Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/5–152

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 7, 1952.

Subject:

• Secretary of Defense’s letter of May 1, 1952 concerning Indochina (Tab A).²

I. Joint Chiefs’ Comments (Tab B):³

The suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Department of State’s draft paper on Indochina, embodied in the Joint Chiefs’ memorandum of April 18, 1952 can, with exceptions to be noted later, be accepted by the Department. The exceptions are as follows:

(a) Paragraph 4 of the Joint Chiefs’ memorandum:

The Department believes that the French will continue their effort to maintain their position in Indochina provided that the United States makes available substantially increased financial assistance. The Department continues, as it has in the past, to give daily consideration to the courses of action which this Government may take if faced with French withdrawal from Indochina. We have been assured by the French Government that we will be given plenty of warning before any withdrawal operation is commenced. It is impossible to plan against this contingency in the absence of knowledge as to the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal.

Even if it were possible to reach a firm U.S. decision at this time as to the course of action the U.S. would adopt in the event of French withdrawal, it would be most unwise to incur the possible dangers of the terms of the decision reaching the French or the States Governments.

(b) Paragraph No. 5(g) of memorandum:

The Department must insist upon strengthening of the MAAG Mission in Indochina, without necessarily increasing its size. We believe you should say to Secretary Lovett that special qualifications for the present members of the MAAG are something less than local conditions require. For example, of the thirty-odd MAAG officers, only three command the French language which is indispensable to their functions in Indochina. Moreover, if the U.S. is to accept an increased degree of participation in Indochina the MAAG must be prepared to perform its new functions.

(c) Paragraph No. 5(i) of memorandum:

The Department does not disagree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s proposal that an “occasional naval and/or air show of force in the general vicinity of Indochina might be advantageous”. Such demonstrations, however, can be productive of unhappy results in a delicate situation; we therefore suggest that the Joint Chiefs agree to consider such matters on an ad hoc basis as they have in the past.

II. Joint Secretaries’ Recommendations (Tab C):⁴

With reference to the second paragraph of Mr. Lovett’s letter of May 1, we believe the only difference in point of view separating the two Departments arises, not from the nature of the objectives to be achieved in Indochina, but rather, from a choice of the means by which they are to be reached. It is evident from the Joint Chiefs’ memorandum and our acceptance of their suggestions that we have no serious difference with the Chiefs.

The courses of action suggested by the Joint Secretaries (page 3)⁵ would, in our opinion, require a distinct and unwise change in U.S. policy in Indochina. We believe that, as a practical matter, U.S. objectives in Indochina can be achieved only through the French. Therefore, proposals of the sort enumerated on page 3, which would undoubtedly encourage the French to withdraw from Indochina, are entirely undesirable.

The Joint Secretaries advocate a program which would consist of pressure upon the French for: (1) a commitment to give the three Associated States a guarantee of full independence within a reasonable period; (2) an international program, preferably under the United Nations, to put an end to the civil war and to protect the three States from Communist aggression and subversion; and (3) a French commitment to continue to defend the area. This program, in our belief, is self-defeating and, for that matter, dangerous in the extreme. In our opinion, if it were suspected in French circles that such a consideration as that embodied in the Joint Secretaries’ memorandum were even under consideration in the American Government it would have a disastrous effect on the French will to continue their present program in Indochina with the sacrifices which it entails. Moreover, if the program were known in Vietnamese circles, it would so undermine confidence that it might sway the great mass of undecided middle-ground opinion against the present Governments and France in favor of Ho Chi Minh. With European and Indochinese soldiers fighting side by side, the results of such a movement can easily be foreseen.

Without direct U.S. military participation, our objectives in Indochina can be achieved only through a continuation of the present scale of French effort. We have reason for concern in that we know the French would almost certainly reduce their efforts in Indochina if they could find a satisfactory way of disengaging French prestige. A program which, at this point, called for pressure on the French to give guarantees of independence on a set time table and for a transfer from the French to the United Nations of responsibilities for the area could only be calculated to appeal to the French as an opportunity for retreating from Indochina without the loss of prestige. It is therefore inconsistent to hope to embody in the same program a French commitment to continue to defend Indochina and pressure on the French for a course of action which gives them opportunity to withdraw.

We believe that progress toward U.S. objectives in Indochina can only be secured on the basis of a firm French belief that, in the first place, there is no honorable alternative to their continued acceptance of responsibility in Indochina and, in the second place, that it is the objective of the U.S. to bolster the French in the execution of their responsibilities in the area. We believe that only if the French are made increasingly aware that the U.S. is whole-heartedly supporting their effort in Indochina will there be opportunity for effective U.S. pressure on the French and on the States Governments for progress toward U.S. objectives in the area.

We cannot accept the assumption upon which the Joint Secretaries have postulated their paper: that the situation in Southeast Asia “continues to deteriorate”. In point of fact, U.S. policy in Indochina, initiated by the Department of State but validated on several occasions by the National Security Council, has contributed to the preservation of Indochina from Communist domination for nearly two and a half years. During this time the following developments, all of them distinctly favorable, have eventuated:

1. In spite of increased Chinese material and advisory aid to the Viet Minh the French have been able to preserve their control over the large urban centers and rich rice producing areas in Cochin China and Tonkin.

2. The growth of the national armies has proceeded favorably and their role in active military operations has become increasingly important, thus offering the prospect of relieving European troops.

3. In spite of overwhelming difficulties in the assumption of the responsibilities required from the French under the terms of the various agreements granting independence within the French Union to the three States, steady progress has been made.

It is improper to identify our present policy as undynamic. The desirability of a policy should be measured by its success and not by its novelty. In this connection we believe it important to emphasize that the favorable developments enumerated above have been possible only because the U.S. has worked in cooperation with the French Government and has, by and large, been able to allay the fear of the latter that the U.S. wished to abandon or displace it. Concomitantly, the French have continued to make the great sacrifices in men and treasure which they have made only because they were given assurances of American support—political, economic and military.

There are, nonetheless, certain recommendations embodied in the Joint Secretaries’ memorandum which the Department can easily accept because these recommendations have been held by this Department as operating objectives for several years. They are:

1. That U.S. policy must be designed not to keep the French committed indefinitely in Indochina but to facilitate the transition from colonialism to self-government in such a way that there is no opportunity for Communism to flow into a power vacuum;

2. That we seek to obtain the fullest measure of international cooperation and the support of a sufficient number of Asian nations;

3. The six measures recommended on pages 5 and 6 of the Joint Secretaries’ memorandum, all of which have long been included among U.S. purposes are also fully recognized and agreed to by the French.

III. In view of the compelling circumstances in France and Indochina it is the Department’s view that we may find it necessary to take steps to anticipate the possible inability of the French to meet the budgetary problems arising from the Indochina operation. It is our belief that the present French budget may prove insupportable, politically and financially, to France unless it is reduced by approximately $250 million. Coincidentally, the present cost to France of the Indochinese national armies project is of the same order of magnitude. It is our belief that further American financial assistance to France on account of the Indochina operation had best be extended through the medium of support to the national armies project. In this connection we wish to quote in part from a memorandum prepared for you on February 11, 1952:⁶

“The formation and commitment to battle of the Indochinese National Armies should be accelerated in every possible way. In our opinion, this offers the most promising prospect of influencing the political complex in a positive way, and of providing additional assistance in an effective manner. In Indochina, as in other oriental countries, political stability as a practical matter often results from the maintenance of a strong national army. In Indochina the national armies will represent the only attribute of sovereignty and independence which captures the imagination of the indigenous population. Finally, only through the commitment to battle of Indochinese troops can the problem of the shortage of French manpower in Indochina be solved. The formation of the national armies in Indochina has proceeded with reasonable speed, the limiting factors are shortage of cadres to train Indochinese officers and NCO‘s and shortage of equipment. Therefore, the U.S. should be prepared:

• “a. to increase its supply of materiel to the national armies;
• “b. to continue to press both French and Indochinese to appoint Indochinese commanders of the national armies.
• “c. to consider assuming all or part of the financial burden now borne by the French necessary to the maintenance and increase of the Indochinese national armies. If an appreciable increase in American involvement in the Indochinese operation is justified, as we believe it to be, it seems clear that, for both political and military reasons, the U.S. should choose the national armies project as the first area in which it is prepared to accept increased direct responsibility.”

We suggest that you tell Mr. Lovett that the Department believes that the program it has advocated for Indochina is a sound one. You may wish to state that, as it is approved U.S. policy to withhold Southeast Asia from Communist control by every means available to us other than the direct deployment of U.S. ground forces in the area, it is our duty to pursue whatever practical means exists to further our objectives. Granted the inability of the native governments to assure the territorial integrity of the area for the foreseeable future without outside help and the unlikelihood that other friendly nations than France are able or willing to participate in the defense of the area, individually or collectively, we are obliged to support the only practicable means available to us, which in this case is the French.

The French will continue to assist the native governments on a major scale to defend their territories only under certain specific conditions. These conditions include an honoring by the States Governments and France’s allies of the agreements under which the three Associated States were granted self-government within the French Union and assurance from the United States that we will continue to supply: (a) military aid in support of the French Union forces on the field of battle and, (b) military and financial aid toward the achievement of the only goal which represents both a relief to France of the overwhelming burden which she is now carrying in Indochina and a satisfaction of the joint U.S., French and Indochinese objective—the creation of national armies capable of assuring the defense of the three Associated States without major outside help.

The only program for us to follow is to continue to do everything possible to encourage the French to remain in Indochina. To this end we must assure them of our continued support of French execution of their responsibilities in the area. We must also provide them with the military and economic assistance which has already been programmed in the requests to the Congress.

We suggest you tell Mr. Lovett that there can be no guarantee that this program will be adequate. There is a strong possibility that the French will not be able to support the present 1952 French military budget. In this case it is possible that there would be severe pressure in French opinion for a reduction of French responsibilities in Indochina. We may find ourselves, therefore, later this year, faced with the necessity of undertaking emergency measures of financial assistance to the French in order to prevent a French withdrawal from Indochina. In this case, it is our belief, that financial assistance for the national armies would offer the best opportunity for coping with the situation.

Mr. Lovett can best further our common objective by continuing to cooperate with us in obtaining Congressional authorization for our aid programs and by endeavoring to assure that such unrealistic proposals as that presented in the Joint Secretaries’ memorandum are no longer offered, if only because they represent a great potential danger in that they might, if their existence were ever to become known to the French and the States Governments, result in the very situation which our past and present actions have been designed to avoid—an immediate choice between allowing Indochina, and possibly all of Southeast Asia, to fall into Communist hands or attempting to defend it ourselves with little or no assurances of outside help.

There is attached an appendix (Tab D) which provides a detailed analysis of the French budgetary situation with particular reference to the incidence of the Indochina program or the French financial situation.⁷

1. Drafted by William S. B. Lacy, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs; William M. Gibson, Deputy Director; and Charles C. Stelle, Member of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. Ante, p. 113.
3. The memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Apr. 18, is printed ibid.
4. Tab C to this memorandum consists of the memorandum of Apr. 8 from the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the Secretary of Defense; and the draft memorandum of Apr. 3, “A Cold War Program To Save Southeast Asia for the Free World.” The two documents are printed on pp. 117 and 119.
5. Reference is to the draft memorandum “A Cold War Program To Save Southeast Asia for the Free World,” ibid.
6. For the complete text of the memorandum, see p. 28.
7. Tab D, a memorandum prepared by Edgar J. Beigel of the Office of Western European Affairs, is not printed.