740.5/8–2051
Memorandum by John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff
State–JCS Meeting August 20, 1951 on Middle East Command Arrangements
outline for discussion
1. It is not entirely clear what the precise nature of the proposals now are in the Standing Group. The paper filed last week by Admiral Wright1 contemplates arrangements under which there would be a British Supreme Allied Commander for the Middle East, with two Commanders-in-Chief under him; one of these would be the Commander-in-Chief of all forces in Turkey and the other Commander-in-Chief of all forces in the rest of the Middle East assigned to SACME. The Supreme Allied Commander would receive guidance and direction with respect to Turkey from the NATO Standing Group, and with respect to the rest of the Middle East from a Middle East Standing Group, whose members would be the same as those of the NATO Standing Group.
2. The State Department does not have any particular objections to such a proposed command arrangement but it is difficult to say now whether these arrangements will be wholly satisfactory to the other NATO members or to Turkey. Therefore we would urge that any agreements reached in the Standing Group be subject to such changes as might be necessary when discussions occur with the other NATO members and Turkey, after its admission to NATO.
3. The important points, so far as the State Department is concerned, are that it be clearly understood by the Standing Group and the other NATO members that satisfactory command arrangements in the Middle East are not a precondition of Turkish membership in NATO and that any preliminary agreement on the command arrangements in the Middle East not be handled in such a way as to suggest any U.S. commitment in advance of Turkish admission to NATO.
4. It is possible that certain French and British views as to the nature of the command arrangements in the Middle East will alter the proposal tabled by Admiral Wright last week. We should try to [Page 172] find out if we can whether Admiral Wright’s proposal has been altered over the week end by the Working Group of the Standing Group.
5. The other major point to be dealt with is the question of the Middle East Defense Board. It is the position of the Department of State that the Middle East Defense Board is a necessary concomitant of the Middle East Command arrangements and it must therefore be understood that such a Board would be established simultaneously with any command. It is possible that the Pentagon will resist the idea of a military defense board, since many of the questions with which it will deal are political. If necessary, it is suggested that the State Department propose that the question of the type of representation on the Board be left open until there has been an opportunity to discuss the most appropriate type of representation with the countries in the area.2
- Not found in Department of State files, but see memorandum of conversation by Dorsz, August 10, p. 162.↩
- At the State–JCS meeting of August 20, it was agreed to instruct Admiral Wright, the United States Representative, NATO Standing Group, that command arrangements for the Middle East could not be considered a precondition to the admission of Turkey to NATO, and that whatever arrangements would be concluded prior to Turkish admission would be subject to revision after consultation with Turkey. It was also agreed to instruct Wright to suggest consultations with the Arab States and Israel before any announcement of command arrangements was made. State Department officials also advanced the idea of a military rather than civilian Middle East Defense Board which would be established simultaneously with a Middle East Command, would be outside the Command structure, and would, in the words of Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, “be bait to get the countries of the area to do more.” It was decided to defer consideration of the proposed Defense Board and to concentrate initially on the establishment of a Middle East Command (State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417).↩