396.1 BE/2–1754
No. 495
United States Delegation Record of
the Fifth Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February
17, 1954, 11 a.m.
- Present: United States
- Secretary Dulles
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. Nash
- Mr. Bohlen
- France
- M. Bidault
- M. Parodi
- M. DeMargerie
- M. Andronikof
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Eden
- Mr. Roberts
- Mr. Allen
- Mr. Birse
- USSR
- Mr. Molotov
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Malik
- Mr. Troyanovski
Mr. Eden, as Chairman, stated that they had two items before them; disarmament and the Far East. On disarmament, Mr. Bidault had made a speech in support of his proposal1 and he inquired what his colleagues wished to do: to finish the disarmament discussion and then go on to Far Eastern questions, or what.
It was agreed to start with disarmament.
The Secretary said he had nothing to say on the disarmament question. They had two proposals—one from Mr. Molotov,2 and [Page 1143] one from Mr. Bidault. Perhaps Mr. Molotov would wish to explain his proposal and then, subject to what the Chairman might wish to say, they could go on to the Far Eastern matter.
Mr. Molotov said that it appeared to the Soviet Delegation valuable to have a short exchange of views on disarmament even though they had little time left. It was worthy of note that two of the delegations had considered it important to discuss this matter and had submitted proposals. World public opinion expected them to devote some attention to this important question and this fact should be taken into account as well as the general desire they all had to see some reduction in international tension. The Soviet proposal had been of a specific nature and, while it had not been rejected in toto, it had not been accepted. The French proposal in many respects was not satisfactory but at least it did favor the general idea of disarmament. The Soviet Delegation therefore could accept the first two paragraphs of the French proposal with the addition in the second of the words “or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments.” To this could be added an additional paragraph stating that they would want an exchange of views to contribute to a satisfactory solution of this problem.
The Secretary said he wished to be sure that this new Soviet proposal was in conformity with the UN resolution calling on a smaller group of powers to explore the disarmament question.
Mr. Bidault said he did not think there was any incompatibility with the Soviet amendment to the French draft and the point Mr. Dulles had made. He thought they could accept the Soviet proposal subject to drafting changes to bring it into harmony with the French text.
Mr. Eden said he saw no incompatibility either.
Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had tried to reduce the armaments question to a minimum and he saw no contradiction with any UN matter.
Mr. Dulles suggested that possibly this might be made clearer by inclusion of specific reference to GA resolution of November 28, 1953.3
[Mr. Bidault had been under a misconception as to the meaning of the Soviet proposal which was intended to replace all the balance of the French draft with the exception of paragraphs 1 and 2.]4
[Page 1144]Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation wished to avoid disputed questions and that there were several points of dispute in the French resolution. To meet the views of the US Delegation he was prepared to add a sentence to the effect that these exchanges of views would take place within the framework of the United Nations.
The Secretary then said he wished to be sure that the exchange of views envisaged between the four were not designed to replace or affect the current discussions on atomic energy matters which at this stage were being conducted bilaterally between the US and the USSR.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation agreed with Mr. Dulles and that the proposed exchange on disarmament did not affect in any way the current talks on atomic matters.
Mr. Bidault, referring to the radical alteration of the French draft said it was not an amendment but an amputation of the French draft.
The Secretary said he was bound to say that while he saw no serious objection to the Soviet proposal, it would not evoke much enthusiasm in the world or at least in the United States. He felt that the French draft had had a substantive paragraph on the nonencouragement of aggression and that it was too bad this substantive point would be lost.
Mr. Bidault said that he must say that the Soviet proposal did not give evidence of the interest in this subject which the French put in their own proposal. He wondered if the Soviet amendment could not be added to the French text.
Mr. Molotov said that the new Soviet text does not satisfy them completely and they preferred their original, but this was the amendment. The French text had certain disputed questions—for example: the definition of aggression on which no agreement existed between them. If they began to debate that they would be led into a jungle from which they would hardly have time to get out. He felt that their version was the minimum which would indicate that the conference had not neglected the question of disarmament.
Mr. Eden then proposed that a specific reference to paragraph 6 of the UN resolution of November 28, 1953 should be added.
Mr. Molotov asked for the views of his colleagues on Mr. Eden’s amendment.
The Secretary said he felt if it was not practical to adopt the French text that Mr. Eden’s amendment would strengthen the document.
Mr. Bidault said he had rather strong feelings on this subject. In fact, only three lines were left of the French resolution and those dealt with the obvious—peace is strengthened by disarmament. He [Page 1145] felt that Mr. Eden’s addition improved the Soviet suggestion and that while he had no objection, he had little enthusiasm for the text.
Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation could accept Mr. Eden’s amendment.
Mr. Bidault said he thought they wished to be clear that the draft they were at present discussing provided that they must reach agreement on disarmament or at least on reduction of armaments.
The text was then agreed with the inclusion of Mr. Eden’s amendment (text attached).
Mr. Eden asked Mr. Molotov if he had any comments on the UK proposal put in at the last meeting.5
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation could agree on the third paragraph of the UK draft provided that there were included the words “Soviet draft dealing with the countries who had participated in hostilities in Korea,” in place of the reference to forces placed under UN Command, so it would then read “countries whose forces had taken part in hostilities in Korea.”
The Secretary said this form was acceptable to the US Delegation.
Mr. Eden likewise agreed.
Mr. Molotov then said, as to time and place, the Soviet Delegation could accept Geneva as the place and April as the month and he hoped before the end of the day to be able to give a final answer on the exact date.
Mr. Eden remarked that there appeared to be nothing more in paragraph three.
Mr. Molotov said he had one more question—namely, what was meant by the word “representatives”.
Mr. Eden said, as it was his draft, he could state that he had in mind not committing the Foreign Ministers definitely at this stage; they could of course, however, attend. The word “representatives” could cover attendance by the Foreign Ministers or by other officials.
Mr. Molotov remarked that this left the question vague.
The Secretary stated that if this conference was held, he hoped to attend at least for the opening; but since it might be a long conference, he could not undertake to commit himself to stay for the duration. He added that it was our custom to appoint special representatives for conferences. For example: He had been the special representative for the US charged with negotiating the Japanese [Page 1146] Peace Treaty and that only at the final stage had the Secretary of State taken part.
Mr. Bidault said it seemed to him that the word “representatives” certainly did not exclude Ministers and simply meant that they were not bound to come. He said the problem was easier for France since they were in a privileged position insofar as distance was concerned.
Mr. Eden said that if he personally was not able to attend or to stay for the whole conference, he envisaged a British representative of Ministerial rank.
Mr. Molotov said he thought this point could be accepted but he would like a little time to think it over and possibly the wording might be improved. The discussion then turned to paragraph 4 of the British text.
Mr. Molotov, turning to paragraph 4 of the British text, said he thought it should be shortened and improved. As written, it dealt with many problems in a few words; he thought they should try to find some simpler form which would make matters clearer. In reply to Mr. Eden’s suggestion, Mr. Molotov said he would have some thoughts to offer.
The Secretary said that he agreed and that the original US paragraph on this point was more precise.6
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation likewise favored their original draft. He then said that if the British paragraph was amended, excluding the words beginning “if and when” and ending with “Indochina,” and the following wording substituted—namely: “the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at a conference,” the balance of the paragraph could be accepted.
Mr. Bidault said that this was a question in which his Government was deeply interested. He would therefore like to think it over and possibly consult with his Government and then maybe later in the day or tomorrow he could give a final reply.
The Secretary said they all recognized that this was a question of particular importance to the French and he would await the words of the French Delegation before expressing his.
Mr. Eden said he held the same view. He added that there only remained the last paragraph which should not encounter objection.
Mr. Molotov said he felt this statement might best be left to those delegations who wished to make such a declaration.
The Secretary said that the United States could not join in this resolution which seemed to imply recognition of the Chinese People’s Republic as the legal Government of China unless this reservation was included. He thought that the Soviet Union would wish [Page 1147] to take a similar position in regard to other countries such as the Republic of Korea. He said this reservation did not involve only China but other countries as well—for example, the countries which would be involved in the Indochinese discussion including the Associated States.
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation understood that this reservation affected other countries as well as China and that it also would affect countries other than the four represented here. He would have to repeat therefore what he had said earlier—namely, that the Soviet Delegation could not speak for the Chinese People’s Republic or for the Korean People’s Democratic Republic. He felt that if they could reach an agreement here on the conference it would not be difficult to avoid undermining the authority or national dignity of any of its participants. He felt that agreement could be reached on this point not only by the four but by others. The Soviet Delegation did not consider it desirable to include the last paragraph but if the United States considered it desirable the Soviet Delegation will study the question and see if they could find some acceptable language. Possibly the United States Delegation might think it over and might find it possible not to insist on this point.
Mr. Bidault said that he saw in this paragraph merely a statement of the status quo with no obligation either way. It merely meant that the preceding paragraph did not have any meaning beyond what it says. He said the French attitude towards the Chinese People’s Republic was well known and he did not have to explain it.
Mr. Eden said he agreed it was a statement of fact that added nothing and bound no one. He said the UK position was likewise known—namely, that they recognized the Chinese People’s Republic, but they don’t seem to recognize them much.
The Secretary said he wished to be clear that the first two paragraphs of the UK resolution were accepted by the Soviet Government.
Mr. Molotov confirmed this view.
It was agreed that they would meet again tomorrow morning in restricted session and would merely tell the press that the discussion on point one had been continued today and would be resumed tomorrow.
At the restricted session this morning the Secretary pointed out again that he had heard that he might encounter headwinds on return flight to the United States and therefore he would like to be able to take off from Berlin at about 7:30 p.m. tomorrow evening.
[Page 1148]The Ministers also discussed the last day’s session which it was agreed would begin at 3 p.m. and there would be time at the end for each Minister to make some remarks of a general nature.
Mr. Molotov inquired whether there was any joint or common conclusion that they would record and how they were to express such agreements as may have been reached.
The Secretary said he thought this was worth considering and the Ministers agreed to appoint a Committee of Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Malik, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Seydoux to consider the question of how they would record officially any agreements reached.7
- For the French proposal, see FPM(54)15, Document 509.↩
- For the Soviet proposal, see Secto 43, Document 376.↩
- For this resolution, see United Nations General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17, Resolutions, pp. 3–4, or Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 838.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- For the British proposal, see Dulte 75, Document 483.↩
- Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.↩
- For a report on the work of this committee, see the memorandum by MacArthur, Document 501.↩
- The text of this resolution was transmitted in Secto 164 from Berlin, Feb. 18. (396.1 BE/2–1854)↩