Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

confidential

[Washington,] June 15, 1951.

Subject: Visit of the Israel Ambassador

Participants:	Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
	Mr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
	Mr. McGhee—NEA
	Mr. Waldo—NE

The Ambassador called on me at his request to discuss briefly certain subjects and to pay his first visit after a rest of three weeks. The Ambassador was in the best of humor throughout and appeared well rested and far less intense and nervous than on previous occasions.

The Ambassador stated, first, that the papers on military assistance which General Marshall had suggested should be prepared were almost ready. He said he wanted to present them to me sometime in the following week. While on the subject of arms, he wished to mention a matter of some concern to him. As I knew, the US had been permitting Israel to purchase certain types of armament on the open market. Since the beginning of April, however, Israel had been unable to obtain State Department approval for any licenses for military equipment. He thought it might be as a result of the incidents of April 5, but hoped those incidents would have no permanent effect on the Department’s attitude. The Ambassador said that Israel was particularly interested in obtaining 250 light machineguns and certain spare parts for military aircraft.

I said that I was not familiar with this matter, and asked Mr. Waldo, who said that he was aware that action on certain of the licenses had been postponed, although so far as he knew no licenses had been rejected during this period. I said that we had never expected the Huleh incident would develop into open war and that we had no intention of cutting off military supplies to Israel.

The Ambassador stated that Israel was disappointed in General Riley’s decision on the Suez Canal matter,¹ but fully understood his position. It now appeared that the problem would have to come before the SC, and Israel hoped that it would be possible for some member of the Council, possibly the British, to take the matter up, especially since much wider interests than those of Israel were involved.

I told the Ambassador that we had constantly reiterated our position to the Egyptian Government, protesting against interference with shipping through the Canal, and that when the matter came up in the Council we would make that position very clear. The Ambassador was informed that there might be some difficulty if the British took up the problem in the Council. In the first place, it would be difficult for anyone except the Israelis to claim that the Egyptian action in the Canal was a threat to the peace and that, therefore, it was probable that SC action based on a complaint of a member of the Council might only be in the nature of a recommendation. The Israelis, on the other hand, could claim that the blockade was a threat to the peace and the Council might then be in a position to take more effective action. An additional factor was that if the British raised the subject, the Egyptians might well insist on raising the entire Anglo-Egyptian question.

The Ambassador said that so far as Israel was concerned, he would prefer to have some member of the Council take the matter up, but he did not care who that might be. It was agreed, however, that it would not be desirable to raise the issue in the Council during the Presidency of the Soviet Union.

With regard to the Huleh dispute, the Ambassador said that it appeared to him improbable that General Riley could obtain the agreement of the Arab landowners in the Demilitarized Zone and that, therefore, other steps would have to be taken. The Ambassador said he hoped these would not consist in a revision of the Armistice Agreement or the holding of a conference for that purpose as suggested by the British. He thought that would set a dangerous precedent. He preferred that the dispute be referred directly to the SC for its determination. I said that we would certainly consider the matter carefully.

The Ambassador then told me he had just seen Secretary Brannan of Agriculture and had been informed that the Israel application to the International Wheat Council for an increase in its quota had been approved and that Israel would receive a 200,000-ton increase in quota/This would save Israel about a million dollars a year. His government was very grateful for the increase.

I thanked the Ambassador for calling and told him we would study the questions he had raised with us.

1. On June 12, General Riley had submitted a report (U.N. Doc. S/2194) to the Security Council. His conclusions have been summarized as follows:

   “He stated his opinion that Egyptian interference with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal was an aggressive and hostile act; it was contrary to the spirit of the Armistice Agreement and jeopardized its effective functioning. He pointed out, however, that the interference was not being committed by the Egyptian armed forces and, therefore, was not specifically covered by the Armistice Agreement. For that reason, he had felt bound to vote with Egypt in the Special Committee that the Mixed Armistice Commission did not have the right to demand that the Egyptian Government should not interfere with the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal. He considered, nevertheless, that either the Egyptian Government must relax the interference in the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, or that the question must be referred to some higher competent authority, such as the Security Council or the International Court of Justice.” (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951, p. 294)