396.1 GE/5–754: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
priority
Secto 131. For the Secretary. Inability obtain Rhee’s agreement plan B facing us with increasingly difficult situation here. If Rhee’s agreement not obtained shortly we must, in spite our best efforts here, anticipate probability some delegation will come forward with proposal calling for all-Korean elections under UN supervision and simultaneous phased withdrawal foreign forces which will command support from all others on allied side (and I believe, majority US public opinion) facing us with decision whether we continue stand with ROKs on plan A and bring about open break with our other allies. Allies of course recognize that without US-ROK agreement no plan can be implemented, and we will do utmost bring home to them possibilities Communist exploitation such a move on their part would create. However, pressure so strong probably cannot indefinitely continue prevent allied side from putting forward “reasonable” proposal. In any event we can expect virtually no support for breaking negotiations on our present position.
It is probable Rhee estimates by holding out agreement on plan B he can, in light of Van Fleet mission, improve bargaining position for obtaining commitment increased forces. Therefore suggest Van Fleet be instructed discuss situation with Dean and to give Dean full support his negotiations, emphasizing the urgent necessity of submitting reasonable proposal without further delay. Also suggest Hull discuss with Rhee military implications this position on troop withdrawal.
I would also appreciate your instructions tactics we should pursue here if Rhee remains adamant. That is, do we (a) join with other allies in putting forward proposal along lines plan B, facing Rhee with decision as to whether he will at that point walk out of conference, or as we would hope, refrain from public opposition to plan pending Communist reaction, or (b) do we continue stand with ROK on plan A to extent if necessary joining ROK in walkout from conference? I recommend course (a) after informing ROK we cannot stand with them on position which would not receive support from any of our allies, US public opinion, and public opinion elsewhere in free world.1
- In telegram 897, sent niact to Seoul on May 7, the Department of State repeated the text of Secto 131 and asked for Dean’s comments with particular regard to the tactics to be pursued at Geneva in the event that Rhee failed to accept Plan B (396.1 GE/5–754).↩