Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.0221/8–2052: Telegram

No. 558
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State ¹

top secret

Bonn , August 20, 1952—8 p.m.

756. US eyes only. Ref: (a) urtel 748 August 15, London 1099, Paris 890, Moscow 152; (b) urtel 682 August 12 [11], Moscow 140, Paris 803, London 974, Berlin 68; (c) ourtel sent Dept 717 August 18, Berlin 97, Moscow 28, Paris 179, London 133.²

We believe your plan ref a divides itself in three parts requiring different handling: (1) Economic sanctions in Germany; (2) Economic sanctions outside Germany; (3) Military planning.

All three items subject to two basic considerations. First, although individual British and French realize logic of situation, their domestic political situation and fear of further provocation to and more dangerous involvement with Soviets may induce resistance to development such plans as required by NSC 132/1,³ increasing in degree from items (1) to (2) to (3).

. . . . . . .

Within these two general qualifications we see no need limit discussion item (1) economic sanctions in Germany, to general terms without considering specific action. Under ref b we have already made general approach to British and French and expect this to lead naturally into discussion specific steps. Certainly such discussion should recognize potential future developments, as we pointed out ref c. But this need not delay current examination possible sanctions, although decision on actual use may await development items (2) and (3) unless Soviets force quick action. Discussions under (1) should continue tripartite as they started, since tripartite agreement clearly needed (many of countermeasures lie British Zone or Sector), and until British and French agree bring Germans in. Discussion should take place in Bonn with ultimate approval in three capitals.

As to item (2), economic sanctions outside Germany, you will of course seek measures which can be implemented by US, Britain or France alone. Many, however, will be effective only if other countries, e.g., all COCOM, join.… Hence present approach to British–French should be only general until Washington has specific list of possible measures which take account foregoing. Bipartite approach more effective, so each will not encourage others doubt, although each should be told we are opening subject with other.

As to item (3), military planning, may find extreme British–French hesitancy for reasons set forth in second para. We think for same reasons set forth in preceding paragraph present approach should be most general until specific proposals have been developed in Washington and should be bipartite.

We shall give further consideration to problem bringing Germans in because we consider failure to do so is serious weakness in planning and prospectively in implementation, but as of today, even if we discussed informally with e.g., Chancellor and Heussinger, we could not feel sure of security although leaks would not come directly from them.

In connection with your proposed study in Washington, we can contribute little except on item (1) and question whether you do not already have such raw material as we can give. Do you want anything more at present? E.g., comments such as paragraphs 6 on airlift and 9 on East-West trade agreement ref (c). As indicated ref (c) our own guess is most likely Soviet course will not be outright blockade but will be series of measures, each with specious justification, probably concurrent in time, and effectively choking Berlin. There will, however, be no dramatic point at which we can say “this is it”. Part of problem therefore is to agree with others concerned how to identify crucial point, and equally to find effective measures and persuade Allies to agree to them which will avoid ever reaching this crucial point.

We think also NSC 132/1/paragraph (3) has one omission, i.e. harassments are likely to be directed at weakening EDC and West integration and if possible at blocking ratifications by one or more parliaments. They may take form of terror or of bait.

Copy this message sent General Mathewson so he may comment directly.

Donnelly

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. Reference a, supra. Reference b is Document 556. Reference c provided a survey of actions that might be taken in response to Soviet actions, but stated that these actions had not yet affected adversely the West Berlin economy, and that it might be better to wait for more proof of the Soviet program to isolate Berlin. (762.0221/8–1852)
3. Document 547.