Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–1954: Telegram

No. 505
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential

Berlin, February 19, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 176. Department pass OSD. 21st (and final) quadripartite plenary, Molotov presiding:²

I. Item 3—Austria.

a. Figl said reluctantly and with misgivings Austria would agree extend period of occupation; but not to some indeterminate uncontrollable date, e.g., conclusion German peace treaty; rather to some definite date, e.g., 30 June 1955.³

b. Molotov had three points:

1. Soviet delegation willing accept implication Eden’s observations, i.e., willing accept unilateral Austrian declaration intent not enter military alliances; such declaration possible as appendage treaty.

2. Soviet delegation reiterated its proposal that postponement troop withdrawal be indefinite but be reconsidered some time 1955.

3. Figl’s proposals met situation to some extent, but not sufficiently. Hope Austrians after further discussion may be willing accept latest Soviet version Article 33.⁴

c. Dulles expressed profound regret that even after considerable and “sacrificial” efforts by Austrians, Soviet delegation still unable conclude treaty. Since treaty not to be signed at this conference, US delegation reserves right reconsider its acceptance previously disputed articles; therefore withdraws earlier concessions.

d. Bidault made three points:

1. France cannot accept (re Article 33) any subordination Austrian independence to extraneous issues, i.e., German peace treaty, since to link Austrian and German issues is in nature of an Anschluss.

2. Since treaty not being concluded, necessary French delegation withdraw its concessions on disputed articles.

3. Under terms Article 35 Austria cannot regain control and benefit its oil resources until fixed period after conclusion treaty. Beginning this fixed period now in indefinite future; but oil resources not inexhaustible; hence this an additional argument for promptest possible conclusion treaty.

e. Eden: (1) Expressed regret nonacceptance Austrian offer. (2) Said Article 33 is essential point and UK Government could never accept Soviet version. (3) Re current Soviet offer substitute declaration intent for Article 4-bis, Austrians had already made declaration—“which should suffice,” therefore, UK entirely opposed appending any such declaration to treaty. Eden withdrew UK concessions on disputed articles.

f. Figl made alternative proposal, i.e., extend (from 18 months to indefinite) period for residual supervision by four-power Ambassadors.

g. Molotov took note positions other governments which he said Soviet delegation would study; but with view to concluding discussion this agenda item, tabled draft resolution to effect that conference deems it advisable continue efforts conclude Austrian treaty through diplomatic channels in Vienna.⁵

h. The three Foreign Ministers studied Molotov’s draft resolution, Figl made terminal speech voicing regret at no settlement and hoping for better outcome earliest possible.

i. Dulles proposed amendment Molotov resolution to make it provide for resumption discussion through diplomatic channels in Vienna whenever USSR prepared name definite date at which it would agree to troop withdrawals; pointed out that it would be most misleading to imply, as Soviet resolution does, that solution is possible by continuing negotiation. This implication completely wrong since prime obstacle has been Soviet desire keep troops Austria fundamentally incompatible with purposes treaty. This difficulty not removable by talk but only by change Soviet attitude which could be evidenced by willingness fix definite date for troop withdrawals. Bidault and Eden seconded Dulles amendment. Molotov “took note” Dulles resolution and UK French support thereof. It, however, hampered conclusion treaty. He reiterated real difficulties are attempted revival German militarism, EDC, danger Anschluss, etc.—all of which not fault of Soviet Government.

II. Agenda item 2—Germany and European security.

a. Molotov called for views on two latest Soviet proposals. (Secto 159 and Secto 161⁶).

b. Dulles’ comment confined to proposals for study police forces in Germany. Said they did not seem, as drafted, have sufficient substance be worth pursuing. Wondered if they indicated USSR now willing reconsider 1948 UN proposal for general census military forces. Such inquiry would be more useful since enumeration forces and armaments in GDR would only touch part of total problem of forces as causing international tensions.

c. Bidault agreed with Dulles re Soviet proposal for study police forces. Thought both proposals consistent with Soviet position throughout conference which had single purpose promoting appearance unification while perpetuating division Germany in fact. Re Soviet second proposal, of little value since facilities already exist for promoting commercial, cultural, etc, contacts which anyway primarily business of Germans, not occupying powers. With view to facilitating “small solution” (since a big one seemed impossible) Western authorities were preparing a concrete program which they would communicate shortly, through their High Commissioners, to their Soviet colleagues.

d. Eden dismissed police proposal on grounds it needs more time for study than we now have. On two-committee proposal, he amplified Bidault remarks by saying Western study, now nearing completion, would cover these points.

1. Re inter-zonal:

a. Abolition residence permits.

b. Opening zonal crossing points.

c. Liberalization transport services.

d. Control procedures over inter-zonal transit.

e. Relaxation restrictions on circulation printed matter.

2. Re Berlin:

a. Reduction formalities on inter-sectoral movement of persons.

b. Elimination obstacles for movement of goods.

c. Relaxation of frontier control between sectors.

d. Improvement communication facilities.

These proposals would and should be taken up by High Commissioners in normal conduct their business. Soviet proposal establish two committees improper since occupying powers should not go beyond their area present responsibilities in order enlarge area purely formal contacts between governments East and West Germany.

e. Molotov briefly defended both Soviet proposals; police proposal on ground it desirable tamp down rumors re militarization police forces in East and West Germany: two-committee proposal on ground four Foreign Ministers ought be able agree something as simple as that. He then introduced new resolution to effect four governments would continue their efforts reach satisfactory solution German problem for purpose insuring peace in Europe.⁷ All three Western Ministers objected to introducing this late date an illusory and over-optimistic statement which not an accurate reflection of area of disagreement.

III. Agenda item 1—Disarmament; five-power meeting.

Conference considered two draft resolutions (see Secto 164 and Secto 171⁸). Both accepted without discussion. Dulles pointed out disarmament resolution does not supplant or interrupt current discussions including those re Eisenhower atomic pool proposal.⁹ Bidault advised conference that Swiss Government had confirmed to French Ambassador Bern Swiss Government willingness conference be held Geneva.

IV. Quadripartite communiqué.

Accepted without discussion. For text, see Secto 171.

V. Concluding statements.

a. Dulles verbatim text, see Secto 175.¹⁰

b. Bidault’s statement¹¹ largely lecture on “realism.” Said it necessary recognize great differences not only on policies but on facts and interpretations thereof. It necessary recognize division of world not remediable by waving magic wand. Given fundamental differences, it desirable try find practical solutions where possible and proceed step by step concretely on basis of inescapable facts.

c. Eden statement¹² quite brief, containing these points:

1. Recognition problems Germany and Austria was basis Western approach. They still basic and sooner or later it will be recognized that we must start there rather than with wider, more pretentious security schemes.

2. Until such recognition, it clearly desirable do what possible in way of small solutions through High Commissioners in Germany and Austria.

3. Failure conclude Austrian treaty most regrettable.

4. On other side of ledger:

A. Disarmament resolution not great thing but shows seriousness with which powers view this problem.

B. Korea–Indochina resolution may break an existing deadlock and open way for constructive solution tangible problems.

5. Even in area where policies fundamentally opposed discussion at this conference not valueless inasmuch as understanding of opposing views was increased.

d. Molotov’s statement¹³ largely repetitive points previously made in specific context. Re Germany, gave brief summary Soviet position as stated many times before—elections should be supervised by Germany; dangers of military groupings; EDC; Anschluss; et cetera. Re Austria, again reiterated EDC, Anschluss, German militarism themes. Expressed gratification re disarmament Korea-Indochina resolution. Took occasion to emphasize conflicts of interest between munitions merchants on one hand and masses of people on the other. Suggested “some governments” influenced by former, USSR only by latter. In conclusion stated that resumption of direct contact was good since it facilitated consideration urgent problems and itself went part way toward reducing tensions. Hoped unsolved problems would remain on four-power agenda and further efforts be made find solutions.¹⁴

1. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, Paris, London, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. The meeting began at 3:10 p.m. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this plenary, USDEL PLEN/21, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.
3. On Feb. 17 the Embassy in Vienna had informed the U.S. Delegation that new instructions were being sent to Figl including authority to offer the proposals made in this final plenary. (Telegram 71 to Berlin, 663.001/2–1754) The Tripartite Group on Austria met with the Austrian Delegation late on the evening of Feb. 17 to discuss these instructions and the U.S. Delegation reported that it was faced with the following dilemma: to satisfy Austrian public opinion with the counterproposals or to deny Molotov any opportunity for creating uncertainty as to who was to blame for the conference ending without a treaty. (Secto 163 from Berlin, Feb. 18, 396.1 BE/2–1854) Apparently the U.S. Delegation decided that it was better to allow Figl to make these proposals in the hope that Molotov would reject them.
4. For the Soviet proposal on Article 33, see FPM(54)66, Document 521.
5. For this proposal, circulated as FPM(54)80, see Berlin Discussions, p. 241, or Cmd. 9080, p. 173.
6. Secto 159, Document 498. Secto 161 is not printed, but see FPM(54)75, Document 524, for the second Soviet proposal.
7. For this proposal, circulated as FPM(54)81, see Berlin Discussions, p. 230, or Cmd. 9080, p. 130.
8. Secto 164 transmitted the text of the agreed resolution on disarmament; see Document 495. Secto 171 transmitted the text of the final four-power communiqué which included the agreement on the conference on Korea and Indochina. (Both 396.1 BE/2–1854) For the text of this communiqué, see Document 525.
9. See footnote 2, Document 326.
10. Infra.
11. For Bidault’s closing statement, circulated as FPM(54)88, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 211–212, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 175–176.
12. For Eden’s closing statement, circulated as FPM(54)87, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 212–213, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 176–177.
13. For Molotov’s closing statement, circulated as FPM(54)89, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 213–216, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 177–179.
14. The plenary adjourned at 7:01 p.m.