Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

788.00/4–1051

Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, in Connection With the Visit to London of The Honorable George C. McGhee, April 2–3, 1951 ¹

top secret

London , April 2, 1951.

Participants:	Foreign Office:	R. J. Bowker, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
		G. W. Furlonge, Head, Eastern Department
	U.S.A.:	George McGhee, Department of State
		James K. Penfield, American Embassy, London
		John Frick Root, American Embassy, London

Subject: Near East Defense

Mr. McGhee outlined the latest US thinking on problems of defense in the Near East. Any tendency to neutralism in the Near East seemed to result mainly from a feeling of insecurity. The greatest danger to the area seemed to lie in the 18 months immediately ahead during the period when the West was gathering its strength. Therefore, our problem seemed to be primarily a short-range one and to consist mainly of restoring confidence to the countries of the area. We probably could not expect from most of them strong fighting allies and our goal was rather to build up stability and determination to resist aggression, to equip and train the countries for what limited military role they were capable of playing in defense of the area, and to establish the conditions which would enable the Turks to play their proper part in military operations. Also, we should aim to lay the groundwork and create the morale which would assure us of internal underground support should the area be lost to the enemy and one day have to be re-won. For these purposes, it would appear that we should help to build up the indigenous armed forces and to give them some sense of being associated in the overall arrangements for the area’s protection.

US officials had been considering recently what more our country could do in achieving the necessary sense of security among the Arab States and Israel. In this area we considered that the UK should have primary responsibility, save in Saudi Arabia where we felt that our associations indicated that we should have a special position. It would be unwise to advertise our relationship or give any suggestion of “spheres of influence”, but the problem seemed to boil down to determining to what extent the US can supplement British efforts. Between us we should try to decide what is needed to be done in each country and to determine how arrangements should be organized on an area basis. In this connection, Mr. McGhee remarked that he very definitely hoped the French would not insist in playing a role. We felt they had nothing to offer in this area and it seemed perfectly clear that countries like Syria and the Lebanon would under no circumstances accept the return of French forces.

The area comprising Greece, Turkey and Iran had to be dealt with as a somewhat separate problem. Greece did not belong in the Near East at all. Turkey on the other hand had a very definite role in Near East defense but might prefer to retain a considerable degree of autonomy in area arrangements. Its position as a link between the Near East on the one hand and the Mediterranean and European defense areas on the other was a special factor to be remembered. Iran was a particularly difficult problem. It was weak and Iranians were not good fighters; moreover it was beset with serious internal difficulties. This raised the question of the part Pakistan might play in Near Eastern defense, particularly in the mountain line facing Russia. The contribution that Pakistan could make was obvious and would probably be the decisive factor in ensuring defense of the area.

It now appeared to us desirable that Greece and Turkey should be admitted to NATO. Beyond this we had no plans for defense commitments to any of the other states. Even without commitments or guarantees, however, it seemed to us that if they realized they were part of an area scheme they would acquire a considerable degree of confidence. The problem in its details was a military one. It was merely for us on the political side to set the framework. We already had military missions in Greece, Turkey and Iran and were supplying them with arms. The type of assistance we now had in mind for the Arab States and Israel was to grant them some arms, to send out technicians, to establish military missions where desirable and, with the UK, to help in weaving the whole area into a coordinated defense plan.

The great complicating factor at the moment was the dispute between the UK and Egypt on defense arrangements.² Mr. McGhee remarked again that the critical period lay in the next 18 months or so while the West was rearming and that in Egypt the political advantages of an acceptable settlement seemed to outweigh the strategic advantages of what might be ideal arrangements from a military standpoint. We had earlier been encouraged by learning of the compromise formula we understood Mr. Bevin had suggested but now we feared the UK might be withdrawing from such a progressive position because of Parliamentary difficulties. Mr. McGhee had gained the impression from his conversations in Cairo³ that the Egyptians would insist on the withdrawal of all British troops within 18 months (although possibly they might allow a little more than this). We have always taken the position with Egypt that the removal of all British troops at this juncture in world affairs is undesirable, but Mr. McGhee had been impressed in Egypt with the extent to which Egyptian demands had become a political issue and also with the sympathy shown for the Egyptian position in other Arab countries.

Mr. Bowker said that the UK had very much in mind the desirability of giving to the Near Eastern countries a sense of partnership in defense arrangements for the area. The purpose of General Robertson’s recent visits had largely been to give just such a feeling. In most places the problem came down to a question of arms and the UK was very much limited in what it could supply. It would warmly welcome any possibility of coordinating efforts with the US and any cooperation or interest we could show in meeting the problem. The British were inclined to believe that the defense of the Near East was probably not possible without the effective support of Pakistan but realized this could not be won without providing Pakistan some guarantee against India. Mr. McGhee said that it seemed to him that what really worried Pakistan was not so much the danger of Indian aggression against Pakistan’s present territory as the possibility of a fait accompli in Kashmir.⁴ He had been wondering therefore whether it would be possible for the US and UK to win Pakistan support for Near Eastern defense by giving them some assurance that we would never recognize any unilateral action taken by India in Kashmir. Mr. Bowker agreed that this was a possibility well worth exploring.

Mr. McGhee went on to say that we were considering whether and how we might make some public declaration of US interest in the Near East as a whole. We had no plans to commit troops and such assistance as we might now be in a position to provide in the event of hostilities would probably be limited to air and naval action.

Reviewing the problem as it applied to individual countries, Mr. Furlonge said that the Iraqis had plans for the expansion of their armed forces and had been told to submit to the UK a list of the arms they required. This had been two months ago and the list had still not been received. However, the UK was encouraged by the resolve of the Iraqis to strengthen their defenses and was anxious to be of help. Syria wanted arms, but pretty largely on its own terms and no doubt to have them available for use not so much against the USSR as against the Jews. Lebanon was getting practically everything it had asked the UK for and had offered its fullest cooperation. Mr. McGhee noted that Arab hostility to Israel put a limit on the fighting contribution that country could make. Its efforts in its own defense would, however, be valuable and its cooperation in providing a line of communications was likely to be essential. Mr. Bowker said that on the whole General Robertson had been encouraged by what he had found on his tour throughout the Near East.

Mr. Bowker then went on to note that the proposed US policy which Mr. McGhee had been describing pertained to the assistance which the US might provide Israel and the Arab states. The UK was of course very much interested in learning about these efforts and sincerely hoped that there would be close consultation between the US and UK before any decisions or action in pursuance of the policy were taken. He understood that the US was proposing that in the next month or so there should be politico-military talks between our two countries and he wished to point out that the major problem which the UK would have hoped to work out in such talks was the question of command responsibility and the coordination of our respective efforts throughout the whole of Mediterranean and Near Eastern areas. This problem seemed to him to be a somewhat separate one from simply determining how the US might best supplement British assistance to the area comprised by the Arab states and Israel.

Mr. McGhee said that the implementation of our policy towards Israel and the Arab states really depended on two steps which had first to be taken within our own government; (1) obtaining approval of the Bureau of the Budget for the proposed arms assistance and, (2) Congressional authorization of the program. We hoped to be in a position to make token shipments of arms at the earliest possible moment. Mr. McGhee agreed that the initiative for arranging the time for the talks with the UK now lay with us and would probably depend largely on the progress in Washington in obtaining the necessary implementing legislation. He agreed that if the problem of command responsibility in the Mediterranean and Near East had not meanwhile been settled by our Chiefs of Staff, this question might be discussed in the proposed politico-military talks now under reference. He noted, however, that in Greece, Turkey and Iran it had been possible to go ahead with the military build-up without raising the question of the command and planning responsibility. Mr. Bowker reiterated the UK’s belief that Anglo-American coordination in the Near East was very much tied up with the question of commands and emphasized the UK’s anxiety to get an agreement on this issue.

In referring to France’s sensitivity at being left out of the Near East,⁵ Mr. McGhee said that it was obvious that France had no role to play in the land defense of the Near East and he and Mr. Bowker agreed on the desirability of trying to divert France’s attention to the Mediterranean.

Another problem noted was that raised by the US proposal to make an outright grant of arms to Near Eastern countries while the British continued to sell whatever arms they could make available. Mr. McGhee appreciated the problem this might raise but said that we had concluded that to achieve the proper psychological benefits, which was our principal objective, a direct gift of US arms was preferable to any other arrangement.

In summary, the immediate importance of Anglo-American coordination in arrangements for the defense of the Near East, and a determination of the respective roles the US and UK should play area-wise and in each country, was acknowledged.⁶

1. Mr. McGhee was en route to Washington via London at the conclusion of his tour through the Near East and South Asia that included the Conference of Middle East Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul, February 14–21 and the South Asian Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers at Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, February 26–March 2. See footnote 2, p. 27. McGhee had to come to London at the close of his tour apparently in response to telegram 5003 from London to the Department of State, March 20, reporting the hopes of the Foreign Office that McGhee would be able to stop briefly on his way back to Washington for general consultations on Iran (888.2553/3–2051). The source text was transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 5 to despatch 4832 from London, April 10, not printed. In all, eight enclosures were sent with despatch 4832 including memoranda of conversations between McGhee and the Foreign Office concerning Iran, Arab refugees, Palestine refugees, Egypt, Libya, and neutralism in the Near East, and South Asia, as well as a memorandum of conversation between McGhee and Gulf Oil officials and a copy of a British Foreign Office despatch to the British Embassy in Washington covering discussions between McGhee and Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison. For the conversations regarding Arab refugees and Palestine refugees, see p. 612; for the conversation concerning Egypt, Libya, and neutralism in the Near East, see p. 356; for the conversation on South Asia, see vol. vi, pt. 2, p. 1689. A summary of the discussion reported in the source text was sent to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Gifford in telegram 5247 from London, April 5, not printed (780.00/4–551).
2. For documentation on the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt concerning the British military presence at Suez and the issue of the Sudan, see pp. 343 ff.
3. See telegram 1001 from Cairo, April 1, p. 352.
4. For documentation on the Kashmir dispute, see vol. vi, pt. 2, pp. 1699 ff.
5. For documentation on French concern at being excluded from the Malta talks between Admiral Carney and Sir Brian Robertson, January 23–24 and March 10–13, see the French compilation in volume iv.
6. During the course of a conversation on April 27 with Lewis Jones and Wells Stabler of NE concerning British defense proposals for Egypt, Denis A. Greenhill, First Secretary of the British Embassy, stated that the Foreign Office was concerned by the impression it had received from McGhee in London that the United States valued Egyptian cooperation more highly than it did the retention of strategic facilities for defense of the Middle East. Stabler replied that such an impression was “not correct” but that the United States was “considerably concerned” about the lack of progress in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations (McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: “Egypt”).