663.001/10–1752

No. 829
The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)1

top secret

Dear George: I have seen a copy of your memorandum to Mr. Bruce on the Austrian Treaty question.2 Just after reading it, I read Vienna’s 1059 of October 16.3 I have been disturbed for some time by the fear that we might get ourselves into a very disadvantageous position in the General Assembly. In part, the problem is one of the presentation of our views in the course of the debates. I agree strongly with Vienna that it is better to say “yes, but” rather than “no, but.” I think it would be most unfortunate if we got ourselves into a position where it appeared to other members of the United Nations, and particularly to the Austrian public, that the Soviets were ready to end the occupation and that we were refusing to do so. I think all of the points that you have in mind can very well be made in argument. I think it is doubtful that the Russians will put us in a hole by accepting a proposal for unconditional withdrawal. However, we must be prepared for such a contingency, and personally I am still not convinced that if we have to vote on a proposal for unconditional withdrawal we should vote against it even though the Soviet Union and Austria are in favor of it. I have tried to raise this basic question for top-level consideration with the Secretary a number of times over the past month, but it seems to me it has never been properly thrashed out with consideration of all points of view. In the light of Vienna’s 1059, I hope that the matter will be given further consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Phil
  1. Copies were also sent to Bruce, Nitze, and Popper.
  2. Document 827.
  3. Supra.