Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

120.4382/3–1551

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Washington, March 15, 1951.

Subject: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Middle East Chiefs of Mission Conference, Istanbul

The Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission, which was held in Istanbul, Turkey, from February 14 through February 21, 1951 under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary McGhee, was attended by the United States Chiefs of Mission in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Arab states, and Pakistan, and the United States representatives on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The conferees had the benefit of Secretary Finletter’s views on the air aspects of the Middle Eastern situation, during his brief attendance at the conference. Moreover, the presence throughout the entire conference of Admiral Robert B. Carney, Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, contributed significantly to its success.

The major recommendations arising from the conference have been the subject of separate action telegrams to the Department: (1) the recommendation for extension of reciprocal security arrangements to Greece and Turkey,² of which you are aware and on which NEA is taking further action; (2) military assistance to the Arab states and Israel³ on the basis of a coordinated United States-United Kingdom effort, which has now been incorporated into NSC 47/4, approved by the NSC on March 14; and (3) the recommendation concerning the desirability of bringing the policy of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company into conformity with our foreign policy objectives in the Middle East,⁴ which is being studied by NEA in the light of the present situation in Iran.

In addition, you may also be interested in the attached documents: (1) the agreed conclusions and recommendations of the conference (Tab A),⁵ with special reference to section I thereof, entitled “Strategic interests and roles of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Middle East, and the problem of achieving more positive cooperation from the area in support of United States objectives”; and (2) a summary by Admiral Carney of the strategic implications of the Istanbul conference agenda (Tab B). Since the latter represents in part Admiral Carney’s personal views, he has requested that it be given no distribution.

Upon his return, Mr. McGhee will give an oral summary of the conference conclusions and recommendations at the Under Secretary’s meeting.⁶

Tab B

Summary of the Strategic Implications of the Istanbul Conference Agenda by Admiral Robert B. Carney, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

I. Every element of democratic strength must be mobilized for the containment of communism.

II. The control of the Mediterranean is one single task of vital importance to the defense of Western Europe.

III. Every element bordering on the Mediterranean will play a part in the control of the Mediterranean.

IV. The potential strengths of Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia are important to SACEUR in that they would undoubtedly involve the commitment of significant Russian forces.

V. Greece belongs in a West Mediterranean region rather than in the Middle East.

VI. Turkey has a dual interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and, conversely, both the Mediterranean plans and Middle East plans must take Turkey into consideration.

VII. Iran must be considered solely as an element of the Middle East and cannot effectively be incorporated into any Western defense structure.

VIII. Division of MDAP funds between Greece, Turkey, and Iran should be on the following basis:

(a) Greece’s manpower is limited, her military potential is defensive only, and military aid should not be in excess of that required to develop defensive capacity to a reasonable degree.

(b) Military aid to Turkey should be the most extensive and should be predicated on the Turkish capacity for great resistance and the possibility of generating some limited Turkish offensive.

(c) Military aid to Iran should be considered as a cold-war measure and should not be in such degree as to benefit the enemy.

IX. Assistance to Middle East countries is desirable as a means of holding their Western orientation but there can be no universal policy as to cash-reimbursable versus grant-aid. Assistance should be granted on the basis of Allied or U.S. interests and reciprocal benefits should always be sought.

X. As soon as a Mediterranean regional structure has been determined, Greece should be included in that structure.

XI. The question of commitments to Turkey should be re-examined with a view toward possible satisfaction of her desires for association with NATO. It is possible that assurance of material assistance plus an expressed intent with respect to minor naval and air cooperation might be sufficient.

XII. Security discussions, at the military staff level, should be encouraged among all elements of the Middle East with a view toward:

(a) Developing sensible and workable interim coordinated plans, and

(b) Ultimate authoritative coordination by some collective security arrangement.

(Note: The foregoing represents in part agreed United States military positions, in part current British-United States military opinion at Admiral Carney’s level, and in part the latter’s personal views which currently have no sanction.)

1. Drafted by Mary E. Hope of NEA.
2. Telegram 305 from Istanbul, February 21, not printed (782.5/2–2151).
3. Telegram 287 from Istanbul, February 17, p. 76.
4. Telegram 296 from Istanbul, February 19, not printed (120.43/2–1951) and telegrams 303 and 307 from Istanbul, February 21, not printed (888.2553/2–2151).
5. Same as Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, Istanbul, February 14–21, 1951, p. 50.
6. McGhee made a brief report of his trip, not printed, at the Under Secretary’s meeting on April 6. He stressed the usefulness of regional conferences as a forum of interaction between Department representatives and field officers, noted the unsettled condition of countries in the Near Eastern region whom he characterized as “colonials in a transitory phase”, preoccupied mainly with security rather than economic problems, argued that “the philosophy of neutralism is predominate in this area and is a most dangerous condition”, and concluded that “Iran is the danger point in this area” (Under Secretary’s Meetings: Lot 53 D 250: UM N–328). For McGhee’s subsequent report on his trip to the State–JCS meeting of May 2, see p. 113.