396.1 GE/5–1554: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea
priority
80. Repeated information Department Secto 216, priority Tokyo 63. Seoul for Briggs and Dean, Tokyo pass CINCUNC.
- 1.
- Re Tosec 164 repeated Seoul 923 and Tokyo 25321 USDel concurs two suggestions strengthen text and will insert if they will help negotiations with Rhee.
- 2.
-
Re Seoul’s 81 to Geneva (to Department 1178 and Tokyo 6982) second sentence Geneva’s 683 to Seoul based on paragraph three Tedul 524 repeated information Seoul 907 and Tokyo 2481.
Third sentence Geneva’s 68 (sent Washington Secto 182) refers very tentative idea Chinese Communist troops might be withdrawn to agreed areas of concentration in vicinity ports of entry near Yalu while UNC troops would move to concentration areas near our base ports. Washington views not yet formulated on this. Purpose would be insulate foreign forces from election processes to extent possible and would be under observation and verification UN Commission. This [Page 272] tentative idea could be included within wording paragraph five basic proposal.5
In Secto 200 (sent Seoul 74)6 or as revised in Tosec 164. Such arrangements would be developed only if Communists accepted basic principles.
- 3.
- Re Geneva’s 70 (sent Washington Secto 187)7 USDel considers draft basic proposal Secto 200 and plan B Secto 1498 2 different ideas. Plan B is detailed counter proposal. As long as Communists repudiate UN authority, UN supervision and genuinely free elections so categorically at Geneva, 16 have agreed inadvisable proceed with any detailed plan for peaceful unification Korea, particularly since agreement on such plan not yet possible among allies. On basic issues we can be in solid position and have strong case free world opinion as USDel has noted several telegrams. Presentation detailed counter proposal such as plan B would give Communists chance move from defensive to offensive attack and distortion of secondary issues in any detailed plan rather than fundamental issues. Basic principles on other hand do not represent specific plan or concessions bring about unification, but fundamental requirements free and orderly establishment of unification and independence Korea. If 16 could agree on them, particularly on general elections, set of positive principles thus would present to world single position all 16 and determine whether basis exists for subsequent detailed negotiations. If Communists accept principles, negotiations would be necessary on detailed implementation which would be worked out only with ROK concurrence. However 16 consider Communist rejection basic principles most likely. This would achieve political result here of great value in world wide struggle against Communist bloc.
- 4.
- By concessions Pyun seems to mean ROK changing position from proposing elections only in North Korea to accepting general elections with constitutional amendment determine will of people. He also may have in mind some modification ROK position on total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections.
- 5.
- USDel cannot overemphasize importance Rhee’s agreement. It would solidify allied support in many forms for ROK and demonstrate firm unity of 16 which Communists trying to fracture.
- Dated May 14, p. 269.↩
- Dated May 14, p. 268.↩
- Same as telegram Secto 182, May 12, p. 257.↩
- Dated May 10, p. 242.↩
- In telegram Tosec 184, May 17, to Geneva, repeated to Seoul as telegram 928, the Department of State indicated that Defense had rejected the idea of concentration of non-Korean forces in specified areas together with insulation of ROK and North Korean forces along a neutralized zone as being militarily impractical. The Department, therefore, believed that it was inadvisable to go further with the proposal unless developments at Geneva should warrant seeking a reconsideration from Defense. (396.1 GE/5–1554)↩
- Dated May 13, p. 264.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 268.↩
- Dated May 8, p. 230.↩