Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762A.0221/8–2252: Telegram

No. 559
The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Washington, August 22, 1952—7:50 p.m.

870. 1. Dept appreciates thoughtful analysis and constructive suggestions contained Bonn’s 712, rptd info Berlin 96, Moscow 27, Paris 177, London 131, and Bonn’s 717; rptd info Berlin 91, Moscow 28, Paris 179, London 233; and Berlin’s msgs transmitted in Bonn’s 723, rptd info Moscow 29 and Bonn’s 724, rptd info Moscow 30. Have also carefully studied Bonn’s 756, rptd info London 138, Paris 186, Moscow 34, Berlin 101 and London’s 976, rptd info Paris 249, Moscow 41, Bonn 166, which bear directly on problem in its widest aspects.² Note from Bonn’s reports favorable initial reaction of Brit and Fr HICOMers to suggested gen approach to Sovs re Berlin communications. Dept anxious press forward soonest possible with this gen approach. If Brit and Fr HICOMers have already sent recommendations to their govts, request London and Paris to discuss with FonOffs and seek favorable speedy response.

2. Dept in gen agreement with HICOG’s views. Desire point out, however, that in urging counter measures now to closing Rothensee and Sov failures provide alternative transportation facilities (para 2 Bonn’s 717) we are not motivated by degree to which Berlin econ may be suffering. We urge counter measures because:

(a) Sov action threatens rapid attainment of staggered stockpile goal and

(b) If we do not react we fear Sovs will apply fresh measure at another point of transportation network. We agree with Moscow that determination to act shld not be particularly related to effects of any specific Sov act. Rather we shld decide at what point Sov pattern of actions poses serious ultimate threat and at that point we shld set in motion planned measures to seek check entire Sov pattern. We believe that unless Rothensee situation is cleared up very shortly, that point for us has been reached. Unquestionably we must most speedily develop comprehensive plan for counter measures in and out of Ger. Interdepartmental Comite has been working here on such plan for some weeks. Results to date indicate impracticability of unilateral US action, and suggest that, to be at all effective, program must embrace not only Brit, Fr and FedRep, but nr other powers, attainment of which will certainly not be easy. Fear in fact our possibilities this connection likely in practice prove not as great as has been generally supposed. At same time, we will get farther faster when we in position to talk specifics, facts and figures. We will push for completion Wash study and hold off approach to Brit, Fr and Gers until fully prepared. Meanwhile, believe it inadvisable to defer partial and local counter measures in Rothensee case. Last para London’s 976 significant this connection.³

3. Putting together various suggestions and comments made, Dept believes we must aim at fairly long range plan of successive steps which cld be taken if circumstances so dictate. We agree with Brit FonOff that no precise plan can or shld be developed to be rigidly put into effect regardless of circumstances. To a certain extent things must be “played by ear”. Nevertheless, we believe our position and our capabilities for action will be immensely improved if we have some idea of steps which can successively be taken provided Sovs do in fact continue and develop broad program of interference and respond negatively to our various approaches.

4. For these reasons we are thinking in terms of fol possibilities:

(a) As first step we wld make gen approach suggested by Moscow and outlined in Deptel to Bonn 682 (rptd Berlin 68, Moscow 140, Paris 803, London 974⁴). Development of this approach will doubtless take several weeks, and meanwhile if there is still no indication of restoration of Rothensee lock to service or offer of alternate facilities, local counter measures wld be taken in Berlin and West Ger against Commie barge traffic. Such measures, preceding or concurrent with gen approach, wld emphasize point we wld be making. Suggest gen approach might well be made by three Western HICOMs in personal visit to Chuikov, in order both to emphasize presentation and give opportunity try and sound Sovs out re such matters as status of Rothensee and other outstanding points bearing on Berlin.

(b) Probabilities are that Sovs wld reject or ignore gen approach. In this case, especially if creeping blockade measures by then further advanced, Dept wld favor proceeding with fresh approach, possibly in Moscow. In this connection, we are considering Berlin’s suggestion, i.e., demand for land corridor to Berlin under Western control. This wld obviously be serious move, as such corridor wld establish extraterritorial rights through SovZone. Hence most unlikely Sovs wld grant request. Demand wld therefore be made mainly as psychological move. Point has been made here that Sov refusal of such demand wld weaken rather than strengthen Ger morale and confidence in West. Wld appreciate HICOG’s views on this, as well as Moscow’s on idea as whole. (Recallable that Reuter has in past suggested such corridor.)

(c) Subsequent to exploitation of demand for corridor or in connection with same, might carry whole Berlin issue to UN. This move, like move (b) wld also depend re use, timing and precise handling upon development of degree and pattern of Sov harassment.

(d) Concurrently with foregoing moves or possibly fol them, but depending entirely upon existing circumstances, there shld be instituted a progressive series of counter measures, extending if necessary beyond Ger. These wld be aimed at relieving pressure on Berlin, rather than trying force Sovs to grant land corridor.

5. To summarize, Dept favors as immediate measures gen approach already described plus local barge traffic counter measures. At same time Dept desires work out for possible use depending on circumstances some coordinated long term plan of action such as described in preceding para. Pls proceed to push immediate measures and all addressees comment on additional proposals. Discussion of latter shld for time being remain on US eyes only basis.

Bruce

1. Drafted by Morris and Laukhuff and cleared in draft with Bohlen, Matthews, Riddleberger, E, EUR, UNP, and S/P. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow.
2. Telegrams 712, 723, and 724 are not printed. (762.0221/8–1852 and 8–1952) Telegram 717 is summarized in footnote 2, supra. Telegram 976 is summarized in footnote 3, Document 557.
3. In this paragraph the Embassy in London reported that the British Deputy Under Secretary of State in charge of German Affairs seriously questioned the wisdom of attempting to predetermine policy in a situation where there were so many variables. He said further that he would like to play it by ear as the situation developed. (762A.5/8–2052)
4. Document 556.