396.1 GE/3–1054
Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur)1
top secret
[Washington,] March 10, 1954.
Subject:
- Meeting at 10: 00 a.m. Thursday, March ll,2 in Room 5104
New State to discuss the Indochina Phase of the Geneva
Conference
I am attaching three papers to serve as guides for our discussion
tomorrow morning:
- Attachment A—A list of five Questions on the Indochina Problem
at Geneva
- Attachment B—A longer list of Questions on Indochina prepared
by Mr. Bonsal
- Attachment C—Possible Advance Tripartite Consultations on
Indochina
I urge each of you to give as much thought as possible to the problems
raised in the attached papers in order that we can obtain maximum
benefit from our exchange of views.
Attachment A
The Problem of Indochina at
Geneva: Some Questions To Be Used as a Guide for
Discussion
- 1.
- What is the U.S. position regarding possible Communist
proposals to:
- a.
- hold a plebiscite in Indochina as the basis for the
formation of a government for the whole country.
- b.
- establish a coalition government which would include
Ho Chi Minh
or his followers.
- c.
- cease fire and establish a demarcation line roughly
along the 16th parallel with the area north of that line
being handed over to the administration of Ho Chi Minh and his
supporters.
- 2.
- What should the U.S. say and do with respect to the French if
the latter are approached by the USSR and/or Communist China
with a proposal to cease aid to the Viet Minh in return for
French support for Chinese Communist entry into the UN or other steps to legitimitize
the Chinese Communist regime?
- 3.
- What should be the U.S. position in regard to the conditions
for a cease fire put forward by M. Laniel on behalf of the French Government on
March 5. (See Paris’ unclassified telegram 3240, dated March
6.3)
As a tactical matter in our efforts to keep the French in
line, if the Laniel conditions are in general
acceptable to us, we might be able to hold the French to
them whereas we might have great difficulty in holding
them to proposals which emanated from
us.
- 4.
- The U.S. may be confronted with a situation where the French
would demand more active U.S. participation in Indochina in
return for their rejecting Communist proposals unacceptable to
us. How far should we go in giving assurances to the French in
such a situation?
- 5.
- How far should the U.S. go at Geneva in committing itself to
substantial contributions to the reconstruction of Viet-Nam,
Cambodia and Laos after the end of hostilities? This might have
an important effect in keeping the Associated States (and
possibly also the French) in line.
Attachment B
Some Questions on the Indochina
Phase of the Geneva Conference
- 1.
- Until we give the French Government our views regarding the
composition and objectives of the Indochina phase of the Geneva
conference, we run the risk of a crystalization of French
attitudes and particularly the making of undesirable commitments
by French leaders to their political followers. What is the
latest date at which we should communicate our thinking to the
French and British?
- 2.
- It is desirable to delay the Indochina discussions at Geneva.
The Secretary envisages a discussion at Geneva among the four
Berlin powers to determine the participants and the method of
issuing invitations
[Page 450]
for the Indochina phase. Can we envisage a date such as June 15
for the start of the Indochina phase of discussions on the basis
that agreement on invitations could be reached early in
May?
- 3.
- Unless we are willing either to make concessions to the
Chinese Communists in certain fields or to take a positive stand
regarding U.S. participation in the struggle, we will achieve no
more through negotiation at Geneva than the Communists believe
the Franco-Vietnamese forces have the capacity and will to
achieve militarily. To what extent do we still believe that the
French and Vietnamese possess the will and the capacity to
achieve decisive results in Indochina in accordance with the
Laniel–Navarre principles in the event
of a breakdown of negotiations?
- 4.
- It is possible that a desirable peace in Indochina could be
obtained in return for concessions in other fields to the CPR and perhaps to the USSR. We are
unwilling to recognize Communist China, to admit the CPR to the UN, to withdraw our support from the Chinese
Nationalists on Formosa or to relax current trade embargoes
against Communist China. Are there any other items desirable by
the CPR or the USSR which we
would be willing to consider as entering into a possible
negotiating position?
- 5.
- It is probable that we could work out with the French and
Vietnamese a minimum acceptable position for a negotiated
cessation of the Indochina war. Such a settlement might include
a cease fire along the lines recently set forth by Laniel,4 general
disarmament of native troops except for Vietnamese troops needed
to maintain order, withdrawal of French Union troops to stated
bases pending conclusion of regular Franco-Vietnamese
arrangements, provision for a transitional period of political
activity looking to eventual elections etc. Such a minimum
acceptable position might be accepted by the enemy if the
alternative were that the U.S. would consider continuation of
hostilities by the Vietminh beyond a certain date as an
aggression warranting “massive retaliatory action” against
Communist China. Would the U.S. be willing to envisage such a
position?
- 6.
- Unless the U.S. is willing to take an affirmative position as
indicated above or unless the French and Vietnamese are willing
and able to carry the Navarre plan to a conclusion, we will be
confronted with a negotiated settlement which will leave the
eight enemy divisions in Indochina undefeated and armed. This
will make it highly likely that the whole area will fall to the
Communists sooner or later. Do we agree that in the eventuality
of this type of negotiated settlement, a
[Page 451]
partition which would turn Tonkin and
northern Annam over to the Communists (a bitter loss of hundreds
of thousands of friends) but would leave Laos, perhaps Cambodia
and southern Annam and Cochin China within the French Union with
French Union air and naval bases (under arrangements similar to
those which we have in the Philippines) would be preferable to
any other arrangement such as a plebiscite or a coalition
government for the entire area?
- 7.
- A willingness on our side to contribute substantially to the
reconstruction of Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos after the end of
hostilities might be an important factor in stiffening the will
to resist of the Vietnamese (and possibly the French) and in
persuading them to adhere to an acceptable negotiating position.
Can we be in a position to make definite commitments at
Geneva?
Attachment C
Possible Tripartite Consultations
Regarding Indochina (in advance of
geneva)
Both the French and the British have posed the possibility of
tripartite consultations in Paris concerning the Indochina phase of
the Geneva meetings. No definite ideas as to timing have been put
forward, this aspect being somewhat complicated as regards the
French because of the current talks with the Viet-Namese.
If it is decided that such consultation should take place, a
tripartite group might begin work in Paris about April 15 with a
view to completing their work in time for the Ministers
consideration when they arrive in Paris for the NATO meeting. This would be Apr.
21–22.
The advantage of such consultation is that it would enable the three
ministers to concert their tactics in advance of the Geneva meeting.
On the other hand, such consultation might result in stimulating the
Indochinese question, when our basic purpose has been to gain as
much time as possible for the military situation to develop in a
favorable manner.
Should we encourage the idea of such consultation or should we
maintain our present relaxed attitude and agree to such consultation
only if the French push for it?
In any event, the opportunity must be found in Paris, prior to the
Geneva meeting, for the Secretary to impress on M. Laniel and M. Bidault in unmistakable terms the
U.S. position with regard to the Indochina phase of Geneva.
