396.1 GE/5–2554
Memorandum by Arthur H. Dean to the Secretary of State 1
Reference Secto 2802 without reference to effect termination of Korea phase might have on Indo-Chinese phase, following would seem to be optimum conditions for termination of Korean phase.
While we were negotiating the Armistice in 1953, JCS decided we no longer needed to maintain bases on the mainland of Asia and that we were quite prepared with or without phased withdrawal Chinese Communists to withdraw our troops in South Korea down to a corps, while at the same time strengthening ROK army so it could hold in event of attack until we could return.
But since then, the problems we face in Indo-China, location of strategic bombing targets north of the Yalu and uncertainty of availability of Japanese bases make essential re-appraisal of JCS’s opinion of Korea in spring and summer of 1953.
If we are to accept that there is no practical method of getting Communists to withdraw from North Korea short of resuming hostilities, should we not again review whether our real objective is to obtain withdrawal of Chinese Communists from North Korea in consideration of phased withdrawal UN forces from South Korea or whether we are not prepared to accept fait accompli of divided Korea and to decide to stay or not to stay in South Korea solely in our own discretion without necessity of having to withdraw ground troops or air forces pursuant to some definitive schedule under approval of some commission comparable to NNSC.
In view of our possible entry into the Indo-Chinese situation and in view of current conditions in Japan requiring complete review of conditions [Page 318] for use of Japanese bases, and inability without use of force or co-equal phased withdrawal to obtain withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from North Korea, it consequently seems better to recognize, however regrettable, that North and South Korea must remain separated. We must then strengthen ROK forces or at least increase our share of military cost of ROK army operations and enter into program of economic aid designed to alleviate continued severance of North and South Korea.
Assuming allies will agree to a clean-cut break on Korean phase and assuming further Communist rejection Pyun’s proposal, we will have clean-cut method of breaking. The result will in fact give us opportunity of either (a) maintaining military status quo in South Korea indefinitely, or (b) withdrawing ground troops down to a corps in our discretion and maintaining all or part Fifth Air Force in our discretion, without reference to any “phased withdrawal” of our and Chinese Communist armies. Moreover, “phased withdrawal” of Chinese Communist armies does not really solve problem if augmented North Korean Communist armies remain.
If we agree with Prince Wan’s proposal of establishing negotiating body of perhaps seven countries we (a) tend to by-pass the UN, (b) blur the clean-cut nature of Pyun’s proposal and the Communist rejection, (c) afford the Communists a talking point with which to confuse issues and possibly persuade allies to make concessions, and (d) irritate Rhee, possibly leading to South Korean withdrawal from Geneva Conference, thus evidencing lack allied unity.
Against the foregoing we might cite (a) possible inability to get allies to agree to clean-cut break. (b) possible greater publicity value of setting up some continuing body rather than announcing clean-cut break, and (c) greater facilities for airing problem in sixteen than in UN.
After weighing the foregoing, the balance would seem to be in favor of a clean-cut break on the Korean phase and we should therefore attempt to persuade as many of our allies to agree to it as possible. (a) to make the break plausible in world opinion and (b) to get as much support as possible for maintaining the status quo on Korea when the matter comes up in the UN.
Further, we should endeavor to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC, and give wide publicity to the futility of the NNSC, thus undercutting the Communist hints that some such allegedly neutral body, rather than the UN, might be acceptable for working out all-Korean election laws, overseeing all-Korea elections, etc. Once the NNSC has been abolished, we should also explore the legal possibility, because of Communist violations, of freeing ourselves [Page 319] from the restrictions of the armistice, though we have no intention of resuming hostilities.
This series of moves—clean-cut breaking off of the negotiations, abolition of the NNSC, possibly freeing ourselves from the restrictions of the armistice, exchange ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty, implementation of the Van Fleet mission report—by demonstrating a hard position in the Korean situation may help our bargaining position vis-à-vis Indo-China.
This is my thinking before we hear from the Communists on Wednesday3—depending on what they say it may have to be revised.
I am sending copies to FE and UNA requesting they send you their comments.4