Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/1–754: Telegram

No. 326
The Chargé in France (Joyce) to the Department of State

top secret priority

Paris, January 7, 1954—5 p.m.

2527. From Tyler. Reference: Deptel 2397.¹ Admittedly present climate Western European opinion not favorable with regard to interpretation and prospect role which US will play Berlin conference.

It seems to us that major factor with which we have to contend is generally prevalent impression that US going to Berlin first and foremost in order prove contention that no basis for agreement with Soviet Union can be reached, rather than in order to explore meticulously and objectively all possibilities for reaching agreement.

We here feel that psychological consequences of this impression cannot be individually eliminated or reversed by specific psychological warfare or propaganda action. …In our opinion problem needs rather to be considered in terms of the creation of an atmosphere or climate in which posture of United States seems consistent with position and expectations our partners.

If above diagnosis correct we will benefit most by recapturing and publicizing note struck by President in his UN atomic speech of December eighth² in passages relating to sincerity and determination of US to explore every possibility for reaching agreement with USSR at conference table.

While of course we cannot prevent newspaper speculation, official pronouncements by officials of US Government could profitably find occasion stress our determination explore every avenue and thus create impression that we are in earnest and not merely going through motions. Western European opinion in general will be acutely sensitive to US posture with regard possibility reaching solution Indochina problem. French opinion in addition will have equal sensitiveness with regard prospects reaching solution Indochina problem.

Rightly or wrongly considerable section French opinion believes that possibility may exist reaching negotiated peace Indochina if United States willing not slam door to possibility eventual five power conference even if this ultimately involves de facto recognition Communist China.

While we must of course expose and knock down any attempt by Soviet Union bargain off abandonment EDC in return for calling off Ho Chi Minh, we must avoid appearing now to take position which in eyes of French would render America responsible for continuation French financial and human sacrifice Indochina war, “kept going” thanks to American financial and military assistance. Here again we find ourselves in psychological context which appears at first sight negative but implications of which are decidedly positive for good or for bad.

With regard to … action which might be taken along line in reference message, we do not feel that statements such as those proposed, whether on Soviet colonial and nationalist issue or record Soviet treaty violations, are relevant to problem under consideration. In fact we advise, for reasons already given above, against anything resembling pre-conference campaign discredit Soviet Union and implicit advances impugning motives Soviet Union agreeing to meet Berlin. Our position and tripartite unity in general will be best served by US Government meeting in Berlin without any suggestion that we are apprehensive at possibility reaching agreement with Soviet Union on any issue of concern to our allies.

One of most intelligent and best-informed observers current world affairs with whom Embassy officer discussed generally topic under consideration, said that US position psychologically at disadvantage in eyes French opinion for following reason: US policy fully and rigidly committed to (a) creation of EDC and (b) continuation present French role Indochina, both of which issues emotionally and politically explosive. If US had given indication willingness follow more flexible tactical course on either of these two issues, chances of the other one succeeding in accordance with our policy would have been increased. However present situation seems, to this observer, to cast role US as holding big stick over France in either hand, so that psychological reaction inclined to be rather fear that US will use Berlin Conference to prove that no alternative exists to present east-west relationship, rather than to act as moral and political leader free world in exploring possibilities even restricted areas agreement.

While above obviously over-simplification for purpose illustration, we believe it contains essential elements psychological truth in terms our general posture. This borne out by stress French Assembly debate January sixth on “independence” with which French Government expected approach Berlin Conference.

To sum up:

a. We do not believe anything useful can now be attempted in terms suggested by reference message to immunize western opinion before Berlin Conference against Soviet appeals.

b. We feel that significant psychological area is less what Soviet Union may say to western opinion than what western opinion believes are basic motives and intentions US Government with regard forthcoming conference. In proportion as climate confidence in west between ourselves and our partners is created, so Soviet appeals will be discounted and fail.

c. Reiteration sincerity and earnestness with which we approaching conference by responsible officials, combined with words suggesting confidence in our partners and recognition validity their preoccupations would doubtless contribute effectively to general improvement atmosphere.

d. We recommend against campaign …exposing or recording Soviet duplicity and past record for two reasons: First because irrelevant to psychological problem before us and second because such campaign likely be traced to US and thus would tend confirm existing suspicions our intentions.

e. We feel that US attitudes and policy as revealed in terms discussions and issues Berlin Conference will be considered by western opinion as touchstone world role US. Therefore recommend that nothing be neglected in arrangements conference which will contribute to insuring that our role will be presented in most accurate and most favorable light.

We suggest that Department may care to repeat its 2397 to Paris to Moscow as well as this message in the belief that Moscow’s comments would be most useful both in Washington and in Paris.³

Joyce

1. Document 322.
2. For text of President Eisenhower’s address, “Atomic Power for Peace”, made before the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 8, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 813–822, or Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 847–851.
3. Copies of this telegram were given to Secretary Dulles and C.D. Jackson on Jan. 8.