795B.00/5–754: Telegram
Dean—Briggs—Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 7, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea ( Briggs ) to the United States Delegation
priority
54. Sent Department 1127, repeated information Tokyo 665. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Reference your 44.1 Ambassadors Dean and Briggs saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Minister [Page 216] of Defense, and acting Foreign Minister Cho one hour this morning. On broad general principles outlined as forcefully as possible basic reasons why we should present united plan soonest at Geneva. President seeing General Van Fleet at 2:30 and obviously wants to see what he can get out of him before making any final commitments. Have always stayed on basic principles and have not discussed drafting changes with President. However, they have been so continually insistent on complete and total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces and surrender North Korean Army before elections can be held and complete unwillingness to leave this to determination of UNCURK. We have suggested “such substantial withdrawal” Chinese Communists as in opinion of UNCURK would permit free elections and this morning suggested “such preponderant and substantial withdrawal, et cetera”, but President and Prime Minister rejected all of this as mere phraseology and insisted on unconditional withdrawal. Pointed out on basis of phased withdrawal this would require complete UN withdrawal also before elections. Again President is so positive he is going to get his entire asking price for complete build-up of Korean divisions this does not bother him in slightest and in fact he looks forward to day. He spoke with great bitterness fact he had not been allowed to move because we had locked up “ammunition and gasoline”. He is basically and fundamentally unreconciled to armistice and to its inconclusive nature and spoke with great fervor on that subject.
He insists constitution does not permit him to agree to hold elections for Assembly immediately after the impending May 20 elections for National Assemblymen four-year term. He also insists he has no right to agree to hold new elections for President and claims that his idea of plebiscite in all Korea by people is correct after elections in north.
We pointed out constitution could be amended by two-thirds National Assembly and suggested he undertake to recommend to National Assembly that the constitution could be amended to permit elections desired.
Prime Minister and Defense Minister strongly objected on grounds if such elections held in south would cause consternation and confusion and insisted Communists would argue they had forced Rhee’s abdication and that ROK Government though sovereign, had been placed by Geneva on par with Communists.
Reference fifth paragraph subdivision (1) your 44, until elections are held under Plan B in north and south, North Korean Communist [Page 217] Government there remains in power in north and must adopt electoral laws requested by UNCURK. Rhee takes violent exception to this. Further if free elections are held President repeatedly asks me if I can guarantee present ROK Government will be returned to power and Rhee elected President.
After President had turned me down flatly, at least six times, we again urged interest US–ROK relations he cooperate with allies to present something at Geneva we regard as fundamental. He still bitter against Casey’s speech and Philippines proposal and past critical reports of his government by UNCURK and every time UNCURK mentioned he objects and insists on UN.
Would it be appropriate to use some such language as “United Nations or appropriate commission thereof” in order to avoid specific use of UNCURK?
My suggestions wording Plan B were in response for request for them but unless specifically noted in cables have not discussed them with Rhee.
At conclusion my strong plea for action President asked me to put suggestions in writing and to send them over. President also asks if he did agree to what we were requesting whether I could promise in writing there would be no further demands for concessions of any kind and if he would get build-up ROK Army he desires; I of course replied had no such authority and question ROK Army entirely within province General Van Fleet.
They are extremely allergic to first sentence IV Plan B and if we do agree complete withdrawal before elections this would of course disappear.
They cannot understand why having supported them on Plan A we are now moving to Plan B in order to achieve unity at Geneva when we do not believe Communists will accept Plan B. All efforts to persuade them essential to preserve unity of free nations have fallen flat. President extremely bitter about our announcement proposed Southeast Asia pact against Communists which includes European nations but excludes Korea and Nationalist China. He considers we stole his idea and then left him out and are including weak sisters and colonial powers.
Would appreciate instructions soonest and whether Defense clearance mentioned Washington 893 subdivision 42 obtained.