763.00/10–2252

No. 830
Memorandum by Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Planning Staff of the Office of Western European Affairs (Williamson)

secret

Subject:

  • Austrian Item at UNGA

S/P had previously noted and approved the Dept position paper on the Austrian item at the United Nations General Assembly1 when our attention was called to Mr. Jessup’s letter of October 17 to Mr. Perkins.2 Mr. Jessup evidently fears that too negative a position toward a possible proposal for unconditional withdrawal of military forces from Austria would be damaging to the United States and, on this point, prefers the view presented in Vienna’s 1059 of October 17 [16]3 to that reiterated in Mr. Perkins’ memorandum to Mr. Bruce on October 144 as our official position.

Fundamentally S/P supports the logic of our stated position but shares Mr. Jessup’s concern at possible adverse consequences for us in the Assembly if we flatly oppose a resolution urging unconditional withdrawal. I assume, however, that in the preparation of our delegation the utmost effort has been made to insure that our position, in the event of such a resolution being offered, is presented as affirmatively as possible. Might it not even be possible to vote initial approval for such a resolution and then to bring out the qualifying arguments in debate?

It would be especially difficult, S/P feels, to reject such a resolution outright if it were supported, as Vienna’s 1059 indicates it probably would be, by the Austrian Government. Is there still any possibility of persuading the Austrians not to give overt approval to this type of resolution if presented at UNGA? It would be desirable to avoid the onus of seeming to oppose the will of the Austrians themselves on this issue.

S/P hopes that if the issue arises it can be handled without the necessity of the United States being put in the position of being responsible [Page 1803] for blocking action that Austria and the majority in the assembly might be disposed to approve. Perhaps another delegation than our own could be made ready to present a resolution including the minimum essential conditions to safeguard Austria’s independence, if possible prior to the presentation of an “unconditional withdrawal” resolution, or as an amendment to such a resolution. We feel that taking all reasonable precautions available to us in this connection represents the farthest we can go to meet the objections raised in Mr. Jessup’s memorandum.

  1. Presumably a reference to a position paper circulated in draft and later designated NYT D–1/4 of Nov. 6, “Negotiating Paper—Austria”. This paper, drafted by E. P. Allen and Baker, was prepared for use by the Secretary in the pending discussions with the British and French Foreign Ministers in New York during the Seventh Session of the UNGA. A copy of document NYT D–1/4 is in CFM files, lot M 88, box 163, “NYT Documents 1–4/3”.
  2. Supra.
  3. Document 828.
  4. Document 827.