974.5301/7–2051: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations1
49. Dept appreciates thoughtful analysis urtel 127 Jul 20.2 In reaching decisions contained in Deptel 43 Jul 193 Dept gave most careful thought to broader implications SC consideration Suez Canal problem in relation to stability and security in NE and recognized that unpleasant prospects and risks (Deptel 15 Jul 7)4 were involved (which may have now increased to some degree as result of assassination Abdullah and Solh). We have always preferred that Suez restrictions be settled through normal dipl means and indeed we are still endeavoring through Emb Cairo to achieve that end. However, if Egypt Govt does not give tangible evidence in very near future [Page 792] that it shares our preference, we cannot see how SC action can be postponed much longer, unless of course reported lack of support for UK res continues. We feel that in cases where violence is being done to Armistice Agreements, either in spirit or letter, and where SC action is unavoidable, failure on our part to face up to issues can only have most damaging effect on integrity Armistice Agreements and our policy of impartiality. In addition price of Arab friendship on these terms wld seem high.
It shld, therefore, be clear that while we are not anxious for early, or even any, SC action, we are not willing exert pressure postpone such action if no legitimate reason exists for so doing.
We shld know in next few days whether Egypt Govt has any intention to “settle out of Court,” but in meantime we must continue assume likelihood SC debate some time in the next several weeks. Re this, reported lack of support for UK res poses most important problem. Deptels 175 and 43 emphasize that we do not intend to take lead in SC debate and we see no reason to change that pt of view. We have, however, indicated disposition to co-sponsor UK res provided certain conditions are accepted, and once we have settled with UK, and presumably Fr, on these conditions, additional support for UK res, likely to be attracted (we assume that since we have not yet agreed with UK, Turkey, China and others not yet aware of our decision re co-sponsorship).
In essence we presume that calling of SC mtg now depends on (1) whether or not dipl approaches succeed and, (2) mustering by UK of support for its res. At this pt answers to these questions are unknown but if response to (1) is negative and (2) positive we wld not be inclined to discourage calling a mtg even under US presidency.
In our view best time for SC to discuss Suez question wld be when Riley submits his report on Huleh wherein he wld presumably discuss Israel non-compliance with May 18 res. It is understood report may be made about Aug. 15. These two items discussed at same time wld demonstrate effectively US impartiality and basic concern over enforcement of armistice system. This procedure might also lessen possibility accusation US-UK requiring Egypt comply with intent of Armistice Agreement while ignoring Israel noncompliance May 18 res.
We feel that once SC debate has commenced it shld be carried through to conclusion with only brief delay if settlement outside of SC appears likely. Resort to methods of settlement such as Conciliation Commission, rapporteur or mediator wld seem undesirable once SC action has begun but resort to some device might be necessary. Re expedient of UNCFI procedure Dept believes that US wld run risk [Page 793] of being Israel’s nominee which wld compromise our position of impartiality. Resort to Kashmir arbitration procedure also risky as yet not tested re likelihood any pts between parties cld be settled prior to obligatory arbitration. Re rapporteur, if UK prepared to accept possibility delay and no concommitant guarantee of solution of problem, resort might be made to appointment such with short stipulated time wherein to report to SC.
Dept reiterates its view that US position in SC debate shld be based primarily on enforcement spirit and intent of Armistice Agreement with secondary attn being paid to adverse effect restrictions on our interests. Our attitude wld be governed by our understanding of the facts in the case and our desire to enforce Riley’s and MAC’s position and wld be consistent with our previous pronouncements in SC re Pal problem.
While we recognize there is chance Egypt might not comply with SC res calling for raising of restrictions we do not consider that our position shld be predicated on this assumption. Consequently, we are not prepared enter into discussions on sanctions question now.
- Drafted by Messrs. Stabler and Ludlow; signed for the Secretary by Hickerson; repeated to London, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Paris, and for information to Jidda, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.↩
- Ante, p. 788.↩
- Ante, p. 783.↩
- The same as telegram 40 to Cairo, July 7, p. 753.↩
- Dated July 9, p. 756.↩