780.5/2–1051: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State
4370. Following emerged from meeting February 6 Palmer and Jones with Foreign Office representatives under Bowker chairmanship:
1. FonOff deeply concerned re problem providing defense for Arab States and Israel as well as by deep fears pervading NE countries that west disinterested their fate and prepared to do little or nothing to save them. FonOff believes this anxiety provides fertile field Communist exploitation.
2. Bowker said British Government anxious reassure Arab States and Israel and to this end General Robertson has been making series of visits designed give each state picture overall NE defense problem, an idea of its role in event war and to render all British help practicable to assist states play assigned roles. FonOff and General Robertson believe “slow but steady progress” being made.
3. FonOff representatives explained demand for arms is loud in each country and supply of arms is considered gauge of western interest. UK faces everywhere in NE demands for jets and modern tanks which are not available now nor likely to be for some time. FonOff believes bare arms cupboard makes desirable maximum political, psychological and other means to steady apprehensive NE.
4. As effective political measure, Bowker put forward idea that display US–UK solidarity re NE defense would be highly desirable. He believed it would help if US would explain to Arab States and Israel that (a) US interested in defense of NE; (b) that by US–UK agreement UK has primary responsibility for defense NE and (c) in carrying out this responsibility UK has the support of US which will render all assistance in its power.
5. Bowker then suggested that following might be among other practical steps which might be taken to emphasize US–UK interest in NE defense: (1) top US military representative and top British military representative in each NE country might sit side by side with local military on committee organized for the discussion local and area defense matters; (2) “training teams” on which US personnel would be associated with British personnel. When requested, such teams would be sent to NE countries for as long as might be necessary to “teach them the job we think they should do in war”. Bowker said obvious parent organization for training teams would be GHQ–MELF.
[Page 44]6. Re nature training, FonOff representatives concurred idea that simple weapons probably more effective Arab hands than complicated tanks, jets, et cetera.
7. Several references were made to recent Malta convention1 from which it was evident UK hopes that ultimately US and UK military will agree on clear definition command responsibility. Specifically, re Arab States and Israel, British representatives indicated that program to increase indigenous confidence and resistance power must be conducted on coordinated basis under general direction commander assigned primary responsibility.
8. Bowker emphasized foregoing principally FonOff thinking. He said ideas paragraphs 4, 5, 6 above would be referred by FonOff to British service chiefs. He put them forward informally and tentatively now in light Department’s concern re deterioration NE political situation as result Arab and Israeli fears that they are virtually defenseless. US representatives promised refer his ideas to Department this tentative basis.2
- Reference is to the talks at Malta on January 23–24; see footnote 5, p. 28.↩
- In telegram 4796 from London, March 7, not printed, Gifford informed the Secretary of State that the British Chiefs of Staff would probably instruct Robertson to inquire of Carney at the Malta talks of March 10–13 whether there was a possibility of some U.S. action “along lines reported Embtel 4370 February 10. Admiral Carney informed.” (780.5/3–751)↩