396.1 GE/5–2254: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

secret

Secto 280. We have been considering possible alternative methods, and timing, for termination of Korean phase, on assumption continuing impasse.

Method of termination: Delegation continues to believe that at appropriate time Korean phase should be terminated completely and unconditionally. In doing so Allies could make statement of referral problem to UN which in any event would inevitably be considering question, presumably at 9th GA. (Department will recall August 28 Resolution GA already calls for report by Allied side on Geneva Conference.)

Complete break off at Geneva would reflect total lack of agreement and emphasize Commie refusal to accept reasonable proposals. Together with referral to UN it would help maintain UN character of Korean action. It will also contribute to Communist uncertainty re ROK-US military plans concerning Korea. It would avoid giving false impression such as Communists tried to give free Germany that there has been reduction of tension.

Efforts in this direction might get some resistance from Allies, particularly if there has been no agreement on firm Allied proposal on Korea. It may also run into pressure for “second stage” agreements on less than unification such as UK suggested before conference, but there have been no indications as yet of any move in this direction from Allies at Geneva, although Communist statement and Nam Il plan might be interpreted as hinting to some such measures which would formalize the division of Korea.

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Prince Wan has suggested to USDel establishing continuing negotiating body, perhaps seven countries (Big Four, ROK, North Korea, Chinese Communists) to resume negotiations whenever prospects improve. USDel believes this has disadvantages chiefly, it might seem to establish “Big Five” machinery (with Korea attached) as quasisubstitute for UN Security Council where Chinese Communists not admitted. ROK would probably not agree such proposal, though Allies might prefer it as softer way of ending Conference, keeping alive hope and forum for negotiation, and perhaps assisting in keeping Rhee from unilateral action.

Timing: Time of break off might be either shortly after Communists reject new Allied proposal (or if none introduced after probable Commies rejection of Eden principles of May 13.) Alternatively, Korea phase can be continued in slow tempo and minor key pending Indochina developments. Prompt termination would please ROK, remove Korean question as factor which Communists might exploit, in timing as well as substance, in connection Indochina negotiations. It would reduce strain on other delegations who have little to do in Geneva and might also sharpen propaganda effect of rejection of reasonable Allied proposal by Commies. Key Allies however will resist termination at least until Indochina phase clarifies, fearing adverse effect on Indochina. Also, from our point of view, if Indochina phase develops in manner not satisfactory to us it might be desirable to have Korean and Indochina phase end together to improve total effect.

Timing of break off should also take into account Van Fleet mission and post-Conference consultations with ROK.

Delegation tends to believe decision on timing should await clearer picture as to how Indochina is going, and developments in Korea.

Department’s comments and guidance requested.

Smith