Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

795.00/5–554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

secret
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Washington, May 5, 1954—8:32 p.m.

893. For Dean and Smith from the Secretary. Re Seoul’s 1119 repeated Geneva 48 Tokyo 659.²

1. Congratulate Dean and Briggs on excellent progress in most difficult task.

2. Express to President Rhee personal appreciation Secretary for his cooperation and for time and effort he is devoting these questions.

3. Assume agreed draft Seoul’s 1119 would be Rhee’s instructions to Pyun and would not be incorporated in draft Plan “B” except as position stated would require certain changes in draft Plan “B”.

4. Language in agreed draft paragraph 1 together subsequent discussion seems indicate Rhee might agree withdrawal US and other UN forces as well as Chinese Communist forces if both accomplished before elections. We do not believe feasible propose withdrawal Chinese Communist forces only although recognize logic and force Rhee’s comments as reported Seoul’s 1115³ and 1119. Withdrawal both Chinese Communist and UN forces probably wipes out armistice which may not be unbearable for us in view NAC [MAC?] and NNSC difficulties and fact armistice is not the real sanction against renewal aggression. Withdrawal all non-Korean forces of course raises possibility Communists would stall all further implementation elections once they have secured their primary objective which is withdrawal UN forces. It might help Rhee’s problem somewhat if Section IV Plan “B” were changed to require withdrawal most non-Korean forces before elections take place. If necessary we might also consider possibility total withdrawal before elections which would have distinct propaganda advantage. This position not cleared by Defense. Clearance being sought. Will notify soonest.

5. No objection to substituting UN for UNCURK supervision elections and making appropriate changes in draft of Plan “B”.

6. Language at beginning agreed draft paragraph 2 seems apply more specifically Chinese Communists than USSR but we have all along insisted USSR should also be one of guarantors of Korean independence and territorial integrity and draft Plan “B” meant make that clear. Perhaps Section V draft Plan “B” as amended according our suggestion should be further amended to make pledge effective at once.

7. Troubled by language re elections in agreed draft paragraph 2 since it seems imply ROK would run elections with only some minor observation UNCURK-style by UN rather than supervision. Unless Dean certain agreed draft means essential acceptance draft Plan “B” by Pyun and Yang at Geneva he should attempt secure appropriate modification conformity Plan “B”.

8. Re Mutual Defense Treaty. Know of no proposal, suggestion or discussion leading to amendment except press report in Seoul’s 1107.⁴ You may tell Rhee we expect bring Treaty into effect near future by exchange ratifications Washington. It is impracticable to amend Treaty as this would require resubmission to Senate and almost certain delay until next session. Therefore urge Dean and Briggs discourage ROK making any such proposals.

Dulles

1. Also sent to Geneva as telegram Tosec 81 and repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2434 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
2. Dated May 5, p. 205.
3. Same as telegram 45, May 5, from Seoul to Geneva, p. 202.
4. See footnote 2, p. 206.