Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/5–152

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, 1 May 1952.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On March 5 the National Security Council called for the preparation of a Report on the United States Courses of Action in Southeast Asia to counter continued deterioration of the existing situation in the absence of identifiable Communist aggression.¹ Thereafter, we were handed informally a State Department draft dated March 27 dealing with the Indochinese section of the National Security Council Report.² This has been given careful consideration within the Defense Department.

There appears to be some difference in point of view between our two Departments and it seems to me that it might be useful for us to sit down together to canvass the situation and to see whether we cannot agree on the general lines of a policy.

In order that you may know in advance the direction which our thinking is taking on this question, I am enclosing memoranda which I have received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Secretaries, together with a memorandum which is intended to set out in outline form an affirmative counterproposal.

I am sure you will agree with me that under present circumstances we should tackle the Southeast Asian problem urgently, and reach an early decision in the National Security Council. I believe that an early discussion between us would contribute to that objective.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret

Washington, 18 April 1952.

Subject:

• Department of State Draft Paper on “Indochina”.

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum. dated 4 April 1952,³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the Department of State draft paper, dated 27 March 1952, on “Indochina”, which was attached thereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, have no objections to the broad recommendations in this Department of State draft paper. They would point out, however, that these recommendations do not offer a new approach to the solution of the problems of Indochina; rather, the paper suggests certain variations in methods together with an unspecified increase in the scope and pace of the courses of action now being implemented under current United States policies. Consequently, the degree of success to be anticipated from these extensions of present policy will in a large measure depend upon the promptness and vigor with which they are prosecuted. In connection with the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request opportunity to comment in advance of decision involving any marked changes in methods of implementation of military measures for Indochina.

2. It is noted that whereas current policy for Indochina (NSC 48/5)⁴ includes promotion of international support for the three Associated States, subject paper does not include the promotion of such international support among its recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that such efforts should be continued and intensified, and further that, if a United Nations flavor can be achieved for such support, the stigma of colonialism attached to unilateral efforts might in some degree be removed.

3. While agreeing that introduction of U.S. armed forces into Indochina might occasion overt Communist Chinese intervention, and also that this is otherwise undesirable as a U.S. course of action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that naval and air forces could be employed in the general vicinity without incurring the disadvantages which would attend the introduction of ground forces. Any Western show of force would in some measure offset the psychological advantage on the Communist side which is inherent in the relative nearness and armed strength of Communist China. For this reason, and in view of the dependence of the countries of Southeast Asia on the sea, the presence of U.S. naval forces could have an important effect as a deterrent to the internal spread of Communism.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while in agreement with the conclusion in subject paper that on balance it appears probable the French will continue the effort to maintain their position in Indochina, would suggest, nevertheless, that consideration be given to U.S. courses of action in the event of voluntary French withdrawal.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, would suggest the following changes to the Analysis of the subject paper:

a. Delete the second sentence in the first part of subparagraph a under the heading Importance of Indochina, which reads as follows:

“It is also generally accepted that in case of Communist occupation of Tonkin there is no other militarily defensible position for the West north of the Isthmus of Kra.”

Reason: The statement is too categorical inasmuch as there are other military positions in the relatively extensive area between Tonkin and the Isthmus of Kra where under various circumstances resistance could be offered.

b. Change the last sentence of the second part of subparagraph a under the heading Importance of Indochina, to read (changes indicated in the usual manner):⁵

“It is possible therefore that in spite of the theoretical military defensibility of Malaya at the Kra, the loss of Indochina would in fact could lead to the loss to the Communist bloc of the entire Southeast Asia mainland, and eventually Indonesia as well.”

Reason: What the loss of Indochina may lead to is conjectural rather than factual. The statement is therefore too categorical. Once French Indochina fell, Thailand would, in all probability, accept Communist domination. The threat to Malaya would be greatly increased if Thailand fell. A defense of Burma by the British would still be possible, particularly if India were willing to furnish forces. Such a defense, however, would be much more difficult after French Indo-china and/or Thailand had fallen. If Thailand had fallen, Malaya and Burma would have to be defended simultaneously.

c. Change the last three sentences of the second paragraph under the heading Considerations Affecting U.S. Assumption of Increased Responsibility for Indochina, to read (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“On the other hand achievement of stability by the Associated States would mean, in effect, the elimination of the Vict Minh and the establishment of anticommunist and Western oriented states on the southern border of Communist China and might also face the United States with a choice between use of its own armed forces or abandonment of the area to Communist control. It is doubtful whether the Chinese Communist would believe that they could afford to permit such a development. There would therefore be continuing real danger of Chinese Communist armed intervention in the event that U.S. courses of action in Indochina appeared to be leading to defeat of the Viet Minh.”

Reason: This is a negative approach which would preclude accomplishment of U.S. objectives toward Indochina. In any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider the situation in the case of French Indochina to be analogous to that in North Korea to the extent that danger of defeat of the Viet Minh forces will necessarily lead to intervention by the Chinese Communists.

d. Change subparagraph a under the heading U.S. Objectives to read (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“Enable the French to continue to fulfill French responsibilities for Indochina without sacrificing with minimum acceptable delay in development of French strength under NATO;”

Reason: The qualification with respect to French responsibilities for Indochina should be related to time rather than to progress in the development of French strength under NATO; otherwise, French replacements or new forces for Indochina, either routine or to prevent imminent disaster, might be withheld inasmuch as their dispatch might conceivably sacrifice in some degree the development of French strength under NATO.

e. Change subparagraph (d) at the end of the section of the paper under the heading U.S. objectives as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“(d) Consistent with the achievement of U.S. over-all objectives in Indochina, minimize possibilities of Chinese Communist intervention.”

Reason: In order to make it plain that U.S. objectives toward Indochina are not to be abandoned merely because of a possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. In any event; the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it may become necessary, in the security interests of the United States, to take a calculated risk with respect to Communist China.

f. Change the first part of the first sentence under the heading Possible U.S. Courses of Action as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“The courses of action which the U.S. might consider following to maintain improve the Franco-Vietnamese position in Indochina and to prevent deterioration of that position include-the following:”

Reason: In the context of this sentence the word “position” may refer to the military posture of the French Vietnamese or to their position on the ground. In either case, it would not be sufficient from the United States military point of view for the Vietnamese to maintain a static posture or position. The transposition of the word “following” is in the interest of clarity.

g. Change the penultimate sentence in subparagraph a under the heading Possible U.S. Courses of Action to read (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“Steps might should be taken to strengthen the MAAG Mission.

Reason: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are unaware of any cogent requirement for the strenghtening of the MAAG Mission to Indochina at this time. Such strengthening may become necessary in connection with increased assistance to that country.

h. Change the second sentence in subparagraph d under the heading Possible U.S. Courses of Action to read (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“It must be estimated that the Chinese Communists have the same sensitivity about their southern border as they have demonstrated in the case of Manchuria and it is probable possible therefore that the intervention of U.S. armed forces in Indochina would might occasion a full-scale Communist military intervention.”

Reason: The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider the situation in the case of French Indochina to be analogous to that in North Korea to the extent that intervention of United States armed forces in Indochina would occasion a full-scale Chinese Communist intervention. They believe this to be a possibility rather than a probability.

i. Add a new sentence as follows at the end of subparagraph d under the heading Possible u.s. courses of action:

“In this connection, however, an occasional naval and/or air show of force in the general vicinity of Indochina might be advantageous.”

Reason: For completeness.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army (Pace), the Secretary of the Navy (Kimball), and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force (Gilpatric) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] 8 April 1952.

Subject:

• Draft State Department Paper on Indochina dated 27 March 1952.

1. We are not favorably impressed by the draft statement on Indochina. It is apparent that the recommendations offer little more than an expectation of preserving the status quo. It is our opinion that a continuation of the current program is an expression of a sit tight philosophy without definitive goals. The mere fact that the loss of Indochina is a bleak prospect does not justify the continual restatement of negative postulates which result in more and more dollars being poured into an uninspired program of wait and see.

2. Accepting the premise that Indochina is the key to Southeast Asia and must be kept secure from Communist influence, it is our opinion that any decision to increase economic or military assistance must be thoroughly analyzed in terms of costs, capabilities and end results. We suggest that such an analysis should include consideration of a dynamic program geared to produce positive improvement in the military and political situation.

3. Any analysis of Indochina brings out the point that the out-phasing of French influence is essential to the emergence of efficient leadership which can unite all factions into a cohesive national government. On the other hand, the continuation of French military responsibility is, at least under present circumstances, essential to the preservation of internal security. The solution of the Indochina problem lies in concentrating on a resolution of this issue.

4. We suggest, therefore, that an analysis of increased economic and military assistance costs and capabilities should include consideration of a program whereby an expanded MAAG would undertake the training and equipping of a national army capable at least of preserving internal security, while international support, encouragement and cooperation is sought and brought to bear in developing Indochinese political self reliance and independence. In order to institute political reform, encourage the development of a sense of civic responsibility, and arouse enthusiasm and cooperation among the Associated States, such a program would be initiated only after an unequivocal declaration by the French of their intent to withdraw from Indochina at the expiration of a specified period. The program would be similar in concept, although not necessarily in scope, to that staged in Greece and Turkey. The prerequisites to its undertaking would be threefold:

a. It must be economically and militarily feasible from the U.S. point of view.

b. The French must approve and agree to cooperate fully with the U.S. and the Associated States and to continue military support to Indochina until the date set for the project’s completion.

c. The Associated States must approve and agree to full support and cooperation with the combined U.S.-French effort.

While admitting the economic, political and military imponderables of such a program we believe that a dynamic approach offers possibilities that are considerably in excess of the current program.

• Frank Pace, Jr.
• Dan A. Kimball
• Roswell L. Gilpatric

[Enclosure 3]

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense⁶

[Washington,] April 3, 1952.

A Cold War Program To Save Southeast Asia For The Free World

the problem

To consider what measures should be taken by the United States to counter continued deterioration of the situation in Indochina in the absence of identifiable Chinese Communist aggression.

assumptions

1. That the military courses of action to counter Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina set forth in NSC 124⁷ will be approved by the National Security Council.

2. That the most likely threat to Indochina and Southeast Asia is from a continuation of present deterioration of the Western position in that area without overt Communist intervention.

3. That the loss of Indochina and Southeast Asia would be unacceptable to the United States.

4. That, in view of the above, the United States would be prepared to make as great an effort to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia in the Cold War as to counter an overt aggression in that area.

discussion

As pointed out in NIE 35/1,⁸ the critical financial situation of France is causing increasing concern over France’s ability to maintain its position in Indochina and to support simultaneously its projected military effort in Europe. There are increasing indications that, at a later date, this situation will adversely influence France’s will to continue resistance in Indochina.

It is even more probable that, in the long run, the rising tide of Asian nationalism will make it impossible or too costly to preserve Indochina as a conspicuous remnant of western colonialism in the Far East. The concessions which the French have already made, while far from satisfying native demands for independence, have probably carried the evolution away from colonialism past the point of no return.

It is essential in the present situation to keep French military power in Indochina as a shield against the imminent threat of Communist encroachment. Immediate French withdrawal would present the United States with the alternative of accepting the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism or assuming a major new commitment of our own military power. However, seen in the perspective of time, the problem for U.S. policy is not to keep the French indefinitely committed in Indochina, but to facilitate the inevitable transition from colonialism to independence in such a way that there is no opportunity for Communism to flow into an intervening power vacuum.

The essence of the problem which a United States program must meet is to utilize the forces which will be released by a firm promise of the withdrawal of French control, together with such assistance as the free world can supply, in proper phase with the program of French withdrawal so that the stability of the area will be increased rather than decreased. There are three basic elements of such a program:

(1) A French commitment to give the three Associated States effective independence within a reasonable period in such form and with such guarantees as to carry full conviction.

(2) An international program, preferably under the United Nations, designed to put an end to the civil war, to protect the three states from Communist aggression and subversion, and to aid and support them during the transition period.

(3) A French commitment to continue to defend the area during the transition period.

The French now maintain that the Associated States have already been given their independence. However, the actual relationship between the French and the governments of the Associated States, and the nature of the present native governments, has not been such as to convince a majority of the Indochinese or other Asian peoples that independence is yet a reality. There have been encouraging signs of evolution in the direction of a greater measure of independence. However, in order to obtain the fullest measure of native cooperation in the effort to resist Communist encroachment, and in order to obtain the support of a sufficient number of other Asian nations in any contemplated UN action, it will be necessary to remove whatever grounds remain for continued suspicion of French intentions.

Prior to any decision to place the matter before the United Nations, the United States should point out to the French the necessity for a statement designed to accomplish this purpose. Such a statement should include a commitment that as soon as the military situation permits, France will withdraw its forces from Indochina, the French Union relationships will be renegotiated on a more liberal basis, and the Indochinese states will be free to choose whether or not to remain in the French Union. Assurance of genuine independence for the peoples of Indochina, and removal of the bugbear of Western imperialism would enable the Indochinese people and their neighbors in Southeast Asia to focus their efforts on the social, economic, political, and military measures necessary to erect a stable bulwark against Communist encroachment. Such assurance would not only go far toward providing the motivation and dynamism which has been lacking under the existing Associated States regimes, but would, at the same time, seriously weaken the Viet Minh. For the latter, while undoubtedly organized and led by orthodox Communists, depends for its popular support, and for the recruitment of manpower into its armed forces, on nationalist anti-colonial sentiment rather than on Communist ideology.

The U.S. should also point out that, in addition to such a commitment, certain steps should be taken now designed to win increasing support and cooperation for the native governments and the prosecution of the civil war, recognizing that the implementation of these measures will necessarily be limited by the exigencies of the military situation and the ability of native personnel to carry out the administrative tasks. Such measures might include:

(1) Ease restrictions on freedom of press and association, and encourage the development of popular and responsible political organizations.

(2) Convene a Vietnamese National Assembly. Such an Assembly would have to be appointed initially, but with the understanding that elections will be held when feasible.

(3) Encourage the establishment of a broader-based government in Vietnam which would include genuine Nationalist elements, Cao Daiists, Dai Viets, and a larger proportion of Tonkinese.

(4) Furnish assistance to the native governments in training administrative personnel, improving administration, eliminating corruption, and establishing an independent judiciary.

(5) Furnish guidance and assistance to the native governments in the development and presentation of a popular program of social and economic improvement, to include land reform, elimination of economic privileges, and adequate and equitable taxation, such a program to be based on a published annual budget.

(6) Weed out unreconstructed colonialists from key positions in the Army and the civil service in Indochina, and institute a vigorous indoctrination program designed to improve the methods of French officials and French troops in dealing with the native population.

Having thus given convincing proof of its intention to give full independence to the Associated States, France would be in a strong position to place the Indochina question before the United Nations. It could then be shown that the independence of the Indochinese peoples from France had been assured and that the only obstacle in the way of the full achievement of that independence was the continuing threat of Communist subversion or aggression. The next step would be to establish a UN Commission to study the situation in Indochina and make recommendations for ending the civil war and facilitating the transition to full independence. Such a Commission might be composed of representatives of the United States, UK, France, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the other states of Southeast Asia. Chinese representation on such a committee would undoubtedly present a difficult problem. In addition to its primary function, such a committee would be useful in making appropriate findings of fact in the event of subsequent Chinese Communist intervention.

A program under UN auspices could be carried out only if the French continued to provide the necessary military protection to the Indochinese states during the period of transition. The final renunciation by France of all colonial interests in Indochina would inevitably result in strengthening the opposition in the French public and the French General [National] Assembly to continuing appropriations for the Indochina war on the present scale. French business interests, which have hitherto supported the war, might react strongly against any loss of their economic privileges in Indochina. It may be possible, however, to preserve majority support in the Assembly for continuing to maintain the French military forces in Indochina during the transition period, provided that France were afforded sufficient relief from the economic burden. This would require the United States to assume an even larger share of the burden than it is now carrying.

There are several means by which this could be done within the limits of whatever program (Fiscal Year 1952 or 1953) is in effect at the time:

1. Accelerate deliveries of presently programmed equipment to Indochina. (The review of the munitions allocation system directed by the President’s letter of 9 January 1952⁹ will undoubtedly result in accelerated deliveries).

2. Transfer to the Indochina program aid now earmarked for other recipients in Title III (Formosa, Philippines, Thailand).¹⁰

3. Subject to authorization by the President, transfer military funds from Titles I, II and IV up to a maximum of 10 percent (providing the 10 percent transfer authorization remains in the new legislation). (Funds obtained as in 2 and 3 above could be used to provide either hard or soft military goods).

4. If emergency considerations required, military goods and logistical support could be provided from the appropriations of the military departments, subject to the department’s obtaining reimbursement by supplemental appropriation from the Congress.

If funds obtainable by the above measures were found to be insufficient, supplemental appropriations could be sought to make possible increased economic and military aid to France and to the Associated States.

The measure of success of an international program of the kind envisaged would be the extent to which the French forces could ultimately be disengaged and replaced by native armies. The mobilization, equipment, and training of the armies of the Associated States is therefore the most critical element of the program.

At the present time, there are four Vietnamese divisions in training, with two more scheduled to be formed in 1953, and an ultimate objective of eight. The United States is now furnishing the military equipment for these forces, and the French are assisting in their training. While certain Vietnamese units have already performed creditably in combat, experience indicates that two to three years would be an optimistic estimate of the time required to make the Vietnamese army into an effective independent fighting force. The development of competent leadership is the key limiting factor.

The legacy of popular animosity toward the French undoubtedly constitutes a handicap in the training of native troops under French guidance. Provision of a United States military training mission to the Associated States armies would eliminate this handicap. However, this advantage would have to be weighed against the difficulty of substituting an entirely new organization for one that is already a going concern. Language might also constitute a serious problem, since French is widely spoken in Indochina, and English is not.

The ultimate phase-out of French forces should be planned in such a way as to afford the maximum benefit at the earliest possible time to France’s NATO contribution. It may be desirable to leave a residue of training personnel, headquarters staff officers, technical specialists, and perhaps Foreign Legion units after the bulk of French forces are withdrawn.

After the withdrawal of French forces, it will probably be necessary for outside military assistance to be continued for some time in order to ensure the maintenance of adequate armed forces by the Associated States. An army of eight divisions would be beyond the economic capacity of Vietnam to support on a long-term basis. Since it would never be possible for the Indochinese states to match the military potential of China, their defense against Chinese aggression will always be dependent upon international guarantees. Therefore, the long-term mission of the armies of the Associated States will be (1) to maintain internal security, and (2) to make at least an initial show of resistance against any Chinese Communist aggression. The degree to which the mission of internal pacification is accomplished prior to the French withdrawal will thus determine the size of the native armies and the amount of outside assistance which will subsequently be required.

1. Reference is to NSC Action No. 614 of Mar. 5, which is described in footnote 5, p. 80. For additional documentation on interdepartmental consideration of the problem of the defense of Southeast Asia, including information on the evolution of the NSC 124 series on U.S. objectives and courses of action with respect to Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, see the compilation on general U.S. policies with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area in volume xii.
2. For the State Department draft, see p. 82.
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. For text of NSC 48/5, “United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” dated May 17, 1951, and approved by the President the same day, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 33.
5. I.e. deletions struck through; additions underscored.
6. This memorandum apparently represented the views of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; for comments upon this memorandum, see memorandum by John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to the Secretary of State, May 7, infra.
7. NSC 124, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia,” Feb. 13, 1952, is printed in volume xii.
8. For NIE 35/1, Mar. 3, see p. 53.
9. A copy of the letter is in the Truman Papers, PSF–General file, at the Truman Library.
10. Reference is to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165, 82d Cong. (65 Stat. 373), Oct. 10, 1951.