Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/3–2552

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 25, 1952.

Subject:

• Comments on British Memorandum of March 15, 1952² Concerning Indochina (for use in conversations with British Ambassador).

As it is expected that the British Ambassador will call on you this week with reference to the British memorandum of March 15, 1952 concerning Indochina, the following comments are submitted for your guidance

1) Weakening of French determination to continue to fight in Indochina.

We do not believe the current British concern regarding French intentions in Indochina is justified. The statements of M. Letourneau which are quoted in the memorandum have since been superseded by other formal declarations made by the same gentleman in his capacity as Minister of Associated States in the newly constituted Pinay Government. In a press conference on March 12th he stated that:

• “a. Ho Chi Minh is too important in the Communist game to remain alone. There can be no illusions on this subject. If our enemies, through exhaustion or weariness, ask for peace one day, France, in agreement with the three Indochina States, would obviously not refuse to examine conditions under which it might be considered. This hour has not come.
• “b. If the situation is not in itself satisfactory, it has clearly improved over past year.
• “c. My visit in Indochina was prolonged in order to make known that France was not changing and was remaining there. The Indochina problem henceforth ‘overlaps’ world policy. France must face the duties she has assumed in order to keep the confidence of not only the French Union but also of her allies. There is no question of choice between the problem of Indochina and that, of Europe.”

It is therefore,

Recommended, that you inform the Ambassador that we believe that these statements appear to be designed to appease the concern regarding Indochina which has been evident in both French and foreign circles in recent months and to which the British memorandum refers. Our Embassy in Paris reports that Letourneau’s declarations can, in their opinion, be accepted at face value and that there can be no thought of French withdrawal from Indochina at the present time or in the near future. Finally, reference should be made to M. Letourneau’s recent visit to London (March 18th) when he conferred with Lord Reading³ and about which Sir Oliver is doubtless fully informed. On that occasion he is said to have attempted to dispel any British fears concerning present French intentions in Indochina. The Ambassador might be queried on this point.

2) Recent Contact of French Representatives with Viet Minh Representatives in Indochina; Russian Mediation in Indochina War; French Approach to Chinese Legation in Bern.

…We do know that it was reported that M. Sainteny,⁴ a former French Colonial official who had close relations with Ho Chi Minh in 1945–6, is said to have been in Vietnam recently for the purpose of making contact with Ho’s representatives but we have no proof of this fact. If any of the allegations are correct we would be obliged to revise our present conclusion that French intentions in Indochina are actually as claimed and review our present Indochina policy entirely. It is,

Recommended, that Sir Oliver be informed as above and told that we would be gratified to know if the British Government has proof of any of these allegations.

3) Negotiation with Ho Chi Minh, from weakness, brought on by French financial situation.

It is our opinion that the French will stay in Indochina providing they have two assurances: (a) That the US will continue to meet the French budgetary deficit or that portion of it caused by the Indochina war either directly or indirectly; (b) That the solution of the French manpower problem can be reached through successful formation of the national armies. All this is, of course, predicated upon a continuation of the US military assistance program. This opinion has been formed after a series of consultations with the French Ambassador and Counselor.

We do not believe that Ho Chi Minh would accept any French proposal to negotiate in the near future even if one were made, which we consider an almost equally unlikely possibility. If the French financial crisis were to become so acute as to make it necessary for the French to retrench in their military expenditures we believe that the retrenchment would take place in some place other than Indochina if only because they would be obliged to carry on in Indochina for at least a sufficient time to assure a successful withdrawal. The plans for any withdrawal would have to be made well in advance and would take months to carry out successfully. We are confident that the French would consult with us as soon as they had determined to set such a course. It is,

Recommended, that Sir Oliver be informed that we do not believe the present French Government is negotiating with Ho Chi Minh nor could if it wished. If the French should finally decide to withdraw from Indochina because of financial weakness or for any other reason the withdrawal process itself would be so complex that the French would be obliged to consult with their allies, particularly the US and Britain, in order to obtain assistance in carrying it out If only for this reason we believe the French will consult with us in sufficient time to permit us to reexamine the question thoroughly before any irrevocable decisions regarding withdrawal are reached.

4) US Agreement with UK Assessment as Presented in Memorandum.

…We do not believe that the French are either planning a withdrawal from Indochina at the present time or negotiating or attempting to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh. We do, however, recognize that the possibility of a decision to withdraw is ever present and that the question should be watched carefully. We also recognize that, although a negotiated peace with Ho Chi Minh is neither feasible nor advantageous under present circumstances, the possibility should always be held open so that if Ho’s fortunes should founder a means should be open to him to request negotiation. It is,

Recommended that the Ambassador be so informed.

5) Statement made to Mr. Eden in Lisbon by the Secretary concerning further allied conversations regarding a course of action in Indochina

It is presumed that when you informed Mr. Eden in Lisbon that you hoped to be able to discuss the Indochina problem in about a month’s time after a US evaluation had been completed you had the current NSC study in mind. You will remember that the NSC has now directed the Department to suggest a course of diplomatic action designed to seek support of our allies for military action in the Indochina area based on two hypotheses: (1) That an aggression against Indochina be countered by a defense on the spot and in the peripheral area of China, which is thought to include the three southern provinces, but is not to extend beyond that; (2) That a Chinese aggression against Indochina be countered by an attack on the China mainland as a whole, without limitations.⁵ The Department is now engaged in fulfilling the NSC directive. Until this is done and the views of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs, and the Department can be reconciled, it is

Recommended that you defer any commitment to Sir Oliver concerning further bipartite or tripartite discussions.

. . . . . . .

Note: Intelligence Questions contained in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of British Memorandum.

“R” has addressed a separate memorandum entitled “Intelligence Factors in discussions with the British on Indochina” to G⁶ which should be consulted by the Secretary in referring to that portion of the British memorandum concerned with intelligence matters.

1. Drafted by William M. Gibson of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
2. Not printed, but see the memorandum of conversation by Allison, Mar. 15, p. 71.
3. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
4. Jean Sainteny, French Commissioner for Tonkin and Northern Annam, 1945–1947.
5. Reference is to NSC Action No. 614, taken by the National Security Council at its 113th Meeting, Mar. 5, in regard to NSC 124, Feb. 13, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia.” (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”) NSC 124 and related material is included in documentation on general U.S. policies with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area in volume xii. Regarding NSC consideration of NSC 124, see also United States—Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 8, pp. 502–507.
6. The memorandum, “Intelligence Factors in Discussions with British on Indochina,” not printed, was directed by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence, to H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, on Mar. 25. (751G.5/3–1253)