Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

974.5301/7–2051: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

New York, July 20, 1951—7:12 p. m.

127. Re Suez, Deptel 43 of July 19.² We are concerned over several aspects of Suez matter which we bring to Dept’s attention as meriting consideration.

It seems to us that canal and other restrictions practiced by Egyptians are so inextricably bound up with larger NE and ME problems that action on them must be considered in light of over-all issues. We understand desired result, but result toward which we are heading is not clear to us since Cairo’s 62 of July 18,³ as well as opinions of Turks, French and other dels here indicate probability Egypt will not heed SC request for dropping of restrictions. Fawzi (Egypt) made very clear his govt had delicate problem with Egyptian people over question of country’s sovereignty. Govt of Egypt could probably not accept any council action of coercive nature (our tel 108, July 18).⁴ This in addition to what fears Egypt may have of Israeli expansionism.

Further to this considerable factor there are at least 2 others we should note. One is that, as indicated mytel 122 of this morning,⁵ there is increasing uncertainty that UK draft res will obtain majority. In any case our maximum effort will be necessary to swing balance with members such as Turkey or China to obtain majority, assuming, as we possibly should not do, that Netherlands del instructions to support British draft, as amended by UKDel, hold. We question whether US should be thus forced into lead. Deptel 43 of July 19 in para 5 assumes UK will continue take lead. Jebb yesterday in his emphasis on importance of US co-sponsorship clearly implied UK unable swing it without our “strong cooperation”, which is a euphemism for initiative:

We assume that if draft res does not have assured majority, SC debate on substance of res should be avoided if possible. Confirmation this assumption is requested.

The other factor is fanatical nationalism manifested in assassinations of Riad el-Sol and King Abdullah,⁶ which we take to be manifestations of wide-spread Arab hostility to West stemming from past history and creation of Israel. We wonder whether strong US role in council action against Egypt will not further stimulate this nationalist reaction.

We should probably add our view that Egypt may have its problem with UK as much in mind as its situation vis-à-vis Israel. Fawzi has warned that this will inevitably come up if Suez restrictions are considered by SC and it may be that the latter will not be soluble without some attention to the former.

Assuming that our immediate objective is to get restrictions lifted and taking into account bearing of above circumstances on methods of so doing, we feel that early council action on a res is not best approach either to Suez matter or to over-all problem. Following launching of SC debate on Israel complaint and Egyptian reply, we should like to see further and intensified diplomatic efforts, including USUN talks with Fawzi (Egypt) pursuant to his offer of cooperation reported in ourtel 108, in effort to develop possibilities of action outside of SC. If results are not visible within two weeks or so council could meet again to consider appropriate action, whether adoption of a res, or making use of UN methods of peaceful settlement such as appointment of conciliation commission (possibly on UNCFI lines) or of rapporteur under rule 28 as conciliator or mediator. If necessary, following effort of one of these two, arbitration might be tried along lines of March 30 res on Kashmir. Door would thus be kept open and Egypt would not be forced into position of intransigence.

A logical selection for rapporteur if this move should be tried would be Muniz of Brazil. His personal qualifications, his country’s neutral position, taken together with disqualification for one reason or other of most other SC members, practically narrows choice down to him.

With situation created by such council move, US would be free to exercise informal good offices behind the scenes, without constraint on Egypt imposed by public coercive aspects of precipitate SC action.

Dept comments foregoing urgently requested, since I have agreed to see Jebb and Lacoste Mon eve for definitive discussion.

Gross

1. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv; repeated for information by air to Ankara, Jidda, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.
2. Ante, p. 783.
3. See footnote 2, p. 772.
4. Ante, p. 780.
5. Telegram 122 from New York, July 20, not printed, reported on separate conversations with Bebler, Sarper, Quevedo, and Tsiang on the subject of Suez (974.5301/7–2051).
6. The former Premier of Lebanon, Riad el-Solh, was assassinated in Amman on July 16 following a visit to Jordan as King Abdullah’s guest. King Abdullah was assassinated on July 20 in Jerusalem; for documentation, see pp. 977 ff.