Office of the Historian

974.531/7–2251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1

secret
Washington, July 24, 1951—8 p. m.

116. For Amb from McGhee. Wld it help you re Deptel 87 Jul 192 (Embtel 88 Jul 22)3 if I were to put raising restrictions to Egpyt Counselor here (Amb unfortunately absent on West Coast) on basis friends of Egypt recall Egypt’s high role in formation UN and dislike prospect Egypt being hailed before SC for restrictions which a) Do little if any harm to Israel; b.) Exacerbate Anglo-Egypt relations; c) Have resulted protest most maritime powers; and, d) Contribute to instability in area?4

I might make pt that Egypt’s voluntary compliance with spirit of Riley’s special comite decision before pressed to do so by SC wld serve [Page 797] as model to world including Israel of proper UN spirit and wld win Egypt internatl acclaim.5 [McGhee.]

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Messrs. Stabler and G. L. Jones and signed for the Secretary by Mr. McGhee. Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and New York; sent by air to Jidda, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman.↩
  2. Ante, p. 781.↩
  3. See footnote 4, p. 782.↩
  4. In telegram 106 July 26, not printed, Ambassador Caffery answered this question in the affirmative (974.531/7–2651).↩
  5. On July 25, Ambassador Caffery reported that Salaheddin had again expressed the hope that means would be found to end the Suez restrictions controversy without bringing it to the Security Council. Salaheddin stated that the United States, and only the United States, could take effective and pertinent action if it desired to do so. Caffery reiterated to Salaheddin that the only means to accomplish this would be to abolish the restrictions. The latter again replied that Egypt could alleviate restrictions considerably but could not abolish them. (Telegram 98, not printed, 974.531/7–2551)↩