396.1 GE/6–154: Telegram

SmithEdenBidault Meeting, Geneva, June 2, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

top secret
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Dulte 138. Eden asked for a private meeting this noon with Bidault and myself. After apologizing for passing out “the usual British bit of paper”, he handed each of us the following, saying at the same time that “British would support the position of France in Indochina and would go along with Americans in Korea”.

[Here follows Part I of the British paper which dealt with Indochina; for text, see page 993.]

“II. Korea.

  • “1. Are we agreed that the next meeting (or two) should be in restricted session, and that we should seek there

    • “(A) To explore the possibilities of further negotiations and
    • “(B) Failing that to agree upon a few general principles?

    Hand over our draft.

  • “2. Do we agree that this move would be preparatory to the winding up of the Korean part of the conference at a subsequent plenary session?
  • “3. Can this idea be pursued further with Molotov and Chou En-lai (and Prince Wan)? What may be said to Chou En-lai tonight?”

[Here follows a portion of the telegram which dealt with discussion of Part I on Indochina; for text, see page 993.]

With regard to Korea, I presented the views of the Department. stating that we had in the question of UN authority a clean-cut issue that would be understood by our own public opinion and that of practically all of our associates. We would not oppose a restricted session, but at this session the first and basic question would be the acceptance or rejection of the UN authority in Korea. None of us felt the Communists, after having taken publicly a firm stand on this matter, would now recede, and that the answer would be that there was rejection on their part of UN authority. The British are extremely [Page 334]unhappy that we cannot follow their suggestion of agreeing upon a few general principles, but their major concern, like ours, is what may happen later in the UN. They do not wish the issue of Communist Chinese participation to be raised in the UN at this time, since they understand our difficulties and desire to avoid a proposal on which we might be voted down. We see in Prince Wan’s suggestion, probably as modified by our own ideas with regard to the inclusion of Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, a formula which might prevent the issue from arising in the UN. Eden will not discuss this with Chou En-lai tonight, as it is not of such urgency as the matter of Indochina. He understands that our final position cannot be arrived at until possibly day after tomorrow.

Smith