786.00/9–851: Circular airgram
The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1
The Department believes that recent events in the Arab world necessitate a reappraisal of the potentialities of the Arab League as a stabilizing influence in Near Eastern affairs.
There are quoted below for background purposes excerpts from conclusions reached by (1) Assistant Secretary McGhee and the British Foreign Office in September 1950 and (2) the Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul in February 1951:
[Page 179](1) “The Role of the Arab League in Future Area Programs
The United States felt that there was little possibility of taking action to strengthen the Arab League in the political field, but that it might be desirable to do something to strengthen it in the economic and social fields. The United Kingdom did not feel that it was by any means certain that the League would revive after the various shocks it had recently sustained. There was, moreover, danger that the League might develop as undesirably in the economic and social fields as it had in the political. It was agreed that it would be necessary to keep an open mind. If there seemed to be some chance of the League occupying itself in the economic and social fields, the two Governments might concert together.”2
[Here follow the conclusions on the Arab League reached by the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul, February 14–21; see page 50.]
In the course of the visit to the United States in late 1950 of Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the League, efforts were made to convince Azzam that the League could play a valuable role in Near Eastern affairs by fostering Arab cooperation in the fields of economic and social matters. The United States Government would seriously consider the possibilities of rendering assistance in the implementation of any programs developed along these lines by the League. It was hoped that the League, heretofore held together solely by virtue of a common opposition to a realistic solution of the Palestine problem, could become a positive factor to “do good” in the area by re-directing its energies away from the politico-military arena. Experience has shown that the Arab’s ability to work out problems on a multilateral basis will have to progress appreciably before these states are capable of coping with politics and military affairs on a regional basis.
It now appears that the League’s tendency to create and compound problems in the area is increasing rather than decreasing. The meeting of the League’s Political Committee in Damascus in the Spring of 1951 failed to take any constructive steps, and moreover fanned the Arabs’ antagonistic attitude regarding the Huleh dispute. There is little evidence to indicate that the League is more than a tool which Egypt and various other Arab states use for their own purposes. Egypt finds the League useful in maintaining its hegemony in the Arab world and in gaining support for its own policies. In the latter connection it is recalled that Egypt requested a League meeting in the summer of 1950 in order to obtain support for the position which Egypt had taken in the Security Council of the United Nations regarding Korea. Egypt also found it convenient to obtain the support of the League on the Suez [Page 180] restrictions question, about which the Security Council has passed a condemnatory resolution. This support will only serve to make Egypt more intransigent in connection with the lifting of the restrictions.
In the case of Syria, the League was utilized to obtain support for the former’s position in the Huleh dispute.3
There are set forth below two of the various alternative positions regarding the Arab League which are open to the United States.
(1) In the hope of seeing the League die on the vine, this Government could, officially and unofficially, give the League—including Azzam Pasha—a cold shoulder and encourage other nations to do the same. (2) An attempt could be made to convince Egypt that the League is of little or no value to her and is in fact a burden to her development as a major international power; this could be done by extending offers of special economic and/or military assistance to Egypt, as opposed to the other states in the area, and by emphasizing to her government that Egypt is a country of much more advanced stature than the other Arab states. This would deprive the League of its main source of strength and allow internal dissention to disrupt the organization. (3) Recognizing the usefulness of regional arrangements where common interests exist, further efforts could be made to encourage the League to concentrate its activities in the technical, scientific and cultural fields.
The addressee missions are requested to furnish the Department with their comments regarding the thoughts outlined above, together with any suggestions or recommendations concerning United States policy toward the Arab League which this airgram may stimulate.4
- Drafted by Robert L. Burns of NE. Signed for the Acting Secretary by Samuel K. C. Kopper. Transmitted for action to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman. Transmitted for information to London, Moscow, Paris, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, and Tripoli.↩
- These conclusions were reached after a discussion of the Arab League on September 21, 1950; for documentation on McGhee’s talks in London, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 192 ff.↩
- For documentation on the Huleh boundary dispute between Israel and Syria, see pp. 559 ff.↩
- In despatch 748 from Cairo, September 20, Ambassador Caffery recommended recognizing the usefulness of the League and attempting to encourage its concentration on technical, scientific, and cultural fields. Harrison M. Symmes, the Second Secretary of Legation at Damascus agreed with this conclusion in despatch 176 from Damascus, September 28, as did Chargé John H. Bruins in despatch 181 from Beirut of October 4. However, Counselor of Embassy Glenn A. Abbey recommended in despatch 117 from Jidda of October 1 that a blend of suggestions 1 and 2 might prove the most “helpful and productive” since the Arab League was not a constructive force in the Middle East as its Political Committee, which was its only active arm, “customarily” became a “mere sounding board for Egyptian policy and deluded speeches destined solely for home consumption, with the result that far greater rigidity characterizes the foreign policies of the seven member states of the Arab League than might otherwise be the case”. The above despatches are all in file 786.00. Throughout 1951, the Department continued to observe the activities of the Arab League, including the meetings of its Political Committee and the development of its Collective Security Pact without formulating an action policy. Documentation on the Arab League may be found in files 786.00 and 786.5.↩