Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: “WFM Mtg. 1951”

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret
[WFM T–3/1a]

[Washington,] September 6, 1951.

Middle East Situation—Tripartite Cooperation

problem

(1) To appraise the Middle East situation, and (2) to determine to what extent a Tripartite approach should be used regarding problems of peace and security in the Middle East.

us objectives

NSC 47/5 approved March 17, 1951, stated that the political and economic stability of the Arab States and Israel continues to be of critical importance to the security of the US; and that it is in the US interest to offset the recently evidenced trend toward neutrality (which continues) and to maximize the will of those states to cooperate with the US and friendly countries in resisting penetration by the USSR. The present US objectives are therefore:

(1) to strengthen the several Arab States and Israel politically, economically, and militarily. To this end there has been submitted to the Congress a Mutual Security Program for the Middle East;

(2) to carry out the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, and to utilize whenever practicable and desirable a Tripartite approach to Middle East problems of peace and security;

(3) without prejudice to our relations with the United Kingdom and to the states in the area, to strengthen the concept of Tripartite efforts looking toward preservation of peace and security;

(4) in collaboration with the United Kingdom and France to develop overall area security arrangements which have the general acceptance of the states in the area;

(5) to take due recognition of (a) nationalist sentiments in the area with a view to harmonizing them in so far as is possible with the basic objectives of the United States in the preservation of peace, and (b) the desire of the nations in the area to be treated as equal members of the family of nations; and

(6) to support UN efforts to bring peace and stability to the area including (a) the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); (b) the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), and the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO).

british position

1. The Middle East is an area of vital importance to the British Commonwealth and of primary responsibility to the United Kingdom.

2. In common interest of Free World, British position and prestige in Middle East should be maintained.

3. Willing to participate in tripartite efforts to maintain peace and security in the area, but strongly desirous of avoiding any arrangements which will cause any diminution of British influence.

4. Cooperating in present tripartite efforts such as: the control of arms supplies, the establishment of a Middle East Command, the carrying out of the Tripartite Declaration, and UNRWA.

french position

1. Believes that the Middle East is of great importance to the security of the Free World and that the situation there is explosive.

2. Believes there are advantages in using tripartite approach to problems of peace and security in the area. Attaches considerable importance to the value of the Tripartite Declaration and maintains that as a general rule initiatives relating to problems of peace and security should be on a tripartite basis since individual initiatives furnish opportunities to countries in the area to endeavor to exploit alleged differences between the US, UK and France. French sensitivity about their role in the Near East was highlighted by their adverse reaction at being left out of the Malta talks in the late winter of 1950–1951²

3. Has a special interest in strengthening its influence in Syria and Lebanon, and is anxious to restore French prestige in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East as a whole.

4. Cooperating reasonably well in present tripartite efforts such as: the control of arms supplies, the establishment of a Middle East Command, the carrying out of the Tripartite Declaration, PCC, UNTSO, and UNRWA, although its financial contribution to the latter is not as large as we should like to see it.

position to be presented

1. The US believes the general situation is such that energetic action must be taken to prevent this vital area from becoming dangerously unstable. We are taking steps both in the UN and in cooperation with others, particularly the UK and France to meet the problems.

2. The US reaffirms its complete support of the Tripartite Declaration. The US believes that this Declaration has made an important contribution to the strengthening of peace and stability in the Middle East.

3. The US wishes to utilize wherever practicable and desirable a Tripartite approach in handling problems of peace and security in the area. Nevertheless, there will probably be instances where it may be more satisfactory for the US, the UK, and France to act individually. This should not, however, do away with the desirability of the three governments keeping each other informed of their respective efforts.

4. The US believes that the growing importance of Turkey in the area requires that we consult with that government as occasion may necessitate. (NSC 47/2³ approved October 17, 1949, states “There should also be close United States-United Kingdom collaboration wherever possible to achieve the basic objectives. In addition, the United States should bear in mind the desirability of collaborating with France and with Turkey and other Moslem non-Arab states in the area for the same purpose whenever it is feasible and practicable”.)

5. US is gratified that there has been increasing collaboration between the three governments in handling arms shipments to the Near East. (NSC 65/3⁴ approved May 19, 1950 called for collaboration between the three governments and was the basis for US adherence to the Tripartite Declaration.)

6. We believe that it is essential that efforts to strengthen the security of the Near East, particularly with reference to training missions, supply of military equipment and the like, should be adequately coordinated through some mechanism.

7. In the establishment of Middle East Defense arrangements we believe that due account must be taken of the attitudes of the States in the area and their desire to be treated as equal members of the family of nations.

8. US hopes that there will be strong support given to the UN efforts in the PCC, UNRWA and UNTSO to bring stability to the area. We especially hope that their financial support for UNRWA can be assured on a ratio of 3–1–1/2 or 6–3–1 for the US, UK, and French contributions respectively, in order to give affirmative evidence to the Arab States of the willingness of the major contributors to carry through the reintegration program. The ratio is about the same as that prevailing between the three in their contributions to the UN regular budget. (We have recently in collaboration with the UK and France supported firm and impartial Security Council action with regard to the Huleh situation involving Israel and Syria,⁵ and in the Suez Canal restrictions question involving Israel and Egypt.⁶ In addition we are seeking to strengthen PCC, and UNTSO and UNRWA.)

1. A cover sheet indicates that this paper was drafted, and then revised on September 4, for use in tripartite talks at the forthcoming Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings held September 10–14, 1951. The source text was given the designation WFM T–3/1a. For documentation on the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings, see vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 1163 ff.
2. For documentation on French reaction to the Malta talks of January 23–24 and March 10–13, see the compilation on France in volume iv .
3. See Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 1430.
4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 163.
5. For documentation on the Huleh situation, see pp. 559 ff.
6. For documentation on Suez Canal restrictions involving Israel and Egypt, see ibid .