785.00/7–2451
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs (Barrow)
Subject: Future of Jordan.
| Participants: | Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel |
| Meir Shalit, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel | |
| G. Lewis Jones—NE | |
| John A. Waldo—NE | |
| John R. Barrow—NE |
Discussion
Mr. Eban opened the conversation by saying that apart from profound shock, the initial reaction of the Israeli Government to the assassination of King Abdullah was one of some concern for the future. Israel had entered into an Armistice Agreement with Jordan on the basis of its respect for the integrity of King Abdullah and on the understanding that there would be a certain balance between the military forces on either side of the border. This situation would be radically changed if Jordan were to be incorporated into a “great sprawling Iraq” with which Israel had no Armistice Agreement and which had shown itself to be very hostile toward Israel. If any such merger were imminent, the pressure exerted by the Revisionists in Israel would be greatly intensified. Israel would be somewhat less fearful of incorporation [Page 794] of Jordan into Syria because it had armistice arrangements with Syria, but believed that for the present the status of Jordan should not be changed. It was conceivable that some day when the political climate in the Near East improved, Israel would be able to acquiesce to some form of an Arab Union taking place, but from Israel’s point of view any step in that direction now would be premature.
Mr. Jones asked Mr. Eban whether he was personally sold on the thesis that unification of Jordan with any other Arab state would necessarily impose a greater security threat to Israel. It was possible, he thought, that there would be so many internal problems in bringing about a true coalescence, that there would be no question for quite some time of such a state seeking to attack Israel. Mr. Eban said he feared that one of the prime motivations for a merger of the Arab States would be the hope of bringing stronger pressure to bear against Israel.
Mr. Barrow remarked that assuming, for the sake of argument, a peaceful union of Iraq and Jordan were brought about it would seem to be the normal procedure for Iraq to assume all of Jordan’s international obligations, which would presumably include the Armistice Agreement.
The discussion then turned to speculation as to who was responsible for Abdullah’s assassination. Mr. Eban said that he did not think the rumors that the ex-Mufti was involved could be discounted. It was an unfortunate fact that nearly every Arab leader who had dealt with Israel in the Armistice negotiations had been assassinated—Nokrashy in Egypt, Zaim in Syria, Riad Solh in Lebanon, and now Abdullah. He said these assassinations did not all spring from the same source and the motives no doubt went beyond the mere fact that all of these leaders had had dealings with Israel, but this striking coincidence, if it was a coincidence, would undoubtedly be a strong deterrent to any other Arab leader dealing with Israel.
Mr. Barrow said that he admitted that the assassination of Abdullah made the prospects for Palestine settlement bleaker than ever but wondered whether there might not be a bare possibility of some gambits being developed in the present situation that could be used to turn the present tragedy to advantage in bringing about a peaceful settlement.
Mr. Eban said he thought that the only way the Arabs could be brought to make peace was by the Great Powers bringing strong pressure to bear, e.g., by the withholding of economic and military aid. Mr. Jones noted that leaders in Syria were making political capital out of renouncing United States aid and he thought any pressure of the kind Mr. Eban suggested would result only in a feeling of martyrdom and produce the opposite effect desired. On the other hand, the United States was trying to sell the “peace” line in virtually every [Page 795] conversation it had with Arab representatives, and he thought it possible that some day the cumulative effect of these efforts would pay off.
Mr. Jones remarked that if Israel felt obliged to oppose incorporation of Jordan into another Arab state, it had a staunch ally in Egypt who was just as opposed to any other Arab state gaining power and influence which might threaten Egypt’s hegemony in the Arab World. Perhaps now was the dramatic moment for Israel’s making a unilateral “act of strength”. The Arabs would all be expecting Israel to pounce on Arab Palestine or at least to play the dog-in-the-manger. If Israel would cross them up by taking a tack in the opposite direction with some “tissue-knitting” gestures, such as, for example, giving Egypt a free-way across Israel territory to the other Arab States, the wind might be taken out of the sails of those Arab leaders who claimed Israel could never be a “good citizen” of the Near East.
Mr. Eban remarked that the fallacy in Mr. Jones’ reasoning was that it contained no element of reciprocity. He was sure a rather imposing list of practical “tissue-knitting” concessions could be drawn up and set off against concessions of parallel value to be made by the Arabs. However, Israel could not be expected to make unilateral gestures without some reciprocal benefit.
Mr. Jones said it was the unilateral nature of the act which was important if Israel was to gain goodwill from it. Although admitting that Mr. Eban’s approach was the orthodox one, it was obvious that up to now it had not worked. So long as Israel gave the impression that it had an inferiority complex and had to trade off each little advantage for some reciprocal advantage, he felt the Arabs would continue to be intransigent. On the other hand, if Israel adopted the attitude that it was a strong state that was going to exist for a thousand years and that it could therefore afford to take “acts of strength”, the Arab psychology might be significantly changed.
Mr. Eban said that he appreciated this argument, but it was nevertheless a fact that Israel was pressed in by its larger Arab neighbors and said he thought Mr. Jones should put himself in the position of an Israeli leader trying to defend a unilateral gesture before the Knesset. The members of the Knesset would inevitably want to know what benefit the Israelis had derived from their gesture since the desire for a quid pro quo was a normal attribute of human nature.
Mr. Jones said that he thought it possible that Mr. Eban had indeed put his finger on the fallacy of his argument, namely that it would take a “super-Israeli” to carry out the policy. Nevertheless, he thought the effect of allowing an Egyptian leader like Salaheddin to drive through Israel on a free-way to Amman or Damascus to attend an Arab League meeting (even though the purpose of the meeting should be to condemn the Israelis) should be considered in the light of what a strong talking point it would be in endeavoring to convince people of [Page 796] the Arab World that Israel’s announced intentions of being a good neighbor were genuine.
Mr. Shalit remarked that he thought unilateral acts of strength on Israel’s part would increase Israel’s prestige in the rest of the world, but doubted that the Arabs would interpret it the same way. He believed the Arabs would think it a sign of weakness and an indication that the Arab economic boycott of Israel was having a telling effect. This in turn would only encourage the Arabs further to tighten the boycott. Mr. Jones agreed that this might be the snap reaction but thought the Arabs would start to wonder if the policy was continued. The concessions involved would not be very great; Israel could take full security precautions, and if the policy didn’t work, the concessions could later be withdrawn.
The discussion ended with Mr. Eban’s asking the estimate of those present as to how the death of Abdullah would affect the Vatican’s attitude toward Jerusalem. Israel’s opposition to internationalization of Jerusalem had been strategically less important than Jordan’s, and if a new Jordan regime were to take a weaker stand on the question, he wondered what the outcome might be. In after thought he said that there were some concrete economic and financial reasons why any Jordan Government would tend to oppose internationalization, and he supposed that Abdullah’s death would not affect the situation greatly. In this, those present concurred.