663.001/10–1652: Telegram

No. 828
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of State1

secret

1059. We consider Gruber’s reply to four questions (Deptel 1049, Oct 152) reflects accurately consensus of opinion in Austrian Govt, i.e. that while short treaty is most desirable objective, Austrians are in no position to reject long draft if early agreement cld in fact be reached on that basis; and further, that in likelihood no early agreement on any treaty draft, mere evacuation of occupation forces and end of occupation regime wld be preferable to indefinite prolongation of existing situation.

What Austrians regard as most likely solution, and one they seem most hopeful about, is compromise between short treaty and long draft. To this end, they hope Soviets can be brought to conference table, and can there be induced to state terms on which they wld conclude treaty. If Soviets can thus be induced to submit concrete proposal, Austrian Govt cld then take question to Parliament, obtain “reluctant consent”, and appeal to us for help in paying price which Soviets will undoubtedly demand for leaving Austria.

We believe foregoing is reasoning behind points one and three of Gruber’s reply. We think Gruber is sincere in point one statement that Austrian Govt will not itself take line in UNGA that no treaty is needed. If, however, it is raised by another power, Austrians must be expected to give support to it. We believe they wld consider [Page 1800] termination of occupation without treaty preferable to treaty plus neutralization, for example. Former wld permit them immediately to build up security forces, and they are apparently unconcerned re internal risks or threat from satellites in temporary period between withdrawal of occupation forces and establishment of their own military. They consider also that withdrawal of Soviet forces wld leave USIA enterprises at mercy of Austrian authorities, even though ownership remained in Soviet hands, and that they cld thus settle affairs to their own relative satisfaction within reasonable time.

As viewed from here, we believe that primary objective of Western powers in UN discussions must be to convince world opinion beyond possibility of Soviet distortion that they are eager for Austrian settlement on best possible terms for Austria. We feel therefore that Western powers shld stand by short treaty as simplest and best solution, at same time making it clear they are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal which Soviets may advance.

Commies here have made great point, particularly since proposal for abbreviated treaty, that Western powers are merely maneuvering in an effort to avoid withdrawal from Austria. It wld be of immense propaganda value if we cld show clearly that we are prepared to end occupation. If withdrawal without treaty shld be proposed by other UN member, we hope Western powrs wld be in position to welcome such solution and wld only in subsequent debate bring out objections to it with reference to establishing the draft terms for withdrawal. In this connection, we cld, of course, re-emphasize Soviet vested interest in their Austrian position, point out necessity for continued negotiation final settlement and insist on UN supervision of withdrawal over a period of time which wld allow Austrian security forces to be established.

We do not believe Russians cld possibly accept such a proposal for withdrawal, but we are fearful that we will be placed on the defensive to our great disadvantage before Austrian public opinion if we too indicated reluctance to accept it. Even in extreme case of Soviet acceptance of proposal with our conditions, I believe we wld have much to gain by eliminating possibility which the Soviets now have of forcing a partition of Austria and breaking the Austrian Govt through measures of violence to which they have not yet resorted. Fact that they have not taken such steps is no guarantee for the future and does not diminish the real value to us of eliminating this danger.

To sum up, we believe that course proposed in draft USUN position paper wld have most serious repercussions in Austria if carried out in such manner as to make it appear that we are reluctant [Page 1801] to withdraw our troops. In other words we shld say “yes, but” rather than “no, but”.

Thompson
  1. Repeated to Bonn for Reber and to London, Paris, and Moscow.
  2. Telegram 1049 requested the Embassy’s comments on telegram 1029 from Vienna, Document 826. (663.001/10–1452)