Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/10–952

No. 827
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 14, 1952.

Subject:

• Austrian Treaty question in the General Assembly.

I refer to Mr. Hickerson’s memorandum attached of October 9, 1952² which raised fundamental policy questions concerning the forthcoming debate in the General Assembly on the Austrian question. While I would welcome a discussion of this question in your staff meeting, I do not believe that such a discussion is necessary since the basic policy in this question is clear. I believe that if such a discussion is held, it need not await an answer to the request which the Secretary addressed to the Department of Defense on October 2³ concerning the requirements for the establishment of Austrian internal security forces, since this question will not be the sole factor in determing our position in the General Assembly.

I wish to submit the following recommendations as the substance of instructions to our delegation in New York.

1. The objective of our activity in New York should be to obtain the widest approval of the abbreviated treaty as amended by our note of September 5⁴ as the basis for a future Austrian settlement. We should take positive steps to assure support for this position as an enlightened and constructive solution of the problem and should not be stampeded into a position which threatens either our present strategic interests or the future prospects for survival of an independent Austria. Therefore, we should insist that a precise four-power agreement is necessary before we can withdraw our troops.

2. We should use all of our efforts and ingenuity to head off any proposal for the unconditional withdrawal of the occupation forces. I do not believe that there is the slightest chance that such a proposal will be passed, provided our presentation of the issues involved is effective. If such a resolution is introduced by the Soviet Union or is supported by the Soviet Union and a majority of member states and Austria, we should insist that it must be accompanied by the renuniciation by all the occupying forces of claims to property and war booty in Austria. If the resolution does not contain such a provision, we should vote against it; otherwise we would find ourselves in the untenable position of agreeing to withdraw while leaving the Soviet Union in physical control of sufficient property and resources to threaten the future independence of Austria. If the resolution is not supported by the Soviet Union, we should still insist that such provision be included in the resolution and, furthermore, that any withdrawal of forces of the four powers must be simultaneous and complete.

3. I believe that it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will make a major change in policy and express willingness to agree on the long draft treaty including Article 35 without raising extraneous issues. If such a proposal is made by them, and supported by Britain, France and Austria, we would be forced in the end to negotiate on this basis within the terms of reference of NSC 38/6;⁵ namely, that agreement be reached on the best terms obtainable. We should not, however, agree to complete the negotiations on the old draft until we have used every means to secure support of the abbreviated text on the grounds that the Soviet Union has prolonged the occupation to exploit and drain a small state. It seems to me that we are in an excellent position to gain widespread support for a reasonable settlement such as envisaged by the abbreviated treaty and to emphasize the Soviet’s claims for material gain. It is clear that the Assembly will not be called upon to negotiate the exact terms of settlement but simply to indicate a basis on which a settlement should be reached. We should have sufficient strength in the UN to influence the final decision of the Assembly. If we find no support for our position we will, in subsequent negotiations, return to a consideration of the long draft including Article 35, under the explicit authority contained in NSC 38/6.

4. Any resolution for withdrawal, or any basis proposed for future settlement should take into account the time required for training and equipping the Austrian security forces. Both drafts of the treaty envisaged that the period required for ratification and the 90 day period following the deposit of ratifications would be utilized for this purpose. No indication can be given in the debate of our intentions in this respect.

1. Drafted by Williamson and cleared by Perkins, Hadsel, and Matthews. Copies also sent to Jessup, Nitze, and Hickerson. Bruce initialed the source text and noted his approval.
2. Not printed.
3. Presumably a reference to Secretary Acheson’s letter to Secretary Lovett, Document 825.
4. Regarding this note, see Document 814.
5. See the Editorial Note, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, pp. 397 ff.