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  4. Document 137

795.00/5–954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

secret
niact
Seoul, May 9, 1954—midnight.

1139. Repeated information niact Geneva 64, Tokyo 673. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva 50,1 [Page 238] 51,2 58,3 59;4 Department 897,5 898,6 899,7 902,8 903;9 CINCUNC C67984;10 Department of Defense 961278.11 We have reviewed situation here in detail with Van Fleet and McNeil12 and suggested Van Fleet accompany us to put seriousness situation to President Rhee and recommend his cooperation. As alternative volunteered have Van Fleet go alone if he thought that preferable. He has been most generous with time and has given thoughtful consideration to problem but on balance declined and recommended we continue.

We have also reviewed strategy and tactics of our approach to Rhee and invited Van Fleet’s frank criticism. He thinks general line we are following of soliciting Rhee’s complete cooperation on basis of friendship as his ally is best possible approach, and Van Fleet does not recommend threats or ultimatum.

Before you break publicly with ROKs at Geneva and support program of 16 and solicit ROK silence or risk Communist taunts on question of ROK support, all here agree we should approach Rhee again and outline distinct advantages to him for military defense standpoint in event sudden Communist attack of retaining some UN forces until after elections at same time getting him to eliminate specific demand for North Korean surrender or withdrawal.

Had pleasant lunch with President today, Sunday, but decided better not mention problems. Will see him Monday morning. Sorry haven’t delivered so far, but believe auspices reasonably favorable; for example, he expressed to Van Fleet great satisfaction negotiations so far. Will comment greater detail last two paragraphs 897 and subdivision 3, Geneva 58 if necessary following conference tomorrow.

Reference Geneva’s 58, having previously pursuant to cable authority and in order to sell him phased withdrawal told Rhee we would unconditionally bring mutual defense treaty into effect, plan use general tactics outlined 58, but question advisability raising issue of implementation defense treaty unless you so instruct. He does not react well to threats or ultimata or retraction of promises but does to strong, friendly pressure. Van Fleet agrees these tactics. If he were choosing, Van Fleet would stand with Rhee on plan A, rather than go with [Page 239] Allies on plan B, because he considers friendship Rhee here more important than to stand with them. He frankly concedes he is not sufficiently familiar with over-all picture to attempt make decision. We mention this only as indicating his frank thinking. It would be helpful if Pyun and Yang would really wire what they tell you, rather than what they actually wire, including strong criticism Philippine position whom they consider under our domination.

As to UN and UNCURK, believe we can sell Rhee UNCURK for reasons you have advanced.

Statements of Judd13 criticizing omission Nationalist Chinese and ROK from proposed Southeast Asian pact prominently featured here, including criticism inclusion colonial powers. Fully understood reasons for such omission, but might be helpful if we could orient Rhee to your thinking. Could we also orient him on current de-emphasis military aid to Japan, or is this still secret? His apprehensions, based on lifetime struggle for united independent Korea, are: (1) fear of abandonment based on American publicity regarding return on US divisions; (2) fear we plan to use Japan as spearhead; (3) fear UNCURK will give only nominal attention to elections in north because of pressure from remnants of unwithdrawn Chinese Communists and North Korean Communist army; (4) fear his government and Communist aggressors are being put on a parity; (5) fear solid Communist bloc in north will unite with DNP in south against him.

We have found it best to use tactics of partnership with Rhee, rather than to use “or else” tactics, and while former perhaps so far not too successful, hesitate to change at this point.

If we have to unite with 16 allies on plan B (without Rhee) and Communists then turn it down, and we have thereby antagonized Rhee, won’t we be in somewhat difficult position in reference to our practical operations here?

If you disapprove present tactics would appreciate guidance. Will try improve batting average.

Briggs
  1. Same as telegram Secto 127, May 7, p. 218.↩
  2. Same as telegram Secto 128, May 7, p. 220.↩
  3. Same as telegram Secto 149, May 8, p. 230.↩
  4. Same as telegram Secto 150, May 8, p. 231.↩
  5. See footnote 1, p. 222.↩
  6. Dated May 7, p. 225.↩
  7. Same as telegram Tosec 97, May 7, p. 224.↩
  8. Dated May 8, p. 234.↩
  9. Same as telegram Tosec 108, May 8, p. 233.↩
  10. Not printed. This message and the immediately succeeding reference pertained to the work of the Van Fleet Mission in Korea; for documentation, see volume xv.↩
  11. Not printed.↩
  12. W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, was a member of the Van Fleet Mission.↩
  13. Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.↩