611.86/2–1251
Memorandum by Robert A. Thayer of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Deputy Director of That Office (Kopper)
Subject: Proposed NSC Paper on U.S. Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel
I have the following comments in regard to your paper.1
(1) The “sphere of influence” concept of letting the U.K. have primary responsibility in the Arab states while the U.S. devotes itself in particular to assisting Saudi Arabia and Israel seems to play into the hands of those Arabs who for their own reasons wish to continue to make political capital out of U.S. “favoritism” for Israel. The effectiveness of any program based upon this concept would appear to be in doubt without continuous coordination between the U.S. and the U.K. on the operating level. Certainly the self defense of the area must become mutual if it is to be a significant factor. To what extent will the U.S. and the British programs reflect different techniques, different weapons, etc.? If one assumes that the area as a whole must be defended and that the U.S. and the U.K. must cooperate in affecting this, what is the reason for continuing the “sphere of influence” concept with its air of colonialism? I do not understand the reasons which lead us to advocate this policy.
(2) I would like to suggest a clarification of the security interests of the U.S. as set forth in the paper. Does not (a) really mean that the area is important in terms of oil and in terms of transport and communications? The area is vital in that it lies across air and shipping routes between Europe and Asia. I suggest also that the area provides access to the continent of Africa which in turn is so important as a source of strategic and other raw materials. I would suggest spelling out (d) to read “The security of air and surface transport and communications routes and facilities.” If possible, I think you might be specific in this regard in referring to (a) air routes to and from South Asia and the Far East lying across the area as well as the facilities needed to support them; (b) dependence of shipping routes upon the Suez Canal; (c) importance of the Near East in enemy hands as a base for attacks upon these routes and facilities.
(3) No mention is made in the paper of what measures, if any, are to be taken to prevent the Arabs and Israel from using the arms received against one another. This becomes of particular significance if the “sphere of influence” concept is applied in that it may place the U.S. and U.K. in competition to meet demands on the part of the Near [Page 49] Eastern States for arms intended to be used perhaps for purposes other than to resist aggression from the north.
(4) Lastly, while I recognize that arms aid could bring important political benefits in terms of our interests, it seems to me that arms aid will be to a large extent2 pouring critical material down the rat hole unless you have training programs as well as control over the use to which the arms will be put. This country gave a vast amount of material assistance to China to no avail, largely because the Chinese did not have either the knowledge, skill or will to put those arms to effective use. I suggest therefore that if we are to go into an arms aid program for the Near East that it should be an effective one designed to insure that the aid will be properly utilized. Otherwise such aid will in no way deter Soviet aggression and will merely result in a matériel loss to the West. In this sense a small program might be useless and wasteful while a larger well conceived organized program might bring the results intended.