396.1 GE/3–1354
Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur)
Subject:
- Questions Relating to the Geneva Conference
1. Proposed letter from Secretary to Bidault
Our Paris Embassy is increasingly concerned with the extent to which hopes for finding an Indochina settlement at Geneva are rising in France, with the growing belief that U.S. “concessions” to China will be necessary for such a settlement. Pleven’s most unfortunate briefing [Page 459] of five American correspondents is indicative of the attitude of certain allegedly friendly members of the French Government. If the French Government is not now given clearly to understand the way the U.S. views the Indochina aspects of the Geneva Conference, the situation in Paris can get completely out of hand. Accordingly, it is believed that the Secretary should send a personal message to Bidault.
2. Composition of the U.S. Delegation
The composition of the U.S. Delegation is of great importance for it is manifestly impossible for the Secretary to remain at Geneva for the duration of the Conference. If the Under Secretary is to head the U.S. Delegation at Geneva after the Secretary’s departure, it seems imperative that he be at Geneva with the Secretary from the opening of the Conference. It is also important that the Under Secretary have the best possible support we can give him, and it is suggested that his principal advisers throughout the Conference be Ambassador Dillon, Assistant Secretary Robertson, Ambassador Heath, and presumably Admiral Davis of the Department of Defense. It is recommended that Ambassador Johnson from Prague act as Coordinator and “Chief of Staff” of the Delegation, assisted by Mr. Young (for Korea) and Mr. Bonsal (for Indochina). The foregoing individuals would be supported by lower level advisers from the Department and the field as appropriate (Mr. Gibson of the Paris Embassy should be included in this group).
3. Duration of the Secretary’s stay at Geneva
It is suggested that the Secretary might wish to stay at Geneva for a period of not more than ten days or two weeks. If the Conference develops the way we want it to, beginning with Korea, the Secretary might actually not be at Geneva when the Indochina item comes up. (It is recognized that the French will wish to have parallel discussions on Korea and Indochina from the very beginning of the Conference.) There are advantages in not having the Secretary deeply involved in the Indochina discussions at Geneva. Furthermore, it seems most important because of the hazards and problems connected with Indochina aspects of the Geneva Conference, that the Secretary be in Washington where he could lay before the U.S. Government and congressional leadership, first-hand, certain problems and alternatives which the Geneva Conference may pose. The U.S. Delegation in turn would then receive instructions on the position it should take. In this connection, it would be logical that the Secretary return to Washington if he and the Under Secretary both were at Geneva, since it could be pointed out that they both could not be absent for more than a relatively short period of time.
[Page 460]4. Tripartite Coordination
Both the British and the French have asked our views on preliminary tripartite coordination regarding Indochina. On the one hand, there are disadvantages in beginning tripartite coordination very far in advance of the Geneva meeting. Too early preparation could lead to pressures from the French to get out invitations to participants in the Indochina part of the Conference so that such participants could be at Geneva on April 26. On the other hand, if the French are permitted to develop their own position with respect to Indochina, without benefit of U.S. guidance, we might find ourselves faced with a frozen French position at Geneva with which we could not live and which would in part be based on concessions which France would expect the U.S. to make to Communist China. Also, refusal to have any tripartite coordination could lead the French to adopting a fixed position and then saying we were responsible because obviously France had developed a position and we had been unwilling to cooperate with her and therefore she had been obliged to prepare a position without our advice and views.
In the light of the above dilemma, the following schedule for tripartite coordination is suggested:
- April 15–20, tripartite working group in Paris. The U.S. Principal member would be Ambassador Dillon, with an appropriate deputy and such supporting personnel as necessary.
- April 21, 9 a.m., Secretary and Under Secretary arrive in Paris. Afternoon, tripartite meeting with Bidault and Eden.
- April 22, tripartite meetings of the Secretary, Bidault, and Eden.
- April 23, NATO Council meeting.
- April 24, Proceed to Geneva.