780.5/4–2452: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
6279. Fr Amb called on Asst Sec FE Apr 22 to discuss fol matters relating to IC and SEA:
- 1.
- Recommendations of Tripartite Ad Hoc Mil Comite.2 Fr Amb identified three conclusions of Ad Hoc Comite as of immed interest to his govt: (a) Recognition of Tonkin and IC as key to the defense of SEA; (b) Tripartite mil courses of action requisite to defense of IC and SEA in event Chi invasion; (c) question of transmitting to Peiping warning from US, Brit and Fr of tripartite retaliation on China in event Chi aggression SEA. Fr Amb stated his govt eager to [Page 112] learn views of US govt on these three points and considered it essential that further tripartite conversations on highest military level take place soonest.
- 2.
- IC national armies. Fr Amb emphasized his govt’s views that satisfactory formation, equipment and commitment to action of IC national armies “brightest light on horizon” in IC; that Fr financial and manpower burden in connection national armies was growing steadily more difficult for Fr to bear in view of Fr Union forces action in IC as well as Fr contribution NATO; and that he hoped US Govt, recognizing importance national armies, wld continue to make maximum contribution to their formation, equipment and maintenance.
In respect of (1) above Asst Sec FE emphasized that US shared Fr estimate importance Tonkin and IC not only to defense SEA but also to successful defense free Asia from further communist domination. In this connection Asst Sec FE pointed out precarious position Japan in the event SEA fell into Commie hands. As for course of action in event Chi invasion IC, Asst Sec FE pointed out this matter receiving most urgent consideration on highest govt levels and that he thought it probable that in very near future US will have completed studies its capabilities to an extent which will make it possible for US to discuss time and place of further tripartite discussions. Asst Sec FE discussed possibility some action which might deter Chi aggression and pointed out that a warning to Peiping need not and shld not specify time, place or manner of retaliation shld the warning go unheeded. Fr Amb indicated his agreement.
Asst Sec FE observed this connection that it seemed apparent from report of Ad Hoc Comite that in some important particulars such as retaliation on Chi, Brit and to a lesser extent Fr were not prepared to go as far as US. Fr Amb replied that his govt particularly eager that no course of action be pursued which wld result in loss of territory, i.e. Tonkin which it was their avowed purpose to defend. Asst Sec FE emphasized that US objective was successfully to defend and retain SEA of course including Tonkin; he added that it was entirely possible that shld retaliation on China become necessary it might be impossible to limit military action to the locality in which the aggression took place. Fr Amb agreed.
In respect of (2) above Asst Sec FE stated that US continued as it had in the past to regard success IC national army project as essential to final solution IC problem.
Fr Amb asked if Dept had engaged recently in conversations with Brit on matters analogous to foregoing. Asst Sec FE replied no such conversations had taken place for some several weeks but that Dept was aware of Brit desire to continue tripartite conversations on the defense of SEA soonest.
- Drafted by Lacy of PSA. Also sent to London as telegram 5450, to Moscow as 734, and to Saigon as 1601.↩
- The report of the Ad Hoc Military Committee, dated Feb. 5, is included in documentation on general policies of the United States with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area in volume xii.↩