Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/5–954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

secret
priority

Geneva, May 9, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 156. Sent priority Seoul 60, repeated information priority Tokyo 38. Tokyo for CINCFE. Comments re Tosec 107, repeated Seoul 902¹ and Seoul’s 59² and 62 to Geneva:³

1. Delegation Geneva considers entirely unlikely allies accept proposal for surrender North Korea Army to ROK and in effect automatic extension ROK sovereignty over North Korea. US would be put in ridiculous untenable position to suggest or support such proposal.

2. Paragraph 1, Secto 149, repeated Seoul 58⁴ gives delegation’s views on proposal Secto 57.⁵ Delegation suggests question now is have we reached this last resort and when should we proceed develop plan B with other 14 and without ROK if, as seems probable, Rhee insists on impossible terms. Believe unrealistic assume ROK can be persuaded or expected remain silent. They will probably take stand along lines Rhee’s views, as Pyun was about to do in plenary last Monday.⁶ This alternative means (a) we reverse our policy of US-ROK collaboration, but we see no alternative if Rhee adheres extreme, unrealistic views and if Pyun is deceiving or completely misleading us here re plan B, and (b) Rhee will end up as appearing be cause for failure of conference, not Communists, which will be major Communist victory.

3. We urge Rhee be faced with choice of (a) presenting united front at conference which fully protects his and ROK position and which will result in Communists bearing responsibility for failure conference; or (b) isolate ROK from allies which will result in relieving Communists of onus for failure of conference. We would, of course, in fact do maximum here avoid such a situation (although we should not tell Rhee this) by attempting obtain all possible support for maintaining present situation in which issues are primarily Communist failure accept UN role and proportional voice of North Korea population, and if possible bring about break-up of conference on these issues.

Smith

1. Dated May 8, p. 234.
2. Same as telegram 1134, May 8, from Seoul, p. 226.
3. Dated May 8, p. 233.
4. Dated May 8, p. 230.
5. The reference is apparently incorrect; it should be to telegram Tosec 97, May 7, to Geneva, p. 224.
6. May 3.