Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

320.2 AA/6–1451

Memorandum by the Adviser in the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (Tomlinson)¹

confidential

[Washington,] June 13, 1951.

Minutes on Consultations With Ambassador Blandford Concerning the Palestine Refugee Problem

(Ambassador Blandford, Mr. Gardiner, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Tomlinson)

Ambassador Blandford presented for discussion the following three papers:

(1) Reintegration Policy

(2) Problems in the Turnover of Relief Administration to Local Governments

(3) Relationship of Compensation to Reintegration

Reintegration Policy

The group agreed substantially with Ambassador Blandford’s views on reintegration policy which, as modified, are set forth below:

1. Reintegration is a process and a program whereby refugees permanently leave a temporary shelter and ration lines and move into houses and become self supporting.

2. Reintegration facilities may be occupied by refugees under permanent or temporary arrangements. PRA will receive documentary evidence of the obligations for the value of the facilities turned over to the refugee. Discharge of this obligation will be determined only after the refugee’s claim for compensation has been determined.

3. Reintegration facilities financed through international assistance shall remain continuously available for refugee use for the duration of the program.

4. Compensation payments due individual refugees shall be used to liquidate their outstanding obligations.

5. Reintegration operations may include:

• (a) Purging ration rolls
• (b) Transportation to reintegration opportunities
• (c) Placement in jobs
• (d) Individual loans
• (e) Loans to development or cooperative institutions
• (f) Provision of land, shelter and community facilities
• (g) Construction of minor works including access roads, irrigation and drainage ditches, wells and pumping

6. Reintegration operations insofar as possible shall be performed by local governments with Agency assistance along the following lines:

• (a) Suitable audit, inspection and reporting services
• (b) Technical assistance
• (c) Contractual services
• (d) Grant or loan of funds

7. Local governments shall be encouraged to establish central facilities for liaison with the Agency, and local reintegration authorities for field operations.

8. Reintegration facilities should not appear conspicuously superior to the prevailing or immediately prospective standard of living of non-refugees in the area. Within such limitation and economical use of funds, modern methods and equipment should be used to obtain a maximum of health and convenience.

9. Similarly, in the use and development of land for reintegration there should be reasonable progress toward better standards of occupancy and cultivation.

10. The reintegration process and program is heavily dependent upon large scale economic development programs by local governments financed out of their own funds, loans and grants. From one-half to two-thirds of the refugees will be dependent for employment and reintegration opportunities upon such large projects for water control, transportation and industrial development.

Problems in Turnover of Relief Administration to Local Governments

The group recognized that one of the most difficult problems to be faced is the turnover of relief administration to local governments. This policy was strongly advocated by Mr. Clapp and has been a policy for which the Department, as well as certain United States missions, have pressed for for many months. The Agency has also been searching for a suitable method to implement this policy. The following questions prepared by Ambassador Blandford are illustrative of many which have to be faced:

1. Should the Agency undertake formal agreements to finance refugee relief administration by local governments?

2. Should the turnover take place at one time or in stages—for example, education, health, relief administration?

3. Should the terms of financing be on the basis of:

• (a) A supplement to the local government’s capacity to contribute?
• (b) A percentage distribution of total contributions received?
• (c) A flat payment based on negotiations?
• (d) A fluctuating payment based on refugee relief loan?

4. Should there be a census operation? Conducted by whom?

5. Should the Agency exercise any control over the ration rolls or the distribution of its contribution whether in cash or kind?

6. Should the Agency finance on a declining schedule related to reintegration progress? How is this to be policed?

7. How is relief financing in one country to be related to reintegration progress in another?

8. Shall the Agency utilize the facilities of the Arab League for inter-government negotiations?

9. Should the Agency attempt overall programming and negotiation for the entire refugee population over a period of possibly three years?

A basic question which is implied above is whether or not local governments can be persuaded to accept this responsibility without a commitment on the part of the Agency or by the major contributing governments to furnish continuing financial support until reintegration has been effected. The group recognized that even if the local governments were to accept administrative responsibility for relief operations, the Agency would still be subject to criticism, possibly even more than at present, because the refugees and the local governments would be in a position to concentrate their fire on the Agency to a greater degree than is the case at present. There is a further basic question of how the Agency can exercise control over reintegration, if it loses control of the official register of refugees.

The group did not come up with any concrete recommendations for handling this matter but recognized that the Agency would need to explore it further and come up with proposals for later consideration.

Relationship of Compensation to Reintegration

The group concerned itself primarily with Ambassador Blandford’s suggestion that a study be made of the means by which contributions for the refugee program could be used for a multi-purpose political effect. Basically the contributions for the refugee program should be designed not only to assist in the reintegration of refugees but also in effectively contributing to a political settlement of lasting value. The refugees will not accept the proffer of reintegration facilities financed by the Agency as a liquidation of their claims for compensation from Israel. Israel itself cannot move forward in establishing normal relationships with its Arab neighbors unless it recognizes its obligation for compensation and takes steps toward meeting that obligation.

Would it not therefore be possible for the major contributors to the refugee program to earmark parts of their contributions as loans to Israel, but to be disbursed by the Agency as compensation payments which would be supplemented where necessary by a reintegration grant out of the remainder of the contributions to the Reintegration Fund.²

The group agreed that a proposal along these lines should be fully studied and elaborated with a view to making early recommendations thereon.

Immediate Action

• (a) Ambassador Blandford will seek the agreement of the Advisory Commission on the statement on Reintegration Policy. The statement will then be circulated to many areas for information.
• (b) Ambassador Blandford will further explore the problem of turnover of relief administration with the Advisory Commission and develop proposals for further consideration by the respective governments.
• (c) Intensive work should be done on the study of the relationship between reintegration and compensation with a view to coming up with definitive recommendations by June 22.³
• (d) A draft statement should be prepared for the Advisory Commission to issue in response to the Arab League note on the refugee problem representing the views of the Department. If agreed to by other members of the Advisory Commission, they would clear it with their respective governments so that it would constitute an authoritative reply on behalf of the governments represented on that body.⁴

1. This document forms the attachment to a memorandum of June 14 from Mr. Tomlinson to Mr. Gardiner. In it Mr. Tomlinson stated that Ambassador Blandford had agreed on the “minutes”. He mentioned also that he believed the statement on reintegration policy needed no further clearance.
2. A handwritten marginal note next to this paragraph in the source text reads: “I doubt [G.] L[ewis] J[ones]”.
3. No such recommendations dating from around the time specified above have been found in Department of State files. For the Department’s later position paper of October 12, see p. 903.

4. In telegram 41 from Beirut (Rapun 187), July 16, the U.S. Delegation to UNRWA stated in part:

   “At request Blandford AdCom has agreed postpone issuance joint statement for three to four weeks. This will permit director hold exploratory conversations during forthcoming round courtesy visits Near East capitals to ascertain whether NE states would respond declaration.

   “Declaration could then be issued as response to Near East views and as opening gun later negotiations relief transfer and reintegration program.” (320.2AA/7–1651)

   (Mr. Blandford had become Director of the UNRWAPNE shortly after his resignation June 30 as American Member of the Advisory Commission to the UNRWAPNE.)

   Department of State files do not reveal further discussion during 1951 of the proposed joint statement.