hope that Burmese participation could be useful at Geneva and educational in its end results.
Formula D—Inclusion in addition to the states included under Formula C of a number of other states in the general area of South and Southeast Asia.
Certainly the interest of states in the general area in the restoration of peace in Indochina cannot be denied. There would be included in this formula such friendly countries as the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand (in addition to Thailand) and such neutralist countries as Indonesia and India (in addition to Burma). Pakistan might also be included. This formula would produce an unwieldly conference “cluttered” with neutralists especially India and Indonesia. It would permit countries rejected by us from the Korean phase to be present at Geneva and would undoubtedly therefore produce some of the disadvantages which we are seeking to avoid.
Recommendation
On the basis of the above considerations, Formula C best serves the interests of the U.S. Under this formula, the four Berlin powers, the Chinese People’s Republic, the three Associated States of Indochina, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Thailand and Burma would participate in the Indochina phase of the conference.
- A cover sheet indicated that this position paper was prepared by Bonsal of PSA and that it was revised and approved by the working group on Mar. 23.↩