Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

740.5/8–2951

Memorandum by John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

[Washington,] August 29, 1951.

Outline for State–JCS Discussion, August 29, 1951

1. Middle East Command arrangements.

There is no necessity for discussing the substance of this question but it is desirable to clear with the Joint Chiefs the appropriate tactics for handling the command problem.

A. The British may feel that some announcement of the tentative command structure should be made in Ottawa.¹ This seems unwise because it would prevent adequate consultation with the Turks in advance and would inevitably give the impression that the matter had been finally decided and was in some sense a precondition to Turkish membership in NATO.

B. The State Department feels that it may be necessary to talk to the Egyptians about the Middle East arrangements in an effort to internationalize the headquarters in Egypt and avoid the difficulties of the present bilateral arrangements between the British and Egyptians. It will not be possible to work with the Egyptians on this matter prior to the Ottawa meeting.

C. The State Department also believes that the question of some form of board or organization to secure cooperation in the Middle East on defense problems should be established at the time the command is announced, and here again it would appear better tactics to have discussions, particularly with the Egyptians, in order to determine the most effective type of organization for achieving the purpose we have in mind.²

[Here follow topics dealing with Egypt, Korea, and MTDP force requirements.]

1. Reference is to the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council which met at Ottawa between September 15–20, 1951. Documentation on this session is in vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 616 ff.
2. At the State–JCS meeting on August 29, it was quickly agreed to discourage any effort at Ottawa to announce tentatively agreed upon command arrangements. Perkins added that recent telegrams from Cairo reporting a steady deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations had made it clear “that a premature announcement of Middle East Command arrangements might prejudice current maneuvers to bring Egypt to cooperate in a Middle East defense arrangement.” Matthews stated that the hope of averting a crisis in Anglo-Egyptian affairs “lay in getting the command arrangements established in time and in such a way as to satisfy the British strategic needs and Egyptian pride” (State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417). Documentation on Anglo-Egyptian tensions over the Suez Canal Zone and the political future of the Sudan is on pp. 343 ff.