Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 132 Series

No. 547
Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay) ¹

top secret
NSC 132/1

Washington , June 12, 1952.

United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action against Berlin

1. In the view of the United States, the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin is of such importance to the Western powers that it could not be abandoned except at the cost of a major political reverse. The Soviet Union has it within its power to make the Western position in Berlin untenable: this result could be accomplished at any time by the use of force; it might be accomplished over a period of time by restricting Western access to the city. In the view of the United States, the Western powers should not voluntarily abandon the city under communist pressure even though the resulting situation may involve great risk of general war.

2. It is also the view of the United States that the Soviet Union should be held responsible for any communist action against the Western position in Berlin whether the action is taken by the Soviets or by East Germans or other satellites. Should a significant change in the status of East Germany take place, and particularly should the Soviets take steps to give East Germany the juridical semblance of autonomy, the courses of action which follow should be reviewed. Pending such review, the policy in this paper will retain its validity.

3. As long as Germany remains divided and Berlin is a land island in the Soviet Zone, the maintenance of our position in the city will not be an easy task. On the contrary, it is likely to be as nerve-wracking as it is important, and there is no way to make it otherwise. We must expect continuing harassing measures of greater or lesser severity. These measures may be designed to put us under pressure for the purpose of gaining concessions from us in Germany or elsewhere in return for the relaxation of the harassing measures. Or conceivably they may even be designed to provoke us into the use of force in an effort to make us appear responsible for the war which would probably follow. Or, and this is the most probable contingency, these measures might flow from steps which the Soviets would logically take to consolidate and strengthen their position in the eastern zone of Germany now that they are faced with the tying of West Germany into the Western defense community.

4. In considering possible courses of action, we must recognize that they can be pursued effectively only with the support of our major allies. It is reasonable to assume that divergencies of view are liable to develop as to the desirability and effectiveness of specific courses of action, and the United States must take these into account at every stage of planning and execution of plans.

5. The United States should therefore, as appropriate, seek agreement with its allies to common courses of action in each of the situations set forth below:

a. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded;

b. Serious harassing measures short of a full blockade are employed;

c. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed;

d. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable;

e. A Soviet or satellite attack on the Western forces in Berlin occurs.

a. courses of action in the event that western access to berlin is not seriously impeded

6. The United States, in concert with appropriate allies, should take advantage of situations in which access to Berlin is not seriously impeded, to decrease Berlin’s vulnerability by such measures as the expansion of stockpiles and of airlift capabilities. In addition, they should prepare to react by economic and other reprisals against the Soviet system in the event that the Soviet rulers intensify their harassing measures. Finally, in the light of the tensions which would be created by intensified harassing measures they should develop Western strength and unity to a degree not otherwise possible.

7. The measures which can be taken to decrease the vulnerability and enhance the security of the Western position in Berlin depend largely on the degree of Western unity. If the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic have a determination to hold Berlin equalling our own, it should be possible to increase our staying power. If this unity is evident to the Soviet rulers, it may serve as a deterrent to aggressive Soviet action. The United States should do what it can to foster unity on this matter.

8. A variety of measures should be taken to convey to the Soviet rulers the determination of the Western powers to remain in Berlin even at the risk of using force to maintain access to the city. It is believed that informal warnings are preferable to formal governmental statements, whether made publicly or communicated through diplomatic channels. Formal action might become desirable if the communists take or seem about to take actions which threaten to make the Western position untenable. It should be made clear that the Western powers will regard the Soviet Union as being responsible for action by the East Germans or other satellites.

a. High officials of the United States should from time to time indicate in press conferences, speeches, etc., that the United States is determined to remain in Berlin, will take whatever measures are necessary to maintain access to the city and their position in it, and is confident that the Russians are sufficiently aware of the dangerous consequences which would flow from the imposition of harassing measures to make such action unlikely.

. . . . . . .

c. U.S. officials in Germany should from time to time “brief” the West Berlin and West German authorities on the determination of the Western powers to maintain their position in the city, with the expectation that such information would reach the communists.

d. Parallel action by officials of allied governments should be sought.

9. The United States should take and encourage action which will strengthen and make evident allied preparedness to cope with a new blockade. This should include the further build-up of a staggered stockpile^* in Berlin adequate to maintain Berlin and the Western position there for a year, as an initial goal, based upon the assumption that a limited airlift can be established and maintained. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government should prepare, as a matter of urgency, a plan for building up and financing this stockpile and for necessary related measures, such as the maintenance and improvement of Berlin airfields. When the foregoing stockpile level has been reached, consideration should be given to the desirability of further increases which would prolong the period during which the Western powers could maintain their position in Berlin in the face of harassing measures.

10. Consideration should now be given to the questions whether it is feasible to evacuate part of the Berlin population and whether, if this could be done, the Western airlift could supply the remaining population and the Western forces with essential supplies.

11. In preparation for severe harassing measures or a blockade, the United States, in concert where appropriate with the U.K., France, and other allied nations, should:

a. Make plans for mounting the maximum practicable airlift.

b. Make plans for such contingencies as use of alternate land routes to Berlin and for engineering work which may be needed to repair obstructions to ground travel such as bridge and railroad repair.

c. Make plans for an immediate cessation of trade and transport with the Soviet bloc by the United States and as many allied nations as possible in the event of a blockade. Since the United States now has a virtual embargo on trade with the Soviet bloc, there is little which the United States can do to increase pressure on the Soviet bloc by intensification of its own trade restrictions. In view of the fact that the possibility of counter-action and reprisal depends almost entirely upon the extent to which our allies in Western Europe are willing to take the necessary measures, it is essential to obtain some sense of the extent to which these other countries would be willing to institute such measures in the event of a new Berlin blockade or other harassment of Berlin. Accordingly, the United States should consult with the U.K., France, other Coordinating Committee (COCOM) countries, and Western Germany on this issue and joint planning should be promptly instituted to develop these measures in detail. In this connection, consideration should be given to the best means of replacing from non-Soviet sources, the essential Western imports from the Soviet system which might be cut off by the Soviet rulers if the Western powers cut off important exports to the Soviet system.

d. Recognizing the possibility that the Western position in Berlin might ultimately become untenable, make plans to materially increase military capabilities to meet the increased threat of general war resulting from that possibility.

e. Make plans for the use of military force in carrying out the courses of action contained in paragraphs 23–25.

12. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government should make such preparations as are feasible for additional reprisals which might be taken against the Soviet system when and if the Soviet rulers intensify harassing measures.

13. The United States should discuss certain aspects of the problem of reprisals with the U.K., France, Western Germany and other allies whose cooperation would be important and attempt to reach agreement with them on the general nature and purpose of the reprisals which would be taken when and if the Soviet rulers intensify harassing measures. The costs of reprisals to the Western powers should be considered as well as the cost of any set of reprisals to the Soviet system. Reprisals need not be restricted to ones directly linked to the local situation, particularly since the Soviet zone is becoming increasingly less vulnerable to the measures of economic retaliation employed up to now. For example, reprisals might include measures against Soviet sea-borne commerce, such as strict enforcement of all relevant laws, regulations, and so forth, with the object of greatly slowing down and impeding this commerce without actually forbidding it.

14. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government should keep under continuing review, in the light of the situation in Berlin, the courses of action which could be taken to accelerate the Western defense effort and to increase Western unity, including consideration of full mobilization.

15. The United States should discuss means of increasing Western strength and unity with the U.K., France, Western Germany, and other allies whose cooperation would be important, and attempt to reach agreement with these allies that such actions will be initiated when and if the Soviet Union intensifies harassing measures.

. . . . . . .

The United States and its allies should maintain flexibility in implementing the courses of action set forth in the following sections.

b. courses of action in the event of serious harassing measures short of a full blockade

17. One of the most probable lines of Soviet or satellite action in the coming period would be employment of harassing tactics, particularly with reference to movement of persons and things to and from West Berlin, short of full blockade but drastic enough to seriously injure the Western position in Berlin, without, however, threatening to make it immediately untenable. In addition to producing this effect, the purpose would probably also be to undermine West Berlin morale and sow confusion and dissension among the Western powers while not incurring the psychological disadvantages of a full blockade.

18. The object of United States courses of action in meeting such a situation should be to minimize the above-mentioned effects, prolong Western capacity to stay in Berlin, and use the increased tension to accelerate the strengthening of the West. Accordingly, the Western powers should initiate—taking account of the particular circumstances at the time—such measures as may be appropriate for which preparations will have been made in accordance with the recommendations in paragraphs 11–… above.

c. courses of action in the event that a blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed

19. Because it would be very difficult to disguise the true nature of any armed attack on Berlin, and nearly certain that any armed attack would rapidly lead to general war, it is highly probable that the Soviets or satellites, if they decide to drive the Western powers from Berlin, will attempt to accomplish this result by restricting access to the city. Belief on the part of the Soviets or satellites that the Western powers would probably use force rather than abandon the city without resistance will tend to deter Soviet action which would pose this choice for the West. However, the Soviet or satellites may not be deterred. If the Soviet or satellites so intensify harassing measures as to threaten to make the Western position in Berlin eventually untenable, the Western powers should prolong the period during which they will be able to remain in the city by taking such measures as an airlift, and should make use of this period to accelerate the Western defense effort and to increase Western unity, including consideration of the initiation of full mobilization. They should also take retaliatory action in an effort to induce the Soviet or satellites to cease their harassment. In short, during this period the Western powers should initiate—taking account of the particular circumstances at the time—such measures as may be appropriate for which preparations will have been made in accordance with the recommendations in paragraphs 11–… above.

20. The Western powers should re-open the Berlin case in the United Nations and should make full use of the United Nations in their efforts to prevent the serious deterioration of the situation and to gain world support for their efforts to remain in Berlin.

21. A direct approach to the appropriate Soviet authorities by the U.K., French, and U.S. Ambassadors in Moscow should be considered if and when a blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a blockade are imposed or are about to be imposed.^† It might be desirable to make a frank exposition, in the light of firm determination of the Western powers to maintain their position in Berlin, of the consequences of the course on which the Soviets or satellites appeared about to embark or had embarked.

d. courses of action in the event that the western position has become or is about to become untenable

22. The Soviet Union probably now has at its disposal means short of overt attack which could seriously interfere with the operation of an airlift. If this proves to be the case and if it employs these means, the Western position in Berlin may become untenable.

23. The Western powers should avoid the use of force unless and until necessity dictates. However, if the Western position is about to become untenable despite the measures recommended in the paragraphs above, it is the view of the United States Government that the Western powers should be prepared to use limited military force rather than voluntarily abandon their position in Berlin. If this need arises, they should realize that they are likely to meet resistance and that war would then be an imminent probability, and they should therefore initiate reasonable precautionary measures probably including full mobilization and appropriate redeployments of military forces. Additionally, they should take measures in the UN and elsewhere designed to lay the best possible foundation for the forceful action which might become necessary.²

24. As a last resort short of the use of force, an ultimatum to the Soviet Union would probably be desirable. It would demand the lifting of the blockade and other harassing measures and would explicitly or implicitly threaten the use of force to break the blockade in the event that the Soviet or satellites disregarded it. The precise nature, terms, and form of the ultimatum and the participation in it should be determined in the light of the circumstances at the time. It should be formulated in terms which are consistent with the UN Charter, particularly Article 51, and which will serve to gain the widest possible UN support.

25. If the Western position becomes untenable despite the measures recommended above and if in these circumstances it is decided to use force to open a corridor to Berlin, the Western powers may be able to maintain their position in Berlin if the Soviets do not offer armed opposition. If, however, determined Soviet armed opposition should develop, the Western powers should not undertake to commit additional forces to meet such opposition in an effort to hold Berlin, but would have to face general war.³

e. courses of action in the event of a soviet or satellite attack on western forces in berlin

26. The United States, U.K. and France maintain a sizable military force in Berlin. An attack on these forces is covered by the NAT commitment. A Tripartite Declaration issued at the signing of the EDC Treaty reaffirmed our commitment with respect to Berlin.⁴ We assume that control of Berlin, in and of itself, is not so important to the Soviet rulers as to justify involving the Soviet Union in general war. We can therefore act on the assumption that the Soviet rulers will not use Soviet forces to drive the Western powers from the city unless they decide for other reasons to provoke or initiate general war.

27. If the Soviet Union should attack Berlin with its own forces, the United States Government will have to act on the assumption that general war is imminent. In addition to resisting the initial attack and to placing itself in the best possible position for immediate global war, the United States Government should, if circumstances permit, address an ultimatum to the Soviet Government before full implementation of emergency war plans. It will be desirable to issue the ultimatum through NATO, if possible. If this is not possible, it would be of great importance to act in concert with other allied governments, especially the Governments of the U.K., France, and the Federal Republic. The precise nature, terms and form of the ultimatum and the participation in it should be determined in light of the circumstances at the time. Appropriate action should be taken in the UN to gain the widest possible support for the actions which had been forced upon the United States and its allies by the Soviet Union.

28. It should be noted that an overt, direct attack on Berlin by Soviet forces as an initial move in a deliberate resort to war is most unlikely. If the Soviet rulers decide to initiate or provoke general war using Berlin as a pretext, it is probable that they will seek to conduct themselves in a way which will obscure their own responsibility and place responsibility on the Western powers. It should be an important objective of the United States and its allies to foil this effort, no matter what ruses the Soviet rulers employ to conceal or dissemble the nature of their action.

29. It is probable that if the Soviet rulers decide to drive the Western powers from Berlin by force, they will initially use East German forces and will attempt to portray this attack as a counteraction to some action by the Western powers.⁵ If this contingency arises, the United States should act as indicated in paragraph 27. It would probably be feasible and it might be even more important in these circumstances to issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union before full implementation of emergency plans for general war.

30. We can also act on the assumption that the Soviet rulers will not use East German or other satellite forces to drive the Western powers from the city unless they are prepared to accept the risk of general war.⁶ This is so because it would be extremely difficult to localize the resulting hostilities. A possible exception should be noted: there is perhaps a chance that the Soviet rulers might use East German forces—alone or reinforced by other satellite forces—under certain circumstances in the belief that if the Western powers did not back down, the satellite action could be broken off without involving the Soviet Union in war. So long as Soviet forces remain in Eastern Germany, should satellite forces attack Berlin the United States, in concert with appropriate allies, should immediately call upon the Soviet Union to suppress the attack at once or stand responsible for its continuance. Should the USSR fail to take adequate and prompt action to terminate the satellite attack, the action outlined in paragraph 27 should be taken.

1. NSC 132/1 consists of this report, a cover sheet, and a note by Lay, which states that the National Security Council at its 118th meeting on June 11 had adopted NSC 132 subject to certain revisions (see subsequent footnotes for the differences between NSC 132 and 132/1) recommended by the Senior Staff. The resulting report, printed here, and circulated as NSC 132/1, was approved by President Truman on June 12.

   The first draft of this paper which has been identified in the files of the Department of State was prepared by GER and S/P and dated Apr. 29, 1952. (762A.00/4–2952) It is based on the same lines but is briefer than NSC 132/1. Another draft, dated May 13 (762.0221/5–1352), has a more complete treatment of the problem. It was approved by S/P, GER, and UNA and circulated by Lay to the NSC Senior Staff on May 14. The text of NSC 132 is indicated in the footnotes following.

2. A staggered stockpile as here proposed is one containing a preponderant supply of relatively inexpensive items needed in large quantities, such as coal and grain, which require greater capacity for their transport during an airlift than the remaining necessary items. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. This does not, of course, preclude approaches at other levels such as have been employed in the face of past harassments. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. In NSC 132 paragraph 23 reads as follows:

   “23. The Western powers should avoid the use of force unless and until necessity dictates. It might be desirable, before this stage is reached, to approach the highest Soviet authorities in a last minute effort to avoid war. However, if the Western position becomes untenable despite the measures recommended in the paragraphs above, it is the view of the United States Government that the Western powers should use force rather than abandon their position in Berlin. If this need arises, they should act in the realization that they will almost certainly meet resistance, that war is an imminent probability, and that they should initiate reasonable precautionary measures probably including full mobilization and appropriate redeployment of military forces. Additionally, they should take measures in the UN and elsewhere designed to lay the best possible foundation for the forceful action which might become necessary.” (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 132 Series)

3. Paragraph 25 in NSC 132 reads as follows:

   “25. If the Western position becomes untenable despite the measures recommended above and if in these circumstances it is decided to use force, the Western powers may be able to maintain their position in Berlin if the Soviets do not offer armed opposition. If however, determined Soviet armed opposition should develop and continue, the Western powers would have to face a general war.” (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 132 Series)

4. Regarding the tripartite declaration, see Document 537.

5. In NSC 132 the first sentence of paragraph 29 reads as follows:

   “For the reason indicated in the preceding paragraph, it is probable that if the Soviet rulers decide to drive the Western powers from Berlin by force (with the intention of proceeding to general war if the attack is resisted), they will initially use East German forces and will attempt to portray this attack as a counteraction to some action by the Western powers.” (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 132 Series)

6. The last part of this sentence in NSC 132 reads “unless they decide for other reasons to provoke general war.” (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 132 Series)