396.1 GE/5–754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation1

secret
priority

Tosec 97. Re Secto 127, 128 repeated Seoul 50 and 51 Tokyo 25 and 26;2 Secto 131 repeated Seoul and Tokyo by Department;3 Seoul’s 11274 and 1133 repeated Geneva 54 and 58 Tokyo 665 and 668.5 Re revised draft proposal Secto 127 repeated Seoul 50 Department approves but makes following comments:

  • Para II A. Do not propose change but point out difficulties taking census and holding elections within 6 months. Assume in your thinking that 6 months period sets final deadline for elections despite UNCURK actions but that desirable slightly blur situation.
  • Para II G. Last sentence prefer changing after UNCURK to read “such assistance and facilities as UNCURK may request.” This strengthens UNCURK’s hand.
  • Para IV. Re force withdrawal Department approves formulation. If Rhee agrees Department also much prefers delegation’s tactical suggestion Secto 128 retain previous formulation in first presentation of Plan B to conference then utilize new draft in subsequent negotiations as bargaining factor since troop withdrawal still seems to be primary Communist aim re Korea. Hope therefore Dean and Briggs can persuade Rhee agree this tactic. Defense position this question not available until receipt CINCUNC’s comments expected May 8.

Re Geneva’s 131 and Seoul’s 1133. Defense wishes Van Fleet talk soonest with Dean and Briggs re Geneva Conference and authorizes him cooperate to fullest with them in endeavoring persuade Rhee authorize Pyun support Plan B. In persuading Rhee authorize use first para Secto 131. Pending outcome approach, Department suggests for Seoul and Geneva consideration and comment alternative course action. Dean and Briggs might tell Rhee we endeavor have one or more [Page 225] our allies introduce Plan B. We convinced Communists will promptly reject. Therefore Rhee has nothing to lose if he instructs Pyun say nothing, reserving his position. US would withhold open support temporarily as some our allies have done re proposals made by Pyun and Secretary. If Communists query whether plan acceptable all 16 and especially ROK our public posture will be insist Communists give answer to reasonable proposal and if they willing accept and sign on dotted line that will be fine and we perfectly willing start preparing document for signature. However, we would try avoid this difficulty by having series supporting speakers lined up until one or more Communist side inscribed to speak.

This position clearly undesirable but believe it preferable to abandoning ROK, or having one of our allies put forward proposal which would wipe out constitutional structure ROK, or abandoning conference, which are only alternatives suggested Secto 131.

Request Geneva view possibility stalling at Geneva until middle next week to allow more time for persuasion Rhee to accept Plan B, and Seoul view usefulness this additional time.

Dulles
  1. Also sent to Seoul niact as telegram 899 and repeated to Tokyo as 2455 with the instruction that it be passed to CINCUNC.
  2. Both dated May 7, pp. 218 and 220.
  3. Dated May 7, p. 222.
  4. Printed as telegram 54, May 7, p. 215.
  5. Not printed. It was directed to Geneva as telegram 58, May 7, to inform Smith that Dean and Briggs were seeing Rhee on the following morning in hopes of getting a general statement which would provide the United States with the desired freedom of movement. It was sent in response to telegram Secto 128, which had been repeated to Geneva as telegram 51. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 274)