396.1 GE/5–3054: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

top secret

Dulte 134. Personal for Murphy.

[Here follows the first paragraph of this message, dealing with Indochina; for text, see page 981.]

We will also within the next two days be squarely up against the final phase of Korea. There are two ways of meeting this issue.

One is to stand and break squarely on the basic issue of the United Nations, without another closed session, and probably with only one more plenary. This presents a clear-cut issue but exposes us to the charge of intransigence and unwillingness even to explore for a few points of agreement in principle.

The second way is to have a closed session and consider the North and South Korean proposals. The result of such a session might be a report to the following plenary that the two sides had been able to agree in principle:

That Korea should be reunited:
That there should be elections in the North and in the South:
That CC and UN troops should be withdrawn;
That both sides agreed that they could not agree on method, timing, supervisory authority, details of procedure, et cetera.

If this were done it would not slam the door entirely and would, I believe, automatically return the problem to the UN, at least as far as we are concerned. It would also avoid the charge of obstruction and intransigence which we are likely to get from Britain and some of the Dominions, particularly India. I recommend it, with some diffidence, as I note my most recent recommendations have not been received with great enthusiasm. But I must know at the earliest possible moment, and [Page 325]certainly before Wednesday,1 which line of action the Secretary considers preferable.2

[Here follows the remainder of the message, dealing with Indochina; for text, see page 981.]

  1. June 2.
  2. On May 31, Smith sent to the Department of State his telegram Dulte 136. marked personal and eyes only for Dulles. It concerned termination of the Conference and related mainly to Indochina: for the text, see p. 992. The brief portion dealing with Korea read:

    “I think we should wind up Korea during the next week or ten days, depending on your decision regarding the two alternative lines of action suggested in my Dulte 134 of May 30 to Murphy, and during this period the senior members of the sixteen will be drifting out. Some have already gone.” (396.1 GE/5–3154)