795B.00/5–854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea ( Briggs ) to the United States Delegation


60. Sent Department 1135, repeated information Tokyo 670. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. From Dean for Smith. Reference Geneva’s 50.1 Following preliminary comments for your guidance only; not discussed with Rhee except as previously noted substantively.

Assuming present ROK electoral laws were originally drawn up by UN Commission, would simplify if II E provided such laws were to govern in north. This would eliminate necessity Rhee working with North Korean Communists on new electoral unified law and hence recognizing them as an “authority”.

If change made, make appropriate changes in II F and twice in G.

IV A. Since according to General Mohn, Communists are not using ports of entry in north but are using other ports of entry which NNSC not now free to inspect, he points out such provisions completely inoperative in north as far as we are concerned but provisions bind us to great detail in south with which provisions we are frequently in technical violation.

Would IV D require withdrawal US training forces, educational pilots, technicians, et cetera; and would this prevent investigatory mission such as Van Fleet current one? Realize language must be reciprocal.

II F. Understood freedom of movement from north to south was to be eliminated. In any event this provision cannot come into operation while armistice agreement remains in effect. See particularly movements in and across DMZ.

Since you don’t expect Communists to accept would greatly reduce irritation here if you could use UN or appropriate agency thereof in lieu of UNCURK but in view Washington 8982 suggest leave UNCURK for present.

Assume you consider impracticable make any provision for disarming North Korean Communists as long as ROK forces remain under arms but believe non-provision for this as well as provision for even residual Chinese Communist forces remaining here till after election will continue to be substantial barrier acceptance here since in their minds implies aggressor has right to remain.

Don’t follow why second paragraph D applies more specifically to Chinese than UN forces.

  1. Same as telegram Secto 127, May 7, p. 218.
  2. Dated May 7, p. 225.