Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

State Department Draft Minutes of Discussions at the State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, January 30, 1951¹

[Extract]

top secret

Washington, February 6, 1951.

Participants:	General Bradley	Mr. Matthews
	Admiral Sherman	Mr. Nitze
	General Collins	Mr. Lay
	General Twining	Mr. Gleason
	Admiral Davis	Mr. Tufts
	Admiral Wooldridge	Mr. Marshall
	Admiral Lalor	Mr. McGhee
	General White	Mr. Rusk
	General Landon	Mr. Jones
	Admiral Blandy
	General Bolte

General Bradley: We agreed to discuss the Far East today, but it has been suggested that we have a brief discussion of the Middle East in view of the fact that Mr. McGhee is about to leave on a trip to the area.² We have just received the State Department paper,³ and have, therefore, not had an opportunity to study it. I note that the paper suggests that the United States should make clear to all countries in the Middle East that the U.S. and the U.K. would give them assistance. One of the French officers here for the Pleven talks⁴ told me that he had heard of a secret Mediterranean conference on the Middle East between the U.S. and the U.K.⁵ He was much disturbed about this, and I told him that probably the conference to which he referred was merely a regular meeting between Admiral Carney and the Middle East Commander.

Admiral Sherman: Would it perhaps be fair to suggest that the U.K. may have deliberately given the French the impression that the U.S. and the U.K. were collaborating on Middle Eastern problems?

General Bradley: I think that is probably so. I know that the British have told the French about previous discussions with us.

Mr. Matthews: I also have the impression that the British give these indications to the French of U.S.–U.K. collaboration.

Mr. McGhee: The French Ambassador came in to see me two weeks ago to suggest that the U.S., U.K., and France should have talks on Middle East security problems. I did what I could to discourage him.

Mr. Rusk: The French have also approached me with the same suggestion concerning Far Eastern problems.

Mr. Matthews: The French are afraid that we will set up a Combined Chiefs of Staff with the British and will leave them out.

General Collins: I think we should take a definite stand that we will discuss with the U.K. matters of mutual interest to the U.K. and the U.S., and that we will likewise discuss with the French matters of mutual interest to France and the United States, but that we will not set up a global organization of the three powers to discuss all problems.

Admiral Sherman: I agree with that. We should tell the British and the French the same thing: we are not going to have a three cornered world outfit.

General Bradley: I think that we have got to take that attitude.

Mr. Nitze: If it makes sense to have an arrangement with the U.K. in the Middle East, I think we should do it and tell the French that we are doing it. We should not shy away from it simply because it worries the French.

General Bradley: We have got to come to that. Ambassador Bonnet comes over here all the time to complain about one thing or another. I think our reply should be, “so what?”

Mr. Matthews: The French believe that we are cooking things up every day with the British.

Mr. McGhee: I am sorry to take up the problems dealt with in our paper on such short notice. We have had discussions of these problems with your operational deputies. The paper stems from our growing concern over the deteriorating political situation in the Middle East. We have understood your objectives in the Middle East and your position that the United States cannot assume large new commitments in the area.

We have recently found evidence that the smaller states in the area are becoming increasingly concerned about their future and want some assurances about their defense. There is a danger that they might defect—not only in the event of a shooting war, but perhaps even in the cold war.

Nothing in the paper involves guarantees with respect to U.S. military forces. The paper raises no question of a pact or of guarantees to defend. Neither does it question the primary responsibility of the U.K. for the defense of the area. We would, of course, hope that the U.K. could get in position to exercise this responsibility.

Our principal objective in these recommendations is to make sure that our major investments in Greece, Turkey, and Iran are effective. I regard the proposals now before you as a kind of insurance that the investment will be effective. What we are after is not so much defense in depth as it is stability in depth. Turkey must not be upset by a defection in Syria, which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Turkish armies to fight effectively.

We fully agree that Turkey should be our major reliance in the Middle East. We want to give separate consideration to the question of whether we should not now increase our rate of investment in Turkey—and perhaps also in Greece and Iran, but we also believe that a regional approach to the problem of Middle Eastern defenses is called for. Such a regional approach is the objective towards which we should strive in the Middle East.

The U.K. has grudgingly accepted responsibility for this theater; but it has only 11,000 combat troops in the area and is planning only for the defense of the Suez Canal. It could not do much to help Greece, Turkey and Iran. We have recently had some questions raised in Athens between the American and British Ambassadors, because neither of them was clear on who, as between the U.S. and U.K., was responsible for Greece and what this meant. I think there has not been a full realization of the implications of British responsibility for the area. I understand your view that the U.K. and the Commonwealth should bring up their troop strength in the Middle East. I believe, however, that there should be some mechanism—some organization—for coordinating with the British just in case we may want it at some later time to build up forces in the area.

As you know, the British position in the Middle East rests on treaties with a number of the Middle East countries, the treaties with Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. Lately, the British have been under strong criticism and attack because of certain of these treaties. They admit they must give way to the strong nationalist sentiments, particularly in Egypt. It is very difficult for them to get the cooperation of the Arab States. This cooperation would be much easier to obtain if the United States could participate in coordinated activities along the lines suggested in this paper.

We have to remember that there is no indigenous political basis for cooperation among the countries in the area. The divisive elements in the Middle East situation exceed the integrative forces. Therefore, if cooperation is to be achieved, it must be under the stimulus of external influences. The United States or the U.S. and U.K. could provide that stimulus but the U.K. cannot do it alone.

The people in the area are more and more concerned about their security. They have serious doubts about the ability of the U.K. to defend them. Not much effort would be required of us to increase greatly their sense of security. It would involve only a small amount of material assistance, and a few countries, really only Syria, Lebanon, and Israel; since the other countries in the area are already receiving assistance under other programs or are being taken care of by the British, as, for example, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. Only token shipments would be required from us at this time. These would stimulate hope in the area, and encourage these countries to play a constructive part in the collective defense of the area. It is perhaps worth noting that the Iraqis assert that the U.K. is holding back their efforts. I think that Lebanon—under the arrangements here proposed—might be willing to participate in the defense of their mountain chain. Of course, the forces which any of these countries could raise would be small, but they would be at least adequate for internal security. At present we have very large military missions in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and will shortly in Saudi Arabia, and are investing about $400,000,000 annually in these countries. However, we have avoided the concept of a regional defense system, and I think we all recognize that the Greek, Turkish and Iranian forces are not yet strong enough to be decisive in any theater-wide conflict.

U.S.–U.K. cooperation could be carried out in individual countries by our military missions to those countries—such as those now in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Our missions are now engaged in some joint planning. We are, I recognize, not in a position to exercise theater responsibility. What is here proposed is not a command organization, but rather a U.K.–U.S. coordinating mechanism which could be related to the defense effort not only in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, but also in Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the other Arab countries in the area. In time, perhaps, enough defensive capabilities could be built up to hold the mountain line. We all know the importance of this objective—it is not necessary here to discuss the significance to us of the area’s strategic position, and petroleum and the air installations. We need to retain these assets if we possibly can. I also think that the psychological importance of the Middle East is very great in world eyes.

It is a hard political fact, in my opinion, that if the United States does not make a determined effort to assist in the defense of the area, the U.S. will not be welcomed back to the area after another war. We have got to make a good show or we will lose any hope of postwar influence. U.S. participation in the defense of the area is necessary if only to regain our substantial oil interests after a war. In summary, we in the State Department feel that the time has arrived for more positive action in the Middle East on our part.

General Bradley: I do not differ with you on much that you have said. We have felt that it was important to be clear on the U.K. responsibility for the area. There are certain difficulties in an attempt to coordinate with the U.K. I would like to ask you whether it is your impression that the Turks are not willing to plan with the U.K. and that they would be ready to plan with us. We have a difficult situation if they are not willing to accept U.K. participation.

Mr. McGhee: That is correct; that is the present situation. I believe the Turks would, however, talk with a joint U.S.–U.K. mission.

General Bradley: We have, of course, had discussions with the U.K. Chiefs on those problems and have been trying to get together with them on our plans for the area. We also called in representatives from Greece, Turkey, and Iran in an effort to achieve coordination with these countries first. It is very difficult to persuade the Turks to engage in any planning with Greece and Iran. The Turks have a very simple mobilization plan—everyone turns out to fight and that is all the plan amounts to. We will get into difficulties trying to furnish leadership in the area and to persuade the U.K. to go along with us and to secure the coordination of all the other states. I am not sure how far we could get with an effort of this kind.

Admiral Sherman: With reference to the whole general problem, I think we should remember that the U.S. is the only country that is doing much in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. We alone have a position of leadership in these countries. If we turn leadership over to the U.K., they will get nowhere, and in the process will derogate from our own position. The relationships between the U.K. and the U.S. in Greece are very complicated. Norton has been on the sidelines and has criticized Van Fleet. Now if we talk about a U.S.–U.K. coordinating outfit in Cairo which would stand above the Greeks, that will make the Greeks very unhappy. So far as coordination of U.S. strategy is concerned, we have already provided that in some degree by the authority we have given Admiral Carney. We should strengthen that coordination—with the local U.S. missions coordinating plans in the individual countries and with Carney providing the coordination of strategic advice for the theater.

The question of responsibility and the position of these countries are not isolated problems and cannot be considered only in terms of the Middle East. All of these countries are also Mediterranean countries. In Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran, we now have soldiers in quantity. They are not only the northern flank of the Mediterranean as a theater and as a line of communications, but they also tie in to the problems of Western Europe. We have responsibilities through NATO in Western Europe. Greece and Turkey are now associated with the NATO effort and are, therefore, tied in with the Western European theater. Greece, Turkey, and Iran cover the Mediterranean and also the Middle East-Persian Gulf area. I find it difficult to compartmentalize these problems by arbitrary lines on a map. I agree that coordinated advice and effort on the part of the U.S. military missions are necessary. We can use existing machinery to improve this, and can strengthen the machinery for this purpose. Then if we were to establish small missions in Syria, Lebanon, etc., they could tie up with that machinery. I do not believe that this can be tied into Cairo. Greece and Turkey are reluctant to get involved with the U.K. in Cairo.

We should reserve judgment, in my opinion, on the degree to which Greece and Turkey and Yugoslavia should be tied into our plans for Western Europe, and we should not make any substantial changes in our organization for these countries until it is clear what organization we will have for the Mediterranean area in the NATO setup. We have a terrific organizational problem ahead of us. In my judgment, General Eisenhower has got to build from the inside out—from Western Europe to the Middle East. I, therefore, think that we should not try to do this organizational job for the Middle East now. I admit that this is to advise delay, but the time factor is such that the delay will not be long. It seems to me that we may want a close link to General Eisenhower’s command. There will be nothing but difficulty in Greece and Turkey if we try to tie up with the U.K. in Cairo now. I recognize that this line of thought will not be of much help to you (addressing McGhee) on your trip except perhaps as a statement of principles. I do recognize the importance of the problem. It is clear that we cannot commit U.S. troops to the Middle East when we are so short of troops elsewhere. In fact, the proportion of troops available to the need for them is probably better in that part of the world than elsewhere. For the time being, we will have to content ourselves, at best, with naval and air support in this area until we have succeeded in building up Western Europe and can give, at a later time, due recognition to the potential strength of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.

Mr. Matthews: Would you (addressing Admiral Sherman) favor small missions in Syria and Lebanon?

Admiral Sherman: I am not sure. I have not given much thought to that question. Let’s talk about France for a minute. As you know the Lebanese forces are all French trained. It might be politically wise to have relations with France on the problem of Lebanese defense.

Mr. McGhee: Of course, there is a strong feeling against French troops in Lebanon. They are not well thought of there.

General Bradley: Would they object to a French military mission?

Mr. McGhee: I don’t think so.

General Collins: The U.S. is now on the outside periphery of the Middle East. Greece is the bridge between that area and Western Europe. The Russians can overrun Greece in the event of war—in fact, they can do this more easily, in my opinion, than the Germans did. The U.S. has large missions in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. We are not in the center of the Middle East—in the Cairo-Suez area. For my part, I am very dubious about the wisdom of a military mission in Saudi Arabia, let alone Syria, Lebanon and Israel. There are two reasons why the people in the Middle East want U.S. leadership: (1) we will furnish equipment and pay the bills; and (2) in the event of war, they think, we will send troops and aircraft to the Middle East. We are kidding ourselves and kidding them if we do anything which indicates that we are going to put forces in that area. The forces to do that are just not in sight. This is a U.K. responsibility. The U.K. would like very much to have us take this responsibility, but it is a job which the U.K. and the Commonwealth have got to do. We must stick to the periphery. If that breaks, then, of course, Cairo-Suez is the place from which to run the area. If we take responsibility for this job now, we are assuming a responsibility which we cannot meet in time of war. I am unalterably opposed to putting forces in that area. I think we should reevaluate the importance of the Dhahran airfield. It just provides us with a way out. I think an alternate field on Cyprus would be just as good and perhaps better—we could use it at all times and it would also enable us to get out of the area. The Chiefs are studying the military aspects of these problems now, but we have not reached conclusions. For one thing, we have not yet had an adequate report on what the capabilities for defense are in that area. In my opinion, we should stay on the periphery and not get down inside.

Admiral Sherman: In reviewing this paper in my shop this morning we felt that the prospect of getting something out of Greece and Turkey was such that we should not agree to reducing their programs in order to finance other programs. General Collins thinks that Greece would be overrun in the event of war. However, what will happen in the Balkans and Turkey cannot be predicted far in advance—the situation there may change rapidly. In my opinion, we would be pushed back, but, even so, we might soak up enough Russian effort to make this worth while. I have been more optimistic about Greece since it has been possible to consider the Greek and Yugoslav problems together. As to U.K. responsibility, the more I study this question, the more I feel that when we speak of U.K. responsibility, we are just getting the responsibility off our shoulders, and are not putting it elsewhere. The U.K. cannot send enough to the area to defend it, nor can the Dominions. I place a very low estimate on the U.K.’s capabilities for this job.

General Collins: I do not disagree with that; however, low as the U.K. capabilities are, ours are even lower.

Admiral Sherman: I agree, but it is not profitable to think of transferring any real responsibility to them.

General Bradley: Well, I am not sure that I am in full agreement. It is true that we are just on the periphery and that we are in the places that will count the most, but my question is, “How much more would it take to send small missions to the other countries?” What we would send to them would detract in some measure from our effort in Greece, Turkey and Iran. However, it would tend to increase our influence in depth.

General Collins: My point is simply that in doing this we would inevitably assume more responsibility.

General Bradley: I think that is right, but it does not seem to me that we would be assuming much more responsibility than we already have.

Mr. Nitze: In the Planning Staff in State we have been considering the question of the priority which we should be giving to the various theaters. We have been looking at this question in light of the fact that we can by no means be sure that the Soviet Union is not going to move against sometime in the near future; for various reasons, it seems to us that if it does move soon, a probable move would be one against Yugoslavia. For the time being, Western Europe is protected by NATO—with all the implications involved therein. It seems to us that the most serious threat of future Soviet action is in this area which we have been discussing. The real deterrent to such a Soviet move can only be, it seems to us, the possibility of our reaction to a Soviet move in this area. This also gears into our consideration of Far Eastern problems. The question is what disposition of our forces in the Far East would be most advantageous to us in the event of general war. Therefore, we thought it would be useful to raise the question of priorities for this area as against other areas in which we have responsibilities and important interests.

General Collins: It is a far cry from Yugoslavia to Iran and Saudi Arabia. We have much more interest in our over-all position in Western Europe than we do in our positions in Iran and Saudi Arabia and these other Middle Eastern countries. The Army is very much interested in Yugoslavia. We can’t do anything about the Middle East, but Yugoslavia is a different story, and a more important one.

Mr. Matthews: We had hoped that we could get into a discussion of Yugoslavia at our next meeting.

General Bradley: However, when we talk about Greece we have also got to talk about Yugoslavia. I am much concerned about the Middle East. The oil there is important to us and it might be very important to the Russians, although they would have a great deal of trouble in getting it home. The Middle East is the gateway to Africa. If we lose Asia, which we seem to be in danger of doing, and lose Africa, then we will be confined to the Western Hemisphere, and that is why I am concerned about the Middle East.

At the same time, there is a limit to how many responsibilities we can take on. Our friends in Western Europe ask what, supposing we hold there for 90 days, we will do thereafter, and that is a good question. At any rate, we are committed in Western Europe and the Far East. We have just received today another new demand for assistance to Indo-China,⁶ and the Philippines are a big problem. This boils down to a problem of priorities. It is a question of priorities on limited supplies of equipment that worries the Army. Where is all the equipment needed around the world to come from? Perhaps in 18 to 24 months we could allocate some to this area.

General Collins: In the event of general war, Australia and New Zealand will not be invaded. They can produce good fighters—they have done it before and they can do it again. The Australian Prime Minister told me that the Australians could send some forces to the Middle East—he didn’t say how many or when. But they can do it and the U.K. has got to put the squeeze on the Commonwealth.

Admiral Sherman: I think the U.S. is going to have to put the squeeze on the Commonwealth.

General Collins: Well, I would be willing to join with the British in that.

Mr. McGhee: The defensive capabilities that we have been concerned about in this paper are those against an attack from the Caucasus out-flanking Turkey and striking towards the Cairo-Suez area, and those against an attack from the Dardanelles toward the Cairo-Suez area. As to the question of U.S. forces, I want to emphasize that our proposals will not involve the stationing of U.S. forces in this area or their commitment in event of war. I believe that the proposals should be regarded as an insurance policy which would protect our substantial investments in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Only assistance in the order of $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 is involved, but this assistance, small though it is, might be the cement which would hold this area together.

Another question altogether is the question of whether we should increase our effort in Turkey. It is our view that we should. However, the subtraction of this small amount of $5,000,000 to $10,000,000 from even the present Turkish program would be worthwhile, in any event, as insurance to protect our investment in Turkey.

I should not have used the term “United States leadership.” That does not accurately describe what we had in mind. Rather, it is that the U.S. should fit into this picture, in a subordinate role, and that the U.S. and U.K. should form an interlocking base for a regional defense effort. The proposals before us involve only a small effort on our part. They do not raise the question whether we are coming to the defense of this area in the event of war nearly as much as our present programs in Greece, Turkey and Iran raise this question already. In fact, what is involved might be described as merely a rationalization of our efforts in the area as a whole.

Admiral Sherman: Personally, I look at Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran not as an area into which we should put forces, but as an area in which we can find forces.

Mr. McGhee: I agree that our proposals should reduce the need for U.S. forces. It would be advantageous to us, for example, if the Turks would move across to help Iran in the event of trouble. The Russians will find that area one in which they will have very difficult line of communications problems. I know that I would not want to be a Russian Commander on the far end of a line of communications running back to the Soviet Union through country as rough as that.

General Collins: We can do a lot on this problem in Iran and we are already working on it.

Admiral Sherman: There is nothing more atrocious in my view than for the U.K. Ambassador in Greece to talk about British responsibility there because Britain has some kind of general responsibility in the Middle East. Greece is a Balkan country and Western Turkey must also be regarded as a factor in the Balkan situation. It is the U.S. which is carrying out defense programs in these two countries, and there must be no question of U.K. control.

Mr. McGhee: The U.K. is responsible in the event of war. That is the basis of our present agreement with the U.K., which was arrived at in the September⁷ conversations.

Admiral Sherman: I was not a party to any such agreement.

General Bradley: That is a problem that we should straighten out. I do not recall any such agreement.

Admiral Wooldridge: Mr. McGhee is right in saying that that is what the minutes show. Such an agreement was arrived at in the September conversations according to the minutes.

Admiral Sherman: Who wrote those minutes?

Admiral Wooldridge: I do not know who wrote the minutes. It was only my privilege to read them.

Admiral Sherman: We should disavow those minutes.

General Bradley: The basic trouble is the lack of organization in the Mediterranean area. This is a problem which General Eisenhower has got to study. He should determine what the relation of the Mediterranean theater is to his theater. Until this problem has been worked out, it does not much matter what we or the British say about the defense of this area for neither one of us can send any troops.

Admiral Sherman: We are providing assistance now and must do whatever is done in the event of war.

General Collins: We are also giving assistance to Iran.

Mr. McGhee: The question is who is responsible.

General Collins: We are responsible initially. Neither we nor the British can send more in the event of war.

Mr. McGhee: It does seem necessary to have some kind of a theater command.

General Collins: The U.K. has got to be responsible for the over-all position in the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: This is largely a question of definition. The Middle East does not include Greece, the Dardanelles, and Western Turkey.

Mr. McGhee: But I think you will agree that Turkey has to be included in the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: No, I think Turkey has to be divided for planning purposes. It is a big country, and it borders on the Mediterranean and it borders on the Middle East. It is just like the United States which has Atlantic and Pacific frontiers. We should confine our discussion of the Middle East to an area which excludes Greece and we should hold Turkey in abeyance for the time being. Western Turkey is not in the Middle East and Eastern Turkey is. Turkey has to be fitted into both areas.

General Collins: From the standpoint of the Turkish army, Turkey is a part of the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: Yes, but we cannot dissociate Turkey from the Mediterranean theater.

General Collins: In the event of trouble, the Turkish army will have to pull out from European Turkey almost at once. It can probably hold the Gallipoli Peninsula for a while and deny the Dardanelles for a while. Then it will fall back into South Eastern Turkey. It will be under constant threat of a flanking movement in that area.

Mr. McGhee: Yes, an attack aimed at Cairo-Suez around Turkey.

General Collins: The Turks will fight and they should be of considerable help. We should persuade the Turks and the Iranians to do some joint planning. The Iranian mountains are really just an eastward extension of the mountains in Eastern Turkey. Evans in Tehran and Arnold in Ankara are stressing this need for joint planning to the Iranians and the Turks, and they were not unreceptive to the idea.

Mr. McGhee: One reason for our proposals is that at the time we were considering the Turkish request to join NATO, it was thought that an extension of NATO to this area would place excessive requirements and organizational problems on NATO. If this is true, the same reasoning would apply to extension of NATO to the land defense of the Middle East.

Admiral Sherman: I recall that the U.K. was urging us to regard Tripolitania as a part of the Middle East. We took a dim view of that. It is too far west.

Mr. McGhee: I do want to emphasize that these countries in the Middle East will not be willing to wait long for a rationalization of their defense problems.

Admiral Sherman: We have been talking about the facts of life in the event of war. It seems to me that we should separate these problems into two groups: (1) the problems we will encounter in the period of the cold war, such as the maintenance of stability in the area; and (2) the problems of defense in the event of a shooting war. This is a very delicate line to walk. Our job in dealing with these countries is to keep them on the rails now without giving them definite commitments at this time about what we can do for them in the event of war.

Mr. McGhee: I agree. It is our view that we cannot hold our position in the cold war much longer without more action. A little extra effort at this time would be well worth while in terms of our cold war problem. It is feared that our actions would imply commitment to come to the defense of the area, and we should keep in mind the degree to which we are already committed by our large programs in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The additional proposals and the small effort they involve would not increase our commitments.

General Bradley: As I understand your position, it is to send them a little more assistance, to establish some small missions, to give them some places in our technical schools, and so forth. That is one question. The question of U.S. leadership is another question altogether. Could the Army furnish men for these missions?

General Collins: If the missions were small we could do it, but our schools are already full and it would be very difficult to find places for officers from these countries in our schools at this time. We have got a lot of production started, and we have got to train cadres of specialists; that is what we are using the schools for.

Mr. McGhee: We would not want our proposals to stand or fall on the question of schooling, for that is a very small and insignificant part of our program. At any rate, we are only talking about 30 to 40 men.

General Collins: My basic trouble is not in the smallness or largeness of our undertaking. It is the psychological problem—the assumption of responsibility—the notion that the United States will come to the aid of these countries. We cannot do that. The U.K. must do it. We should not deal in illusions, but in realities, and we are kidding them and kidding ourselves if we take on such responsibilities.

Mr. McGhee: We are already running this risk by our programs in Greece, Turkey and Iran, and it does seem to us that we could make this small additional effort as a form of insurance and as evidence of our faith.

General Collins: I cannot agree. In my opinion, it would be an act of bad faith, not of good faith. I favor putting our effort into places where the people will fight, where the terrain is suited for defense, etc.

General Bradley: There may not be mountains in this area, but the desert is very tough, and in some ways well suited for defense. The real question is whether 200 men in Ankara will accomplish more per man than five men will accomplish per man in Baghdad. The five men might be helpful in developing the ability of the Iraqis to exploit the defensive potentialities of that country.

Mr. McGhee: I agree that the U.K. should do whatever it can, but we feel that the U.S. should do some more in its own interest.

General Collins: We have got to win the battle in Western Europe. First, last, and always, that is the big job. Even if we lose temporarily in the Middle East and hold on to Western Europe, we will be in a satisfactory position. Once the job is done in Western Europe, we can go down later to the Middle East and clean up whatever problems we find there.

General Bradley: Have we (addressing McGhee) covered all your questions? I do not want to interrupt this discussion, but we do have a lot of other ground to cover and I fear that we are getting into a range of questions which you would not want to take up in your forthcoming meetings in any event.

I think it is important to consider your proposals from the cold war point of view—the problems you raise are more a cold war problem than a hot war problem. The more solid we can keep an area, the better off we are. I can see great advantages in this.

Mr. Rusk: I think that we are “kidding” in Western Europe also for some little time to come.

General Collins: However, we should not water down our efforts in Western Europe, for this would only make the job tougher.

Mr. McGhee: I would rather give the people in the Middle East a few illusions at this time than to leave them in their present frame of mind.

General Bradley: Clearly, we are not going to resolve these issues before Mr. McGhee leaves on Sunday.

Admiral Sherman: Can we agree that we do not want to tie in with the U.K. in Cairo in any way, so far as Greece, Turkey, and Iran are concerned. Can we also agree that Greece should be regarded as part of the Balkans.

Mr. McGhee: That is difficult because we are operating on a different basis now.

General Bradley: This “agreement” must have gotten into the minutes as a result of a misunderstanding of some kind. Of course, I recognize that in the event of war the United States will not furnish a ground commander for this theater. That will be a U.K. responsibility.

Mr. McGhee: Isn’t there some inconsistency here? This raises a problem of coordinating our efforts prior to a war with the U.K. responsibilities after war breaks out. Some kind of preparation would seem to be necessary if our activities at present are to gear in with the U.K.’s activities at a later date.

Admiral Sherman: The strategic coordination of military missions in Greece and Turkey is the mission of Admiral Carney.

General Bradley: However, we do not have a theater commander in this area and the U.K. does. There is a problem here which needs to be straightened out.

Mr. McGhee: The coordination of supply activities and, in general, of economic support to these areas would seem to be quite a problem in view of the divided responsibility as between a cold war situation and a war situation.

General Collins: No one has any logistic responsibilities in the event of war in this area.

Mr. McGhee: Do you mean that we are just going to cut them off?

General Collins: We will not be able to send them any supplies.

General Bradley: I agree. Our present plans call for furnishing these countries something like two months’ reserve supplies. After they have exhausted those, they are on their own.

Admiral Sherman: I do not understand why it is necessary to have any discussion at this time of theater organization in the event of war.

Mr. McGhee: I am talking about joint planning activities. These have now been stopped.

General Bradley: The Greeks will be fighting in Greece, and the Turks will be fighting in Turkey. There really isn’t much of a problem of coordination, even in the planning field. Possibly we can help by dropping a few bombs here and there, but that job won’t be supervised by a theater commander in that area. It is hard to visualize the role of a theater commander in this area.

Mr. McGhee: There is a problem of coordinating what our own people are advising these countries to do.

Mr. Matthews: Admiral Sherman says that that is Admiral Carney’s mission.

Mr. McGhee: But, in carrying out this mission, no account is being taken of what the U.K. is doing in the area.

General Collins: We are advising the Turks about what they should do in the event of war. We have pointed out to them the need for joint planning with Iran. In the event of war, the Turks plan to hold certain areas and to yield certain others. The Iranian plan involves withdrawal to the mountains. At some time, in the event of war, it will be necessary, I grant, to make plans for the entire area back in Cairo. That is the only place from which the job for the entire area can be successfully done. But here we are dealing with couverture forces—the Turks are not going to fall back and defend Cairo. We do not know at this time what the potentialities are. The Cairo job in the event of war is a U.K. responsibility.

General Bradley: You (addressing McGhee) will not want to discuss these problems anyway, will you?

Mr. McGhee: No, not at these meetings.

General Bradley: I feel that we should consider this problem from the cold war viewpoint. I think we need an NSC paper on this. We have to get a governmental position. Of course, the cold war problem is related to the possibility of general war for we cannot make too many promises during the cold war period.

Mr. McGhee: We will undertake to prepare a paper for NSC consideration. I suggest that we take up separately the misunderstanding with the U.K. on the question of responsibility in this area.

Mr. Nitze: I fear that we may confront three types of situations in the period ahead: (1) There is the cold war situation which presents the kind of problems we are now concerned with in Western Europe and the Middle East. (2) There is the situation of global war. (3) There is an in-between situation in which we might face satellite action in specific countries or areas—this is not quite a cold war or a hot war situation.

Admiral Sherman: I think we should re-group our areas a bit. We should start thinking about the Balkans as an entity and not link them up with the Middle East. It may be wise to group Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey for planning purposes.

Mr. Matthews: The danger Mr. Nitze referred to may now be very close.

General Collins: The basic problem here is a land mass problem—what is the Soviet Union going to move over the ground. Greece can be overrun as it has been overrun before.

Admiral Sherman: We got into the habit of thinking about Greece as a Middle Eastern area closely tied up with Turkey when Yugoslavia was in the Soviet camp. Now I think we have to regard Greece and Yugoslavia as an area which can furnish couverture for Italy.

General Collins: I agree. The defection of Yugoslavia—if we can make the most effective use of it—can save Italy. I believe that our forces together with the Yugoslav and Italian forces can hold a short line in northern Italy.

Mr. Nitze: Of course, no one of us knows just how to assess the risk of action this spring. Some of our people think there is a 30 percent chance, some a 50 percent chance, some a 60 percent chance that the Soviets will move somewhere in this area this spring.

General Collins: I would be all in favor of doing everything we can before the event. I would be ready to talk about a mission to Yugoslavia right now. From our point of view, it would be an excellent idea.

Mr. Matthews: I hope we can spend our next meeting on this problem.

Admiral Sherman: The Navy would also like to see some action on the Yugoslav problem.

1. Drafted by Robert W. Tufts of the Policy Planning Staff. The discussion of McGhee’s paper (Annex, supra) on the Middle East comprises pp. 1–23 of the source text. Thereafter, the remainder of the meeting (pp. 24–37) was taken up with a discussion of NSC 101/1 “Avoidance of Extension of Hostilities in Korea”; for a memorandum of a portion of this discussion dealing with China, see vol. vii, p. 1566.
2. McGhee traveled to Istanbul for the meeting of the Middle East Chiefs of Mission, February 14–21 and from there to Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, for the South Asian Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers, February 26–March 2. For documentation on the Istanbul meeting, see pp. 50 ff. Regarding the South Asian Regional Conference at Nuwara Eliya, see vol. vi, pt. 2, p. 1664. A partial itinerary of McGhee’s tour through the Near East may be found in the editorial note, p. 49.
3. Reference is to paper entitled “The Middle East”; see annex, supra.
4. For documentation on the visit of Prime Minister Henri Pleven to Washington, January 29–31, see the compilation on France in volume iv .
5. Reference is to the talks at Malta on January 23–24 between Admiral Carney, Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Sir Brian Hubert Robertson. British Commander in Chief Middle East Forces. No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files. However, at the close of a second series of conversations at Malta between Carney and the three British service chiefs responsible for the Middle Eastern area which took place March 10–13, a letter, designated Mil/3039/ME, was sent both to the British Chiefs of Staff and to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This letter is printed, p. 94.
6. For documentation on Indochina, see vol. vi, pt. 1, pp. 332 ff.
7. Reference is to Mr. McGhee’s discussions with Foreign Office officials at London in September; for documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 192 ff.