Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: 723 Near and Middle East

Paper Prepared in the British Embassy¹

top secret

Washington, September 1, 1951.

Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East Command

The Turkish Ambassador in London has told the Foreign Office that as the Turkish Government had said in their reply to an earlier communication from the British Government and as Mr. Koprulu had repeated to Mr. Morrison at Strasbourg Turkey had already accepted the principle of her participation with the United Kingdom and the United States and France in an integrated Middle Eastern Organisation. There was no doubt about that. The Turkish Government would be willing to repeat this statement to us and to the United States and French Governments and to any other of the North Atlantic Treaty Governments, if they wished to put the question. Turkey was not willing however to take part in conversations with the United Kingdom, United States and French Governments about the detailed working out of this organisation until she could do so as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as Turkey became a party, talks among the Four Powers could take place; and those could be followed by talks with other powers such as Egypt.

2. In the light of this communication the Foreign Office have decided that some modification will be necessary in the procedure they had envisaged for dealing with the joint problem of Turkey’s admission to N.A.T.O. and the setting up of a Middle East Command Organisation. They have considered various alternatives and have come to the conclusion that the best course would be as follows:

Agreement at Ottawa to invite Turkey and Greece to join N.A.T.O. and notification to both countries that it was now open to them to accede to the Treaty, coupled with some sort of statement that they would be regarded as “members elect”. On the strength of this the United Kingdom, United States and France (if agreed among them-selves) should be able to persuade the Turks to join them immediately in conversations about the Middle East Command, stressing that they would take part in the talks in this capacity. It would have to be explained to them that the reason why they were not full members of N.A.T.O. was not connected with the Middle East question but with the formalities of their assumption of the obligations under N.A.T.O. etc. Meanwhile, they might possibly begin to sit in as “members elect” at meetings of Deputies and other N.A.T.O. bodies immediately after Ottawa if they wish.

3. This means in fact that the Foreign Office agree to the entry of Greece and Turkey into N.A.T.O. without attaching any “strings” to the invitation and that they content themselves with the formal undertaking given by the Turkish Ambassador that “Turkey had already accepted the principle of participation with the United Kingdom, United States and France in an integrated Middle Eastern Command Organisation.” In these circumstances the Foreign Office have in-structed His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara to make a communication to the Turkish Government on the lines of the Annex to this paper, which gives the gist of Mr. Morrison’s instructions.

4. The Foreign Office wish the State Department to know of their conclusions on this subject and of the action they have taken in Ankara. In order to summarise and clarify the position they have stated that the programme as they see it should now be as follows:

(i) The Three Powers should reach firm agreement at the Tripartite conversations in Washington on the broad principle that they will organise an integrated Allied Command in the Middle East in which they will seek Turkish participation as soon as Turkey has been invited to join N.A.T.O. and in which they will seek to secure Egyptian participation as a price for a settlement of the base and headquarters problems in Egypt. (The sort of arrangements we have in mind for this will be discussed in the forthcoming talks on Egypt in Washington).

(ii) At the Ottawa meeting the Three Powers will simply inform the Council of their intention to make an announcement of this kind and there need not be any discussion in the Council. We agree therefore not to press any further for the inclusion of Command questions in the Agenda.

(iii) The announcement would then be made by the Three Powers with an indication that they would propose to discuss the whole matter as soon as possible with the Turkish and Egyptian Governments and at a later stage with other interested Governments in the Middle East. There would of course have to be some preparation of the Egyptian and other Middle East Governments in advance. The form of the announcement would have to be very carefully considered in order to meet the various susceptibilities of the Parties involved.

(iv) We are prepared, subject to (v) below, to agree that the announcement should not mention the nationality of the Supreme Commander since the statement that it was to be a British officer might create an unfavorable initial reaction in Egypt and prevent them agreeing even to discuss the matter. This of course does not mean that we in any way retract from the position (with which the United States Government have agreed) that Supreme Allied Commander Middle East should be a British officer.

(v) We should, however, be obliged to insist on a public statement to this effect if the final appointment of an American Admiral as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic were to be announced. We would rather see the Atlantic appointment even further delayed than prejudice in any way the prospects of selling the Allied Command idea to the Egyptians.

1. In a covering memorandum to this document, Dorsz informed Matthews that the paper and “the text of a communication which gives the gist of instructions from Foreign Secretary Morrison to the British Ambassador at Ankara” had been handed to Perkins by Burrows on September 1. The instructions to the British Ambassador, not printed, were to ask the Turkish Government if it would agree to hold discussions with the Standing Group powers at the end of September in order that some sort of approach could be made to Egypt for the purpose of obtaining Egyptian participation in a Middle East Command. (PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: 723 Near and Middle East)