Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: “Arab States, Israel, Iran”

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington, February 10, 1951.]

Outline of Proposed NSC Paper on US Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel

the problem

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow towards the Arab states and Israel, particularly in the light of the growing tendency in the area toward neutralism and the decline of an attitude favorable to the United States and other countries of the West.

analysis

2. NSC 47/2, October 17, 1949,² covering U.S. policy toward Israel and the Arab states and NSC 65/3, May 17, 1950³ on U.S. policy toward arms shipments to this area set forth policies which should now be reviewed in the light of the material changes in the international situation.

3. The political and economic stability of the Arab states and Israel were determined in NSC 47/2 to be of critical importance to the security of the United States, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both the United States and the United Kingdom have as recently as October 26, 1950⁴ agreed that “the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Europe”. The security interests of the United States in the area are primarily:

(a) Political and military importance of the area in view of its geographic position with respect to western Europe;⁵

(b) Oil resources;

(c) Military bases; and

(d) Communications and facilities.

4. United States objectives in the Arab states and Israel are:

(a) To preserve and strengthen the orientation of the nations in the area toward the West;

(b) To create political stability in depth as a contribution to the stability of the Middle East as a whole;

(c) To induce the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities against the USSR and Soviet satellites; and

(d) To obtain the right to deploy, base and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the areas upon threat of and during general hostilities, and to lay the political ground for us to regain access to the territories of the nations of the area in event of their loss during general hostilities.⁶

5. The increasing belief, particularly in the Arab states, that the U.S. will not help the countries to prepare to defend themselves, is producing marked political disaffection and deterioration. The risk is increasing that important areas will swing away from the West toward neutrality, or even toward the U.S.S.R. It is important that this adverse trend be halted.

6. It is now in the interest of the U.S. that the U.K. maintain primary responsibility in the Arab states, other than Saudi Arabia, and Israel. However, the political influence of the U.K. in the area is declining and appropriate cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. would be in our mutual interest.⁷

7. The indigenous defenses in the Arab states and Israel can be increased through relatively small US and UK efforts in the area.⁸

8. If the Arab states and Israel do not become oriented toward the West during the cold war period, it is doubtful that the support of these countries could be obtained during a global war or regained after the war.⁹

conclusions

9. It is in our interest to maximize the will of the governments and peoples in the Arab states and Israel to cooperate with the West in resistance to the U.S.S.R. both now and in the event of war; to translate that will into indigenous efforts to strengthen internal security to resist the Soviet advance to grant the western powers necessary military rights therein; and, if the area is nevertheless overrun, to harass and sabotage the invader and to assist in liberation.

10.¹⁰ Steps should be taken on a combined U.K.–U.S. politico-military level to clarify the role of the U.S. and the U.K. in strengthening the Arab states and Israel.

11. Following agreements reached in the discussions held in accordance above paragraph 10. The U.K. and the U.S. should, on a coordinated basis undertake and accelerate the following measures with respect to the Arab States, excluding Saudi Arabia.¹¹

(a) Obtaining the right to deploy, base, and operate forces in the territories of the nations of the area upon threat of and during general hostilities;

(b) Development of fighting groups and techniques which are best suited to local capabilities and terrain;

(c) Initiating limited arms supply programs, required to achieve (a), to certain of the Arab states and Israel by early delivery of token quantities;

(d) Furnishing on request small U.S. advisory groups and individual service technicians, and consider requests for training for local military personnel in U.S. and U.K. schools;

(e) Making, in agreement with local governments, “show-the-flag” visits by air force planes and naval vessels; and

(f) Placing of orders in local industries for needed raw materials and war materials.

12. The United States should unilaterally for Saudi Arabia and Israel undertake and accelerate all of the measures listed under paragraph 11 above, such actions to be without prejudice to measures otherwise arranged with or contemplated for these two states. In this connection the United States should keep the United Kingdom informed, as appropriate, regarding measures taken with respect to Saudi Arabia and Israel.¹²

13. Subject to the enactment by the Congress of legislation providing military assistance for Middle East States other than Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran during fiscal year 1952, appropriate authorities of the United States should develop the necessary arms supply programs in consonance therewith in order that immediate military assistance to the ground forces of the Arab States and Israel may be provided if the need for such assistance becomes urgent.

14. The United States should undertake and accelerate technical and economic assistance¹³ that will help convince the peoples of the Arab States and Israel that they will benefit as individuals as well as States, from the victory of the West.¹⁴

1. This paper was drafted by Kopper (NEA/NE). The source text is labeled “Revision No. 1”, and it bears a covering sheet, dated February 12 which reads as follows:

   “The attached revision of the proposed NSC paper on U.S. policy toward the Arab States and Israel contains suggestions informally received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The paper as revised has NEA’s complete approval. It is hoped that it can be presented to the NSC at the end of this week. Please let me have any comments you desire to make by Wednesday afternoon, February 14.”

   The source text appears to be the copy submitted to Bishop (S/A). Other copies may have gone to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Berry and Frank Nash, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. For the later version of this paper submitted to the National Security Council on February 28, see p. 88. The original version of this paper is included in the McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: “Military Assistance”.

2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 1430.
3. For text, see ibid., 1950, vol. v, p. 163.
4. For documentation on the talks under reference, see ibid., pp. 233 ff.
5. The words “Africa and European and Asiatic Russia” were included in the original version of this paper.
6. The original version contained the following sentence at the close of paragraph 4 (d): “Our actions until now have not been sufficiently positive to achieve these objectives.”
7. Paragraph 6 of the original version reads: “It is now in the interest of the U.S. that the U.K. maintain primary military responsibility in Israel and the Arab states, other than Saudi Arabia. Although the political influence of the U.K. in the area has been declining in certain parts of the area, it is nevertheless still stronger than that of any other country in other parts, and it is in our mutual interest that there be cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. in order that the maximum benefit may be derived from our respective efforts in the area. The JCS has submitted a program involving [$]76,000,000 cash reimbursable assistance to Saudi Arabia. Therefore primary military responsibility for that area should rest with the U.S. but there should nevertheless, be coordination with the U.K. The Israeli Government is aware that the U.K. has primary military responsibility with regard to the area in the environs of Israel.”
8. The original version contains the added phrase: “particularly in the difficult terrain of the Arabian peninsula where American operated desert facilities, engineering equipment and American experience already exist.”
9. The original version contains a brief paragraph (9) at this point which reads: “Retention and use of even a part of Middle East oil production or even delayed loss of it would contribute importantly and perhaps critically to an allied war effort.”
10. In the original version, this paragraph begins with the following words: “Taking cognizance of the fact that it is in the US interest that the United Kingdom have primary military responsibility for Israel and the Arab states excepting Saudi Arabia”.
11. The original version of this paragraph substitutes the word “All” for “Following” in the opening phrase, and the words “Arab states and Israel” for “the Arab States, excluding Saudi Arabia” in the final phrase.
12. This paragraph not in original version.
13. Original version contains at this point the added phrase: “coordinated with action in para 13 above”.
14. Original version contains a paragraph 15 which reads: “The U.S. should accelerate the developments of its information program in the Arab states and Israel”.