Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.0221/8–752: Telegram

No. 556
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Washington, August 11, 1952—7:18 p.m.

682. While most Commie actions in SovZone since sig contractuals and EDC Treaty seem to have been designed primarily to tighten control over SovZone and separate it from West Berlin and FedRep and only secondarily for their possible effect on Berlin, we are concerned that certain recent developments related to access to Berlin may foreshadow either stepped-up harassment of Berlin communications or possibly eventually all-out blockade. We believe situation has reached pt where our interests are seriously enough threatened to warrant action along fol lines.

Essential issue now is whether we shld approach Sovs prior to any further restrictions, such as recent Rothensee closing,² or wait until they have been imposed before requesting alternative surface transport facilities. We are impressed by Moscow’s proposal and reasoning behind it (Moscow 263 to Dept rptd info Bonn 11, Berlin 15, London 14, Paris 57³). It is in accord with our basic policy, and we believe approach shld be made along these lines in near future. Unless you have strong reasons to contrary, you are therefore authorized discuss it with Fr and Brit HICOMs.

Re Moscow’s draft, Dept prefers omit pt (f), for time being at least, and wld also prefer to begin statement with more specific reference to question of communications and without raising issue of rights. Suggest therefore that pt (b) be omitted, and fol added to pt (a): “In particular, we refer to the closing of the Rothensee shiplift on Aug 1, allegedly for technical reasons but without any indication of length of time it is intended to keep it closed, and also to statements recently made by Sov officials to Gers implying that Autobahn bridge over Elbe wld be closed in near future”. Pt (c) might then begin: “We therefore believe it essential that in future we be given advance notice.…⁴” We believe this approach to Sovs shld be made on HICOM level, for reasons given Moscow 138 to Dept, rptd Berlin 10, Bonn 5 (being rptd London and Paris⁵), and in proposing this approach, you might point out that suggestion originated with Kennan, since believed this may carry weight with Fr FonOff.

It might also be advisable to take any counteraction to closing of Rothensee shiplift (see below) at same time or just prior to making above approach to Sovs. However, failure to agree on gen approach shld not delay any countermeasures which we may decide advisable re Rothensee.

Our further views re current specific problems are as follows:

1. Autobahn. Re temp bridge over Elbe, our concern is based on your prediction (Bonn 482 to Dept rptd info Berlin 59⁶) that Sovs will close in near future and fact that temp bridge reaching end of life predicted for it when constructed in 1945. We wonder, however, whether repair materials reported Bonn 482 may not be those for work on permanent bridge reported Berlin unn tel Jul 15, 9 a m?⁷

We have been considering urging tripartite approach re bridge to Sovs on technical level (even though this, or in fact gen approach discussed above, wld not accord with line taken with Reuter last spring when he was told that upkeep of communications strictly Sov responsibility (Berlin unn Feb 5, 5 pm⁸)). However, on assumption that above gen approach may be made in near future, Dept believes it preferable avoid confusing issue by refraining, for time being at least, from such specific approach re Autobahn. If Brit and Fr shld not agree on gen approach or if there are other developments meanwhile re bridge, we shld of course reconsider such step, which wld inter alia raise several pts: whether initial representations shld be limited to request for joint technical exam; whether we shld then, if such exam indicated repairs needed, offer our assistance; question of alternate route through Magdeburg; and possible alternative of proposing temp installation of pontoon bridge. Re latter, cld such bridge still permit passage of Elbe River traffic, and wld US Army be prepared to build shld Sovs agree?

2. Canals. Re Rothensee lift, if it is decided Sov action warrants reprisal, we agree that action against Commie barges in West Berlin and FedRep wld be most effective countermeasure, assuming (in case of Berlin) that by-pass canal wld not be fully operative for some time. Request more specific info re your plans in this regard, as we are not entirely clear what you have in mind. We suggest that if Sovs do not give satis within reasonable time (Berlin 260 to Bonn, rptd info Dept 233, and Bonn’s 591 to Dept, rptd info Berlin 77⁹) a final note might be sent, implying some prompt action on our part if request not granted. As suggested above, we might wish to time our countermeasures with gen approach to Sovs discussed above. Pls report meanwhile any info which you can obtain on whether Rothensee lift actually needs repairs and whether Sovs are actually repairing it.

3. Air corridor. We observe that series of written protests begun last May by Sovs re alleged violations of air corridor continue. We assume that at least one purpose of this is to build up record for any future action re corridor. We noticed that as of Jul 17 Williams had evidently not replied to Trusov 1tr of Jun 21 (Berlin Jul 17 tel to Bonn rptd info Dept 117¹⁰). We assume you are urging Air Force reply to these protests promptly and that you are maintaining record of protests and replies involving US planes for use in event future Sov ref to them.

4. Log transmitted Bonn D–214 Jul 24 very useful.¹¹ Request you transmit additions to log periodically, with copies to Moscow, London, Berlin and Paris.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Ausland and cleared with Riddleberger, Bohlen, Bonbright, Matthews, and Fowler of GPA. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow.
2. The Rothensee canal lock had been closed by Soviet officials on Aug. 1 for technical repairs.
3. Telegram 263 transmitted the outline of an approach to Soviet authorities which (a) would state concern over West Berlin, (b) indicate that past arrangements were inadequate, (c) request advance notification for interrupting traffic or communications with the city, (d) make arrangements for alternate facilities, (e) offer technical assistance to repair problems, and (f) state that further closings without adequate alternative facilities would be interpreted and regarded as an action against the military position of the Western powers. (762.0221/8–752)
4. Ellipsis in the source text.
5. See footnote 3, supra.
6. Not printed. (962.0221/8–152)
7. Not printed. (862B.2612/7–1552)
8. Not printed. (962.50/2–552)
9. Neither printed. (762.0221/8–552 and 8–952)
10. Not printed; it transmitted the text of a Soviet protest dated July 17 concerning air corridor traffic and referred to a previous protest along similar lines on June 21. (962A.526B/7–752)
11. Not printed; it transmitted the text of a log of recent Soviet harassments in Germany. (762.00/7–2452)