Office of the Historian

663.001/10–2752

No. 831
The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)1

secret
[Washington,] October 27, 1952.

Dear Phil: I heartily concur in all that you say in your letter of October 172 concerning the Austrian treaty question. Our approach should, of course, be “Yes, but” as recommended in Vienna’s 10593 rather than “No, but”. I think that our argument might well follow the outline contained in my memorandum of October 144 to Mr. Bruce in order to head off the introduction of a resolution calling for unqualified withdrawal. An additional argument which should not be overlooked is that, aside from the troops in Austria, there exists also a four-power organization in the form of the Allied Commission which, with its many subordinate agencies, functions pursuant to four-power agreement. This situation can be changed only pursuant to agreement among the four occupying powers and a simple withdrawal of troops would not of itself terminate four-power control.

Defense has now concurred in our position paper5 subject to the following changes being made therein:

(a)
Change the final sub-paragraph under paragraph 2 of the Recommendations (Page 2) to read:

“However, in the unlikely event that all our efforts along the above lines fail and that an unamended resolution calling [Page 1804] for an unconditional withdrawal were to appear to command majority support, the United States should vote against such a resolution even if the Soviets also indicate their support and if Austria, France, and the United Kingdom join in supporting it, since an unconditional withdrawal would have no provision for security safeguards”.

(b)
In the first line of the first full paragraph on Page 9 substitute “most undesirable” for “difficult”.
(c)
Change the paragraph numbered 1 on Page 9 to read:

“The existence of an adequate Austrian internal security force”.

It will be observed that Defense, in suggesting the foregoing changes, has taken a firm stand against voting in favor of an unconditional withdrawal even if the Soviet Union, Austria, France, and the United Kingdom join in supporting it. This position taken by Defense is consistent with NSC policy approved by the President and I fear that there is little likelihood of our securing a modification of the Defense position at this time. I suggest, therefore, that we play the “Yes, but” approach strongly with full argumentation in any debate on a resolution for unconditional withdrawal. In the unlikely event that all of our arguments should fail and a simple withdrawal proposal should gain widespread support, I think that we should at that time urge upon the President a modification of the U.S. position with a view to preventing our being placed in an untenable position on this question. I see no other alternative course of action for us to pursue at this time in light of the position taken by Defense.

Sincerely yours,

George W. Perkins
  1. Drafted by E. P. Allen and cleared by Collins, Williamson, and R. B. Knight. Copies also sent to Bruce, Nitze, and Popper.↩
  2. Document 829.↩
  3. Document 828.↩
  4. Document 827.↩
  5. Regarding the Department of State position paper, see footnote 1, supra.↩