396.1 GE/6–1054: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State


Secto 418. Repeated information priority Seoul 120, Tokyo 123. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

Korean plenary has been scheduled for Friday afternoon.1 UK, New Zealand, Canada and possibly Thailand will speak for our side. Hope also for Spaak and short statement from Garcia.
Thereafter, USDel tentatively plans to lay following tactical recommendations before meeting of 16 Saturday June 12.2 Believe good possibility general acceptance by 16. Communist tactics are the problem.

A. Basic Considerations.

Our tactics should be based on probability that unlike Berlin, the Communists will not agree to any termination formula. They will make major propaganda issue out of our “breaking up” or “wrecking” conference, while they still wish negotiate. They will maneuver to keep Korean phase conference going.
Continued sessions will only renew possibilities for confusing the basic issues, for creating differences among 16, and for propaganda which may have some effect on our respective public opinions. Nothing more can be achieved since Communists have shown no slightest intention to compromise on basic issues.
Therefore, Allies will probably have to terminate conference unilaterally, but on issues which will stand up before world opinion.

B. Preferable Plan.

We should hold no more meetings either plenary or restricted. Such meetings would invite further Communist delaying tactics such as elaboration Nam Il’s point 3.
Representatives 3 Allied inviting powers (US, UK and France) could send joint written memorandum to Molotov informing him, as representative 4th inviting power, that they, and their 13 associates, are agreed that the 2 basic issues on which they insist, i.e., authority of UN and provision for genuinely free elections, have been repeatedly rejected by other side. Therefore, 16 are agreed that further consideration and examination Korean question by conference would serve no useful purpose as long as Communist delegations reject these two basic requirements.

The 16 could issue joint declaration drafted broad terms simultaneously with delivery letter to Molotov. Letter and joint declaration could be issued soon as necessary consultations between delegations of 16 and their governments can be completed preferably by Tuesday June 15.

Eden may wish first see Molotov in attempt obtain his agreement to no further meetings. Some of other 16 would probably support this. This would probably not be successful and in that event we should be prepared promptly to implement foregoing plan. If it is successful, the letter from the 3 on our side could be eliminated.

General outlines of a report to UN by 16 should be agreed to if possible at meeting of 16 June 12, and detailed drafting should be referred to working group of 15 in Washington.

C. Alternative Plan.

As a less desirable alternative to above procedure in event some of 16 insist on another meeting, we should tell rest of 16 we would be willing have one more plenary or one more restricted meeting.
At close such meeting, letter to Molotov would be delivered and declaration of 16 would be issued.
Would appreciate Department’s comments soon as possible.3
  1. June 11.
  2. The meeting of 16 was not held until June 14.
  3. The Department of State’s response was conveyed in telegrams Tosec 396 and 397, June 11, to Geneva, which indicated a preference for the plan set forth in paragraph B2 but stated that there was no objection to the plan in C2 if Smith thought it desirable in order to maintain Allied unity. The Secretary concurred in this judgment. (396.1 GE/6–1054)