396.1 GE/5–454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea ( Briggs ) to the Department of State


1108. Repeated priority USDel Geneva 40. For Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva’s 32,1 following very preliminary comments:

In view our 382 you may wish define “foreign”. If procedures as to NNSC under armistice agreement followed, will UNCURK really be allowed supervise withdrawal Communist troops? In interview Dean had with General Mohn last Friday, who succeeded Grafstrom on NNSC, Mohn strongly recommends NNSC’s complete abolition under armistice agreement on account its complete unworkability and complete refusal Communists respect any wording except in highly uncooperative technical sense defeating intended meaning [Page 195] and hence enormous advantage Communists have with their inspections over US who live up to spirit in south.
In view our 38 should we amplify “necessary conditions?”
2. [II] B.
Should there be same length of home residence required in one part of Korea as other? What will be definition of “citizens?” Will Chinese Communist immigrants into North Korea be citizens? Will Communists who are not pardoned by ROK be counted as citizens et cetera; namely will ROK decrees depriving Communists of citizenship be recognized for voting purposes?
2. [II] F.
Does freedom of movement mean Communists in North Korea can freely come South during elections? Suggest adding freedom to file petitions without molestation or police intimidation of signers, affording proper police protection for meetings. How large do you envisage UNCURK forces in North at time of elections will really be before complete withdrawal Communist forces? Who will house and feed them?
4. [IV]
Is not “both sides” hold over from armistice as will be only one all-Korean Government?

Will not Korean Communist forces have to be disarmed and ROK forces recognized as only legitimate army in all of Korea after organization all-Korean Government?

Mohn ridiculed to me “ports of entry” in armistice agreement and said everything came through other nondesignated ports with no way for NNSC to supervise so might as well rely on Communist good faith, since their ability to inspect our honest records in South gave them tremendous intelligence advantage and therefore we are really kidding ourselves about advantage in North of having any so-called neutral agency do checking.

Do you still plan on recommendation (C) of 7 October, 1950 about cooperation of representative bodies in view previous Communist experience this regard?

Also refer you to recommendation (D).

In II B. presume you mean “X” representatives to “Y” population and not technical system of proportional voting designed to give minorities a voice—would spell out a little more.

II E [D], Actual voting can be in secret but if Chinese Communist troops not withdrawn voters can be intimidated at homes before voting or threatened or kept from polls or roughed up afterwards so fear may keep many from voting or may sway their vote. Difficult for temporary commission to have much effect.

II E. Who will appropriate authorities be before elections? Will law of North Korea be co-related with those of South Korea before elections?

[Page 196]

II F. With government controlled press and radio doesn’t mean much.

II G. This requires collaboration between ROK and Communist North Korean authorities with Rhee recognizing latter for this purpose before elections.

III B. What is meaning “constituent”?

IV. Will be extremely difficult to govern North for a year if Chinese Communist forces are to remain there. In this period what do you visualize relation of present North Korean forces will be?

V. Would unified Korean Government be free to adopt mutual defense pact with US and one or more treaties of alliance with USSR and her satellites now in effect with North Korean Government?

VII B. Would this require US to give up bases and right to station troops under defense pact—in other words unified government won’t be free to extend bases to US as in Spain, Holland, et cetera.

  1. Dated May 2, p. 178.
  2. Supra .